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Trespass was an assault against property and therefore a crime, but
fraud was fine: fraud was practically a constitutional right, like free
speech. '
[T]here is no use trying to find villains, because the problem is in the
structure of the situation.2
INTRODUCTION
Any essay which begins with the words "against freedom" has a
heavy burden to carry. 3 However, the most important word in the title
is "commercial." There are good reasons to conclude that protection for
the freedom of speech of commercial entities should not excite our
tenderest solicitude-at least not as a matter of the First Amendment.
This is a position that may strike some readers as objectionable, not to
say heretical, because although this is not the first time the argument (or
something like it) has been made,4 it goes against the current trend.
That trend is to offer broader protection to commercial speech and
corporate speakers than has been extended in the past. And it seems
likely to culminate in a decision to do away with the distinction between
protected commercial speech and other speech protected by the First
Amendment. Such a decision would jeopardize the government's
ability to regulate commerce in the public interest, a power all but the
most die-hard of libertarians agree is sometimes necessary 5 in order to
I MAx BARRY, JENNIFER GOVERNMENT 120 (2003).
2 THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE AND
THE THEFT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 22 (2002).
3 1 hope to demonstrate that we can decline to extend what Steve Shiffrin has called the "free
speech pnnciple" to commercial speakers without fear of wandering into "the outer darkness" of
repudiating the principle altogether. Steve Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free
Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J. 689 (1994).
4 Many distinguished scholars have critiqued the notion that commercial speech and/or
commercial entities ought to receive broad first amendment protection. Among those writing in
the law who have had the most influence on my work are C. Edwin Baker, Daniel Greenwood,
Fred Schauer, Steve Shiffrin, Roger Shiner, Lawrence Soley, and Lawrence Mitchell. One of the
most recent critiques, although it does not predate the first circulation of this Article, is Tom
Bermigson, Nike Revisited Can Commercial Corporations Engage in Non-Commercial Speech?,
39 CONN. L. REV. 379 (2006) (answering this question in the negative).
5 Even economist Ronald Coase, who might have been described as a libertarian, or at least a
proponent of deregulation, see Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase
Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1211 (1991) (describing Coase as "a middle-aged libertarian"),
noted that governmental regulation might sometimes be necessary. R. H. Coase, The Market for
Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AMER. ECON. REV. 384, 389-90 (1974).
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discourage fraud, promote food and product safety,6 clean water, or any
of a number of other public interests which may not always be
adequately protected by the unfettered operation of the market. A
significant constitutional limitation on the government's ability to
regulate in these areas seems undesirable.
From its inception the commercial speech doctrine has struck some
observers as problematic on several grounds. 7 One of these grounds has
been that it is inappropriate to treat artificial entities as if they were
human beings. As Justice Rehnquist put it, "[t]o ascribe to such
artificial entities an 'intellect' or 'mind' for freedom of conscience
purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality."'8  In this article I echo
Justice Rehnquist's objection and others that have also been previously
voiced. But I add to these critiques some closer examination of
marketing practices and their ties to events in several specific areas-
business reporting, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, and others-in which I
argue that we are reaping negative consequences from de facto
unfettered speech such that to do away with the already modest
restraints on such speech seems ill-advised.
These criticisms have greater urgency than ever before because
there are some indications that the Court is more receptive than it has
been in the past9 to arguments for a fairly radical expansion of existing
protections to corporate and commercial speakers,' 0 an expansion which
might well have significant negative consequences for the public
interest in product safety, public health, environmental policy, market
stability, and perhaps many other areas as well. Proposals for expansive
protection for commercial speech are radical because they would
require a revision of our understanding of the appropriate role of the
government in the regulation of commerce and a substantial (not to say
6 In 2007 this became a particularly serious source of public concern with respect to products
imported from China: tainted food, pet food, toothpaste, medicines, and lead contaminated toys.
See, e.g., Megan Mcllroy, Mattel Hopes to Reassure Parents With Print Ads, ADVERTISING AGE,
Aug. 14, 2007; Eric Lipton & Louise Story, Bid to Root Out Lead Trinkets Falters in U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at Al; The Diddle Kingdom: Chinese Manufacturing, ECONOMIST, July 7,
2007, at 63; David Barboza, When Fakery Turns Fatal, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at CI.
7 Nat Stem, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV.
55, 83-87 (1999) (summanzing critiques).
8 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 38 (1986) (Rehnquist, J,
dissenting).
9 1 refer to the Court's decision in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). Although the
Court ultimately did not decide the case, instead dismissing it on the grounds that certorari had
been "improvidently granted," the concurring and dissenting opinions accompanying that
dismissal indicated that the Court (or at least the Justices writing), had largely accepted Nike's
arguments and was receptive to the notion of greater First Amendment protection to corporate
and commercial speakers. I have discussed this case in greater detail in an earlier article. See
Tamara R. Piety, Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike's Quest for a Constitutional Right to Lie, 78
TEMP. L. REv. 151 (2005).
10 Corporate speech and commercial speech are different albeit overlapping categories which
are described in more detail infra Part I.
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radical) amount of law reform. So I argue not so much for law reform
as for restraint, that is, for courts and commentators to resist the urge to
engage in law reform by extending broad constitutional rights of
expression to for-profit, non-human entities since, once given, rights are
difficult to retract.
As many other observers have noted, the arguments advanced for
expansive protection for commercial speech reflect a sort of latter-day
Lochnerism.lI And just as at that time the phrase "freedom of contract"
seemed to refer to a self-evidently untouchable basic principle, so today
does "freedom of speech" appear to refer to a self-evident good. It is
something of a legal trump card-once invoked it is often a winner. 12
However, a review of the theoretical and political justifications for
extending constitutional protection to speech by commercial, non-
human entities, and the structural imperatives of corporate governance
law, suggest that for-profit entities are not appropriate rights holders
under the First Amendment and that arguments for an expansion of
existing protection to commercial entities should be rejected.
The commercial speech doctrine, with its extension of a limited,
intermediate level of protection for commercial speech, is a doctrine of
relatively recent vintage. 13 It is the natural outgrowth of a slightly older
notion that corporations are natural entities, "persons" with rights
parallel to those of natural persons.' 4 The combination of these ideas,
corporations as rights holding "persons," with the notion of protection
for some category of "commercial" speech on the grounds that the
listeners were entitled to the information, led to the conclusion that
corporate, commercial speakers are entitled to broad First Amendment
rights. 15 Although it has happened incrementally, such a conclusion
I1 See, e.g., DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 381-93 (1997)
(surveying critiques by Mark Graber, Owen Fiss, J.M. Balkin, Morton Horwitz, Cass Sunstem,
Frank Michelman, Robert Post, and others regarding the use of claims for First Amendment
protection by powerful commercial interests much as claims for protection of freedom of contract
were used in an earlier period).
12 Professor Daniel Greenwood has called this phenomenon "First Amendment imperialism,"
the tendency for the First Amendment to dominate and colonize every other body of law. Daniel
J. H. Greenwood, First Amendment Imperialism, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 659 (1999).
13 See, e.g., Stem, supra note 7, at 58.
14 See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960,
at 67 (1992) (the natural entity theory of the corporation "was nowhere to be found in American
legal thought" in 1886 and only emerged a decade later).
15 ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY 257-59 (2000). I am making
this claim, as I think McChesney does, on the basis that the idea of corporate personhood makes
rights seem "natural," a natural outgrowth of the principle, albeit not a necessary one (as I argue
further below) or an inevitable one. The case law, however, does not explicitly rely on this
argument. See Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863 (2007). 1 agree with Professor Winkler that the problem in this area is
largely one of corporate governance and that large corporations would find a way to influence
government with or without the legal fiction of personhood. Id. at 872-73. But I think he
underestimates the power of the metaphor to influence thought and to make the constitutional
[Vol. 29:62586
AGAINST FREEDOM
represents a fairly dramatic revision of the understanding of what are
the appropriate boundaries between protection for speech and the
government's ability to regulate commerce.
Before the latter half of the twentieth century there was little
examination of the question of whether speech in aid of transacting
business was protected by the First Amendment. Commerce and speech
were largely viewed as separate categories, notwithstanding that
commerce, like any other life activity, is often conducted with the
assistance of speech and despite the fact that First Amendment
protection for expressive activity is not limited to protection for words.
The late 19th and early 20th century saw many legislative attempts to
deal with what might be called market failures in the wake of
industrialization. Among these attempts were the antitrust and labor
laws of the early twentieth century and the reforms of Roosevelt's New
Deal. These attempts to respond to the political and social problems
arising from commerce were met with objections that they violated
freedom of contract and interfered with property rights. Ultimately
these objections were overcome, ushering in, for better or for worse, the
era of the administrative or regulatory state. However, the objections
did not go away, they simply changed shape and resurfaced in claims
for protection under the First Amendment.
Today many attempts to regulate commerce meet with First
Amendment objections. And even areas previously thought to be
appropriately regulated have been newly attacked on First Amendment
grounds. 16 The argument is that if corporations are appropriate speakers
and commerce is a subject worthy of protection under the First
Amendment, then there is no intellectually respectable basis for an
intermediate level of protection for commercial speech and speakers and
so such speech and speakers should receive the full protection afforded
to expressive and political speech under the First Amendment.
However, if the most extreme form of this argument is adopted it may
have serious implications for the government's ability to regulate in the
public interest, which may in turn have negative social consequences for
health, safety, and general welfare. One need not assume regulation is
invariably better than market mechanisms to deal with threats to the
general welfare like tainted food or defective products in order to
conclude that it might be somewhat rash to make the inverse
assumption, that market mechanisms are invariably better than
decisions seem unassailable. See also THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM
191 (Beard Books 2000) (1937) ("[T]he personification of the great corportion actually worked to
monopolize completely the mantle of protection designed for the individual.").
16 For example, proposals have been made to extend some First Amendment protection to
areas currently covered by securities laws and regulated by the SEC. See Aleta G. Estreicher,
Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REv. 223 (1990) (regulation that was
generally thought to be desirable and necessary in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929).
2008] 2587
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
governmental intervention, and then to back that assumption up by
preemptively disarming the government and extending a constitutional
shield to commercial speech. Experience and present-day conditions
suggest that would be unwise.
In this article I argue that none of the proposed theoretical
justifications for protecting freedom of expression support application
of its most robust incarnation to for-profit corporations. 17  To the
contrary, a review of those theories leads to the conclusion that the
interests the First Amendment was meant to protect are unlikely to be
advanced by broad protection for the speech of for-profit corporations.
And although it is undoubtedly the case that (1) governmental
suppression of truthful speech should be viewed with suspicion, that (2)
the provision of much commercial information is a social good and (3)
that stimulation of commerce is a legitimate political goal, we might
nevertheless conclude that the First Amendment is not a particularly apt
framework for analyzing problems presented by commercial speech.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I is definitional. This part
offers a brief review of the commercial speech doctrine, the parallel
corporate speech case law, and the doctrinal development of the
meaning of "commercial speech."
Part II discusses the corporate person and points to some specific
features of that person that might make us wary of extending a broad
constitutional shield to speech from such institutions.
Part III reviews the work of Thomas Emerson, whose article
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment 18 was extremely
17 This is also not an original observation. See, e.g., Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and
Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2355 (2000) ("The free
speech jurisprudence of the First Amendment is notorious for its flagrantly proliferating and
contradictory rules, its profoundly chaotic collection of methods and theories."); Steven Shiffrin,
The First Amendment and Economic Regulation Away From a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1283 (1983) ("Speech interacts with the rest of our reality
in too many complicated ways to allow the hope or expectation that a single vision or a single
theory could explain, or dictate helpful conclusions in, the vast terrain of speech regulation."); see
also Stem, supra note 7.
18 Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
888 (1963). See also THOMAS 1. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1968) [hereinafter EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY]. These ideas were
further articulated in THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970)
[hereinafter EMERSON, SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION]. I turn to Emerson for his
proposal about the interests the First Amendment is thought to protect rather than for his analysis
of specific cases or his policy proposals. As the commercial speech doctrine had not yet been
articulated, Emerson does not use the term and only devotes a tiny portion of his discussion to the
problem of economic regulation. EMERSON, SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra, at
413-17, 423-25 (using the terms "commercial communication" and "communication of a
commercial nature" and noting that this area was not well defined). And although he also noted
that private actors could represent a threat to freedom of expression and that the proscription
against governmental interference might be appropriately relaxed to remedy that private
suppression, he seemed to focus more on political interest groups and unions than for-profit
2588 [Vol. 29:6
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influential in the development of First Amendment doctrine. Emerson
proposed that First Amendment protection was premised on the
protection of (broadly speaking) four key interests: (1) self-expression
or self-actualization, (2) protection for truth, (3) protection of
democracy or democratic process, and (4) as a means of social
stabilization. Analyzing the evidence of how for-profit corporations act
and the structural incentives in their organization, I show how existing
practices of commercial speech suggest that none of Emerson's four
goals are advanced by offering expansive First Amendment protection
to commercial speech or to for-profit speakers generally.19
Part IV covers what I have called "persistent objections" to the
arguments I present in the preceding sections. In this section I offer
some rebuttals to these common objections. Here and throughout the
Article I offer specific examples as evidence of problems that would
seem to be exacerbated if there was less power to regulate such speech.
Nevertheless, because the category of commercial speech is immensely
complicated and because technology can profoundly change the
practices and the forms of commerce and communication in ways which
may implicate this discussion, I think it is impossible to anticipate all of
the possible questions, let alone all of the correct answers. However, in
the conclusion I propose that whatever the answers are, they are not
necessarily best supplied by an expansive application of First
Amendment protection to commercial speech.20
A few methodological caveats are in order. I am not offering a
new theory. Rather I am simply applying old ones in a slightly different
way. Most prominent First Amendment legal theorists appear to agree
that the justifications for protecting freedom of expression are complex
and multifaceted. And it seems to me self evident that there is no
unifying, conscious theme to be teased out of the Supreme Court
precedent-whether from an originalist, historical perspective, a
straightforward analysis of the words or a review of the doctrine. 2'
Many of the Supreme Court's decisions in this area are in conflict with
one another, at least superficially, even if, as Robert Post has
corporations. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY, supra, at 105-10.
19 I use Emerson because it seems to me that every other theorist uses some variation of one
or more of the interests he proposed, thus by reviewing these it would seem to address the
theories raised by others. For a summary of the most prominent of these theorists, see GEOFFREY
R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-18 (2003). In my view the checking function
articulated by Vincent Blasi could be part of the self-governance or democracy promoting value.
Lee Bollinger's theory about the value of tolerance and the development of character similarly
appear to be ways to re-frame questions about self-fulfillment, autonomy, and the interest in a
safety valve.
20 Hereafter when I refer to "commercial speech" I will be including all speech by for-profit
entities. This makes the term as I use it here different than it is in the commercial speech
doctrine.
21 See STONE ET AL., supra note 19, at 3-6.
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persuasively argued, those familiar with the doctrine "can predict with
reasonable accuracy the outcomes of most constitutional cases. ' 22 So
this article does not attempt to reconcile or harmonize precedent in this
way or offer a grand theory in competition with any of those previously
offered. Rather I take here the existing justifications and precedent and
review them against observations about actual marketing practices and
events.
Although I am not inclined to find a unifying theme in the
precedent, I do think it is possible to discern what I will call "legal
moods" (for lack of a better phrase) from reading the precedent in light
of wider social facts and commentary on those opinions. Such moods
might explain why some opinions, while not overruled, are nevertheless
not as influential as others or seem to have less of a grip on the
collective legal imagination. 23 In making my arguments here though I
treat all precedent as equal unless it has been explicitly overruled or its
reasoning set aside.
Second, this article draws on literature from many other academic
disciplines, as well as many non-academic sources. In particular I think
it important in a discussion of advertising to read what advertising and
marketing professionals say about their practices. So this article
contains many references to materials from these areas. However, when
one delves into other disciplines there is always the risk that one has not
gone deeply enough, and so this Article may represent a starting point
but not an endpoint for inquiry, particularly when I touch on other
disciplines. But in some sense there is no purely legal position with
respect to a topic like commercial speech. The First Amendment is
concerned with the regulation of social matters on which other
disciplines can shed some light. So it would seem to behoove those of
us in the law to look at these areas as they bear on the decision making
process and to look at them as they are, not as we imagine them to be. I
attempt to do this understanding that one of the limitations of this
approach is that it runs the risk of oversimplification or
misunderstanding of observations in other disciplines. Still, if such
inquiry is not made it seems we run the opposite risk-that of creating a
parallel legal universe concerning a practice like advertising that bears
little or no resemblance to the practice in fact. 24
22 Post, supra note 17, at 2355.
23 Perhaps it is just a matter of who has the most money to spend. Those with the most
money to spend litigating issues important to them may bring cases and file amicus briefs more
often. So the frequency with which arguments in support of expanded protection for commercial
speech appear may be more a function of the wealth of its supporters, not an indication of any
legal "mood." Still, if an argument is raised often enough it begins to seem like a trend. And if it
goes unopposed, it may prevail by default.
24 We could actually make this objection about law generally and conclude that law contains
representations of the world outside of it that are subject to the objection that it is a picture crafted
2590 [Vol. 29:6
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At the same time, law has some distinctive requirements not
imposed on other disciplines. The application of law requires answers
to specific questions and the resolution of disputes in a position of
imperfect knowledge. It may even require "answers" to the
unanswerable, such as the monetary value of the loss of a limb. This
may mean that even if lawyers, judges, and legal academics had a better
grasp of the applicable disciplines it would not always be possible to
alter the law in ways that would take account of the insights of such
disciplines if they do not provide what the law needs---definite answers
in a time-bounded context. The questions that arise in the First
Amendment context, as well as the attempts in the jurisprudence to
answer them, may illustrate the need for pragmatic revision of the
doctrine in light of experience and context-what Robert Post called
Holmes's "pragmatic epistemology. '25 So it seems to me as perilous for
the social welfare to delve not at all into the subject matters to be
regulated as it is to go into them too shallowly. The commercial speech
doctrine has suffered from far too little reference to the actual practice
of advertising, marketing, and the concerns of the market. If this article
adds anything new it is the incorporation of more of these materials than
usual. Nevertheless, the subject will undoubtedly benefit by closer
investigation of a number of issues raised here, and I do not expect this
to be the last word.26
Finally, what I offer here is a pragmatic critique of the argument
for broad First Amendment protection for commercial speech. And
although the critique is informed by philosophies of the good, the
appropriate aims of good government, and notions of free will, it is not
a work of philosophy. It is intended as a working analysis to apply to
concrete problems which may appear before courts. There is obviously
much deeper work that could be done on questions of what represents
the public good and the appropriate role of government in attempting to
promote it. It is undoubtedly the case that in this article I assume fairly
more to the demands of the practice of law and dominant interests than it is descriptive of the
world it purports to represent. For example, the law posits all sorts of imaginary bargaining with
respect to the terms of a contract for a credit card, terms of employment, rationality of a consumer
choice, freedom of exit by a shareholder and all manner of other scenarios that may on the whole
not conform with our lived experience (for example, few people read the fine print of credit card
agreements; most employees are not "bargaining" for terms of employment but are rather subject
to a take-it-or-leave-it offer from employers; there is little evidence of rational deliberation in
many consumer choices, particularly where those choices are made in the context of advertisers'
intentional attempts to stimulate the "reptilian brain" response; and many shareholders hold their
shares in retirement funds over which they have little control and so cannot exercise the exit
option when one of the companies in which they are invested engages in a strategy with which
they disagree).
25 Post, supra note 17, at 2360.
26 For example, there may be some issues which are susceptible to empirical work to discover
if our intuitions or stated justifications for a particular practice can be justified or supported by
that work.
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general definitions of "truth" and "public welfare" that are open to
question and could be hotly contested in specific instances. But the
analytical structure I propose here is provisional and essentially legal,
that is, it is not one that will generate definitive answers. It is only
suggestive of the direction of outcomes, not determinative of them. The
reader should bear these caveats in mind with what follows.
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH, THE DOCTRINE, AND CORPORATE SPEECH




In discussing commercial speech we start with a problem. There is
not a very clear working definition of what commercial speech is. 28
One might observe, as the Court has, that the mere fact that the speech
is created in the hopes of earning money is not what makes it
commercial. 29 Books, movies, television, and other entertainment are
(presumably) usually produced for money.30 Yet when talking about
commercial speech most people seem to feel that, like obscenity, they
know it when they see it. When confronted with definitional
difficulties, a common response is to throw up one's hands and
conclude that because commercial speech is difficult to define, if it
deserves some First Amendment protection, the only intellectually
respectable position is that it should receive full First Amendment
protection, even though historically commercial speech was not
protected and despite good reasons for rejecting this approach because it
would undermine much of the government's ability to regulate
commerce. 31 I propose a definition that focuses on both the speaker and
the content.
27 Edward J. Janger, Brandeis, Business Ethics, and Enron, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 69 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
28 This is not necessarily a bad thing as Professor Nat Stem has pointed out. Stem, supra
note 7. For more discussions of the definitional difficulties see Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine
Fisk, What is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1143 (2004).
29 As the Supreme Court has noted, "[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection
because money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another .... [or
because] it is carried in a form that is 'sold' for profit .... " Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (internal citations omitted).
30 ld
31 Very few people argue that all regulation is undesirable even if they think a lot of it is.
[Vol. 29:62592
AGAINST FREEDOM
One definitional question is: Is it the identity of the speaker or the
content of the speech that makes speech "commercial"? Here I argue
identity determines content because when the speaker is a for-profit
corporation the content is always, by virtue of the nature of the for-
profit corporate structure, "commercial." Even if the subject is not
obviously commercial, the purpose of such speech is always to advance
a commercial interest.32 Every time a corporation offers its opinion
about climate change or tax reform or promotes awareness of breast
cancer or any other political or social issue of public concern, the only
legitimate basis for it doing so, pursuant to principles of corporations
law, is that management has made the determination that this
communication would enhance the corporation's profitability. That
may not disqualify the speech as valuable or of public interest, but
because of large corporations' ability to spend disproportionately larger
amounts of money on speech than most individuals, one could
conceivably find it legitimate to regulate it in the same way that the
government might reasonably impose limits on corporate campaign
contributions or the deductibility of charitable contributions. 33 This is
not a position that has been adopted by the Supreme Court, however,
and recent developments in the campaign finance area suggest that even
there the distinction may be losing its persuasiveness. 34
There is no question that commercial speech has not been clearly
defined, 35 and perhaps a completely satisfactory definition will remain
elusive. Nevertheless, a provisional definition might be that
commercial speech is speech offered by a business entity or person with
the intention of promoting a commercial activity (product or service)
other than the speech itself. This might not be sufficient as a
longstanding definition, but it is a starting point from which to assess
what we are talking about when we talk about commercial speech. And
using this definition it would be difficult to overemphasize the
enormous social impact of speech in the service of commerce.
Consider one small slice of that speech-television advertising. A
study by the American Psychological Association, published in 2004,
concluded that in the year 2000, average adolescents in America were
exposed to approximately 40,000 ads per year and that advertisers spent
$12 billion on such ads. 36 This figure does not take into account
32 See infra notes 184-222 and accompanying text.
33 See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (corporations
as creatures of law may be legitimately subject to regulation concerning speech relating to
elections). But see Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007)
(rejecting expenditures restriction on the basis of status as corporation, although corporation in
question was not for-profit).
34 See Fed. Election Comm'n, 127 S. Ct. 2652.
35 See Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 28.
36 Press Release, Am. Psychological Ass'n, Television Advertising Leads to Unhealthy Habits
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billboards, newspaper and radio advertising, point-of-sale displays,
direct mail, flyers, and innumerable other places where advertising or
promotion identifiable as such appears. Another study, covering all
expenditures in traditional advertising, reports that national advertisers
spent $105 billion on such advertising in 2006.37 That is a lot of
advertising but it is only the tip of the iceberg.
Figures for traditional advertising spending do not capture all
spending on commercial speech as defined above. Speech in service of
commerce can appear as news stories that are verbatim reprints of press
releases issued by a commercial company, 38 video news releases (press
releases in video form known as VNRs) aired as "news" items without
attribution, 39 product placement in entertainment, 40 product references
in textbooks 4' and other educational materials, "stealth marketing" 42 in
in Children; Says APA Task Force (Feb. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.apa.org/releases/childrenads.html.
37 Bradley Johnson, Leading Advertisers Report: Spending Up 3.1% to $105 Billion,
ADVERTISING AGE, June 25, 2007, available at http://adage.com/print?article-id=118648.
Another source pegs total U.S. advertising spending for all traditional media categories to be
$152.3 billion. TNS Media Intelligence Forecasts 1.7 Percent Increase in U.S. Advertising
Spending for 2007, TNS MEDIA INTELLIGENCE, June 12, 2007, http://www.tns-
mi.com/news/06122007.htm.
38 See, e.g., Do We Have a Story for You!; The Public Relations Industry, ECONOMIST, Jan.
21, 2006, at 57-58 ("Media commentators have noted how PR material is now being published by
some local newspapers virtually unedited and unchecked.").
39 FCC Pursues VNR Inquiry, ODWYERPR.COM, Aug. 15, 2006, available at
http://www.odwyerpr.com/members/0815fcc vnr letters response.htm (available to subscribers);
see also DIANE FARSETTA & DANIEL PRICE, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY, FAKE TV NEWS:
WIDESPREAD AND UNDISCLOSED (2006),
http://www.prwatch.org/pdfs/FakeTVNewsApr2006Rpt.pdf.
40 See, e.g., Lights, Camera, Brands; Product Placement, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005, at 61-
62 ("Product placement is rapidly blurring the line between content and advertising"); see also
Trudy Lieberman, Epidemic, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.-Apr. 2007, available at
http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2007/2/Lieberman.asp.
41 In addition to product advertising in traditional textbooks there is apparently one publisher
offering free electronic textbooks which are subsidized by the ads. Randall Stross, Words of
Wisdom vs. Words From Our Sponsor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, at 3 (describing publisher
Freeload Press' offering of textbooks free on-line with embedded ads). For a discussion of the
infiltration of commercial interests into the university context in a number of ways, see JENNIFER
WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2006).
42 "Stealth marketing" is a term of art in the industry that refers to word-of-mouth ("WOM")
advertising efforts. Although the professional organizations for WOM advertising officially take
the position that best practices dictate disclosure of the source, the term "stealth" refers to the fact
that these efforts often involve direct to consumer marketing that appears as if it is not marketing
because the person making the pitch, whether an actor posing as a friendly stranger or a friend
paid to promote a product, does not disclose the payment. See, e.g., Deborah Branscum,
Marketing Under the Radar, CMO MAG., Dec. 22, 2004 (reporting on an article in the California
Management Review, Stealth Marketing: How to Reach Consumers Surreptitiously). For a
discussion of stealth marketing and other practices in which marketing or promotional fees are
not disclosed, see Ellen Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83
(2006). For a discussion of how these PR techniques have penetrated government
communication practices, see Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005). For the most recent outbreak of this phenomenon, see David
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the guise of friends or acquaintances being paid to tout a product known
as word-of-mouth (WOM), 43 and other under the radar attempts to sell a
product or service.44  One such stealth marketing technique is
"flogging"-that is, setting up fake blogs (by which I mean blogs that
are not readily identifiable as a part of a marketing plan), or blogging
anonymously or under an assumed name as John Mackey, the CEO of
Whole Foods, was exposed as doing.45
One of the most troubling forms that speech in service of
commerce can take is where the speech is not clearly identifiable as
coming from a commercial source at all but instead appears to emanate
from a third-party, non-commercial source. This is a common public
relations tactic. The idea is to gain credibility for the message by
putting it in what appears to be another speaker's mouth. "To get
something going from nothing, you need the validity that only third-
party endorsements can bring. ' 46 Typically, it simply involves getting a
newspaper or other media to carry the message by reprinting a press
release or by getting some authoritative third party expert to make the
case. 47 For example, in order to encourage physicians to prescribe its
Barstow, Behind Analysts, Pentagon's Hidden Hand: Courting Ex-Officers Tied to Military
Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at I (describing efforts by Pentagon to place their own
nominees, with ties to military contractors, as apparently expert commentators in TV news
programs without disclosing the Pentagon's role in coordinating their statements). It is
interesting to speculate whether the prominence of marketing and public relations people in the
role of political advisors has played a role in the adoption of techniques from those professions in
politics or whether it has ever been thus.
43 Rob Walker, The Hidden (in Plain Sight) Persuaders, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 5, 2004, at
69 (describing WOM marketing efforts also known as "buzz marketing").
44 For a brief discussion of the ubiquity of advertising, see Walter Kim, Here, There and
Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 11, 2007, at 17 (quoting some research suggesting that
adults are exposed to as many as 5,000 ads per day). Apparently there is no consensus on just
how many ads people are exposed to (on average) everyday. Estimates run "[s]omewhere
between 254 and 5,000" per day. Matthew Creamer, Caught in the Clutter Crossfire: Your
Brand, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 1, 2007, available at http://adage.com/print?article-id= 115873.
Some have proposed that the solution to ad clutter is to make advertisers pay for ads rated as
"bad" by consumers. Jack Neff, Clutter Pollution Solution: Make 'Em Pay for Bad Ads,
ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 8, 2007, available at http://adadge.com/print?articleid=115984. The
logistics of the rating system to implement this proposal have yet to be worked out.
45 Mackey, posting comments under an anagram of his wife's name, allegedly posted positive
comments about himself and about Whole Foods, and negative ones about the company he was
seeking to acquire, Wild Oats, on a blog. Christopher Caldwell, Not Being There, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Aug. 12, 2007, at 11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/magazine/12wwln-
lede-t.html?ref=-magazine.
46 AL RIES & LAURA RIES, THE FALL OF ADVERTISING & THE RISE OF PR, at xx (2002).
This is known as the "third party technique." See Source Watch, Ctr. for Media & Democracy,
Third Party Technique, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Third_partytechnique (last
visited Apr. 1, 2008).
47 "[T]he one advantage of PR makes up for all of its disadvantages. PR has credibility,
advertising does not. People believe what they read in newspapers or magazines or what they
hear on the radio or see on television." RIES & RIES, supra note 46, at 85. One academic
textbook on public relations claims that "upwards of 70 percent of daily newspaper copy"
emanates "from public relations-generated releases." FRASER P. SEITEL, THE PRACTICE OF
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antidepressant Paxil to adolescents suffering from depression,
GlaxoSmithKline allegedly enlisted doctors it identified as "Key
Opinion Leaders" to publish favorable reviews in the academic
literature of a study of Paxil. 48 Unfortunately for those receiving the
prescription, the study did not (according to some observers) support the
conclusion that Paxil was appropriate for use in treating adolescent
depression. 49
If no third party is willing to carry the message (or in addition to
such third parties), companies can manufacture the apparently neutral
third party. For example, with the assistance of its public relations firm,
Wal-Mart set-up an organization named "Working Families for Wal-
Mart." The impression it conveyed was of an independent, grassroots
political organization. 50  Its function was to bolster Wal-Mart's
argument that, despite the criticisms, its labor practices actually
benefited working families by providing a place where workers and
customers could post positive testimonials about their experiences. It
claimed that the organization was giving voice to the millions of
Americans who believed Wal-Mart made positive contributions to their
families and communities. 51 "Working Families for Wal-Mart" had a
web site and a blog, none of which clearly identified it as generated by
and on the behalf of Wal-Mart. 52  Instead, it claimed that its
membership was made up of diverse community leaders in business,
education, and other civic fields across America who had first-hand
knowledge of Wal-Mart's positive contributions to communities. 53 But
it did not say that Wal-Mart had a role in funding the group or that its
public relations firm, Hill and Knowlton, was associated with its
formation. 54
PUBLIC RELATIONS 38 (8th ed. 2001) (emphasis added).
48 Shelley Jofre, Doctoring the Evidence: GlaxoSmithKline Pushes Depression Drug,
CORPWATCH, July 30, 2007, http://corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14606. The most troubling
aspect of this incident was that GSK apparently engaged in this effort because the study in
question had too many adverse incidents, making it clear that the pharmaceutical company would
be unlikely to receive FDA approval to prescribe for teenagers. Jofre reports that the company's
internal correspondence reflected that management felt the company had gone as far as it was
going to be able to go with sales for adult patients and so expansion in the teen market would
have to come through off-label uses since there were too many adverse incidents to expect that
the FDA would approve the drug for use in treating teens. Apparently the fact that such uses
might come with an arguably unacceptably high risk of teen suicides to those receiving the
medication was not a dispositive factor.
49 Id.
50 The original site is now inactive but you can find more information about the site at one set
up by Wal-Mart Watch, Working Families for WalMart?, http://workingfamiliesforwalmart.com/.
51 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., PR Watch.org, Ctr. for Media & Democracy, Front Group's Fake Blog Just One
of Wal-Mart's Recent Woe's, http://www.prwatch.org/node/5316 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
53 Id.
54 For more information on the group, see Source Watch, Ctr. for Media & Democracy,
Working Families for Wal-Mart,
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This technique was pioneered by the tobacco companies when they
pooled resources and combined forces to form, pursuant to advice from
Hill and Knowlton,5 5 the Council for Tobacco Research. The Council
was intended to serve as a third-party spokesperson with the explicit
aim of using the entity to issue "information" on behalf of tobacco
companies to counter the growing body of evidence of the negative
health consequences of smoking. 56 The efforts of the CTR and similar
organizations founded by the tobacco companies themselves, as well as
the articles and publications sponsored by it, played an important role in
minimizing the health dangers of smoking for several decades. This
was the role they were intended to play. It worked very well for
decades and, according to some, inspired similar efforts to create "a
paralyzing fog of doubt around climate change" 57 to perhaps potentially
even more devastating effect, since everyone is affected by global
climate change.
In short, there is an enormous amount of speech that is
commercial-whether we know it or not. This speech is issued by
entities with vast resources, far more than any comparable institution,
except perhaps the U.S. government itself.5 8 So it stands to reason, both
because of its scale and its ubiquity, that commercial speech has a
significant impact on society, even if we cannot say for certain what that
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=WorkingFamilies-for-Wal-Mart (last visited Apr.
2, 2008) (website sponsored by the Center for Media and Democracy).
55 The firm resigned the account in 1969, reportedly because of ethical concerns about the
tobacco industry's application of the strategy Hill and Knowlton developed for it. KAREN S.
MILLER, THE VOICE OF BUSINESS: HILL & KNOWLTON AND POSTWAR PUBLIC RELATIONS 141-
45 (1999). The basic strategy of "creating doubt about the health charge without actually denying
it"; characterizing smoking as a "right"; and claiming that objective scientific research would be
the "only way to resolve the question of health hazard" continued for several more decades. Id. at
143. And it has proven to be a template for the response to concerns about climate change.
56 United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 41 (D.D.C. 2006).
57 Sharon Begley, The Truth About Denial, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 2007, at 20, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/32482 (last visited Apr. 2, 2008). Begley reports that the
American Enterprise Institute, an organization which has received funding from ExxonMobil,
was offering $10,000 for articles to dispute the latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) that reflected a consensus that the 1990s "were likely the warmest on
record" and that the warming was at least partially attributable to human activities. For a
response to an earlier report on the charge that AEI was offering $10,000 for articles critical of
the IPCC report, see Kenneth P. Green & Steven F. Hayward, Scenes From the Climate
Inquisition: The Chilling Effect of the Global Worming Consensus, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 19,
2007, at 26, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070222 OTI.pdf. See also Paul Krugman,
Enemy of the Planet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at A21 (recounting efforts by ExxonMobil to
sow uncertainty about the reality of global climate change).
58 The resources available to large multinational commercial enterprises often outstrip those
of all but the richest nations. See Sarah Anderson & John Cavanaugh, Top 200: The Rise of
Corporate Global Power, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES,
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=377 (last visited May 9, 2008) ("The Top 200
corporations' combined sales are bigger than the combined economies of all countries minus the
biggest t0.").
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impacts is. Moreover, large corporations play significant roles in
shaping what constitutes "news" and the attitudes of the world around
us. And that influence is exercised with what is perhaps unprecedented
knowledge of human psychology and motivations. 59  Marketing
research intended to fine tune the ability of marketers to engender
positive reactions and thus improve return on investment (ROI) in
advertising is a multibillion dollar business and is reflected not only to
the venerable focus group and survey, but extends to the accumulation
of massive amounts of data 60 through grocery store "savings programs,"
rebate and warranty requests, surveys, census data,6' fMRI scanning,
and other research that, were it conducted in a university setting (and
sometimes it is under the auspices of corporate grants to university, but
that is another story), would presumably be subject to rigorous IRB
standards governing research on human subjects.62
The scale of such research efforts seems particularly troubling
when it comes to targeting children, since there is no assumption that
children are fully rational in the way we assume (however
unrealistically 63) that adults are and who, because of their relative
59 It may be fair to say, and certainly an interesting topic for exploration, that more
psychology research has been done by market researchers than by any academic group. And
when one considers that much academic research may be sponsored by commercial interests or
have an explicitly commercial goal, it seems likely that most intellectual energy, time and effort
in areas like psychology has been dedicated to discovering more about what motivates people to
buy. For a discussion of the general topic of the commercialization of education, see
WASHBURN, supra note 41.
60 See, e.g., Kim Severson, Seduced by Snacks? No, Not You, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at
F I (reporting on market research tying package size and design to how much people eat); Market
Research C'mon, Mom! Kids Nag Parents to Chuck E. Cheese's, SELLING TO KIDS, May 12,
1999, available at available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOFVE/is 9 4/ai-
5463124 (reporting on Western Initiative Media's "Nag Factor" report); CLOTAIRE RAPAILLE,
THE CULTURE CODE: AN INGENIOUS WAY TO UNDERSTAND WHY PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD
LIVE AND BUY AS THEY Do (2006) (cultural anthropologist uses insights from psychology and
focus group research purporting to identify cultural "codes" that he claims tap into the "reptilian
brain" and by-pass rational thought processes in order to sell products). For more on Dr.
Rapaille, see the PBS program Frontline: The Persuaders (PBS television broadcast Nov. 9,
2003), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/persuaders/ (last visited May
9, 2008). Additional types of marketing research are reflected by PATRICK RENVOISt AND
CHRISTOPHE MORIN, NEUROMARKETING: UNDERSTANDING THE BUY BUTTONS IN YOUR
CUSTOMER'S BRAIN (rev. ed. 2007) (purporting to use research in neurology to find the "buy
button" in the brain and obtain "instant success"); The Triumph of Unreason?, ECONOMIST, Jan.
13, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?storyid=8516366
(reporting on similar research in economics identified as neuroeconomics, a field that perhaps
overlaps with what is described as behavioral economics).
61 See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Kids & Cul-De-Sacs: Census 2000 and the Reproduction of
Consumer Culture, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 853 (2002) (describing degree to which census data was
used for marketing purposes).
62 For a comprehensive look at the regulation of research on human subjects in all public and
some private contexts, see CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF
RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (2006).
63 The evidence that people do not behave rationally as we often define it with respect to any
number of issues seems so exhaustively demonstrated that is difficult not to conclude that
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cognitive plasticity and limitations, are more vulnerable to
manipulation.64 With such power comes corresponding potential for
harm on a large scale. So it seems reasonable to suppose that the
government might have a legitimate role in regulating some of these
communication efforts in an attempt to prevent harm. However, at
present, the commercial speech doctrine covers a much narrower slice
of commercial communication than that described above.
B. Commercial Speech Doctrine
The commercial speech doctrine is a subset of First Amendment
jurisprudence that creates a category of intermediate scrutiny for speech
falling within its boundaries. 65 Commercial speech is offered less
protection than political or other quintessentially protected speech, but
regulation directed at this speech must meet an intermediate scrutiny
test that, over the last couple of decades, has begun to look a lot more
like strict scrutiny.66 Most observers agree the doctrine was created in
1976 in the Virginia Pharmacy case. 67 There, the issue was whether the
State of Virginia could forbid pharmacists from advertising drug
prices. 68  A consumer group protested that suppression of truthful
speech actually hurt consumers, notwithstanding the State's assertion
that price advertising would lead to price wars that would in turn lead to
diminished professionalism and hurt consumers in the long run.69
Consumers argued this position was excessively paternalistic and that
perpetuation of this assumption in the law is due more to despair about workable alternative
presumptions than about any doubt that it is true. For an entertaining summary of some of the
research on this question, see CORDELIA FINE, A MIND OF ITS OWN: How YOUR BRAIN
DISTORTS AND DECEIVES (2006). Certainly advertising professionals themselves believe that
emotional and psychological appeals that are largely unconscious, unacknowledged and hotly
denied are greater motivators of purchasing decisions than the reasons people are willing to
articulate. ROBERT B. SETTLE & PAMELA L. ALRECK, WHY THEY Buy: AMERICAN CONSUMERS
INSIDE AND OUT 31-49 (1986) (describing consumers as mostly motivated by unconscious needs
for status, approval and love, and an unwillingness to report that they have been influenced by
advertising or to accurately identify motives for purchasing decisions).
64 See, e.g., Jon Gertner, Mom, Is It O.K. If These Guys Market This Stuff to Us?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Nov. 28, 2004, at 100. See also JULIET B. SCHOR, BORN TO Buy: THE COMMERCIALIZED
CHILD AND THE NEW CONSUMER CULTURE (2004); ALISSA QUART, BRANDED: THE BUYING
AND SELLING OF TEENAGERS (2003).
65 Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (with respect to
commercial speech, governmental regulation need not be "absolutely the least severe" burden on
speech that will achieve the desired ends of advancing the state's substantial interest).
66 See, e.g., David Vladeck, Lessons From A Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1055-59 (2004).
67 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (Virginia Pharmacy),
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
68 Id. at 749-53.
69 Id. at 766-70.
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the government ought not to be in the business of protecting the public
from the truth.70 The Supreme Court agreed. 7'
In order for the Court to find the consumer group had the standing
to raise the issue of suppression of the pharmacists' speech, the Court
had to first find the pharmacists themselves had a First Amendment
right to advertise. 72 With little discussion of this point the Court found
they did. But the Court's key holding was that the consumers had a
First Amendment right to hear the price information. 73 Had the Court
been writing on a blank slate it might not have been necessary to make
these doctrinal moves or to invoke the First Amendment at all. But
because the Commerce Clause, which is directed specifically at
licensing government regulation of commerce sets up a fairly
undemanding rational basis test, which the rationale advanced by
Virginia for its prohibition of price advertising would have almost
certainly passed, the consumer advocates who brought the case invoked
the First Amendment for the argument that, as listeners, they had a right
to hear this price information. 74 This is a non-obvious reading of the
First Amendment's prohibition on the restriction of freedom of speech,
but the argument had appeared earlier in the scholarly literature.
Some years before Virginia Pharmacy came before the Supreme
Court, Professor Martin Redish published an article entitled The First
Amendment in the Marketplace75 in which he argued that speech issued
in aid of commerce was entitled to First Amendment protection because
such information was critical to market function and market function
was an essential part of social welfare and self actualization. 76 Of
course, only truthful information performs this function. 77 So Redish
70 Id. at 770.
71 Id. at 756-70.
72 Id.
73 Id
74 Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist's
Recollections, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1189 (2004).
75 Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971).
76 Id. at 432-48.
77 Actually, it is not entirely clear that only truthful information performs this function. Much
false information may also stimulate economic activity. And if that were the sole measure of
utility we might say there is no reason for limiting protection to truthful information. However,
whether because we place a competing value on truth for its own sake, whether or not it
stimulates economic activity, or because we take the position that fraud is its own punishment,
that is, false information will ultimately harm the market when consumers find out about it
through product failure or otherwise, the official position is that only truthful information furthers
the social goals reflected in the commercial speech doctrine. The argument that fraud ultimately
does not pay even if it stimulates economic activity in the short run seems to overlook the fact
that many players enter and exit the market with no intention of staying for the long run. So if
they can escape with an economic benefit to themselves they are unconcerned about long-term
effects of fraud. Whether or not "cnme pays" is both a philosophical and empirical question
beyond the scope of this article. However, it does seem safe to say that few would propose doing
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argued that it was truthful commercial speech that should be protected,
and that such protection was justified on behalf of the listeners (i.e.,
consumers/market). When presented with the issue in Virginia
Pharmacy, the Court picked up Redish's argument in virtually every
respect, including his explanations for why commercial speech, unlike
political speech, could be safely regulated for its truth. Regulation of
commercial speech for its truth Redish argued and the Court later held,
was not as troubling as similar regulation in the political sphere would
be because the economic motive made commercial speech hardier, that
is, because companies had a powerful motive to communicate they
would be unlikely to forego speech altogether even if it was regulated. 78
This move made it possible to extend the protection of the First
Amendment to commercial speech while simultaneously leaving intact
much consumer protection regulation.
Later, in Central Hudson,79 the Court set out the four-part test for
commercial speech still applicable today (albeit more strictly
interpreted). In order to receive constitutional protection of the First
Amendment under the commercial speech doctrine, the speech in
question must (1) concern a legal activity and not be misleading (that is
it must be truthful speech about a legal activity); (2) if the government
seeks to regulate that speech it must do so pursuant to a "substantial
interest"; (3) such legislation must directly further the substantial
interest in question; and (4) the regulation must be no more expansive
than necessary to advance that substantial interest (often described as
"fit"). 80 The test does not define what makes speech "commercial,"
although it is clear that such speech is only protected if it is truthful.
The Central Hudson test, however, sets up something of a definitional
quandary because if something is commercial it is protected only if it is
truthful; but being truthful does not make it "commercial."
The Court in Virginia Pharmacy seemed to think, and Redish's
article reflects much the same stance (although he has since expanded
his definition), that "commercial speech" was "advertising,"' since the
away with the criminal law altogether on the theory that doing evil will reap its own punishment.
Similarly, it seems unwise to place too much reliance on the idea that fraud will not pay in the
long run so that we need not spend resources attempting to deter it.
78 Redish, supra note 75, at 458-59 (suggesting profit motive may be some insurance against
the chilling effect of regulation of false advertising). Cf Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771
n.24. Reading Professor Redish's article in tandem with the Virginia Pharmacy decision should
offer cheer to those academics who despair of having influence on the courts. One cannot read
these two without concluding that Redish persuaded the Court to adopt his theory. The Court also
concluded that "[t]he truth of commercial speech ... may be more easily verifiable by its
disseminator than. .. [by] news reporting or political commentary ..... Id.
79 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
80 Id. at 566 (describing test).
81 Redish, supra note 75, at 432 ("The subject of inquiry ... is the value to society of
traditional commercial advertising of products and services the public purchases and uses
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Court used these terms interchangeably. 82 And at times the Court has
suggested that what makes speech "commercial" is whether it was
speech "propos[ing] a commercial transaction. '83 But the Court quickly
retreated from such simplistic definitions when, in subsequent cases,
claims for protection involved material that could not be so easily
categorized. 84 Nevertheless the Court has never clearly articulated an
alternative definition, so many continue to allude to the "speech which
does no more than propose a commercial transaction."
C. Corporate Speech
At the same time the Court was crafting protection for speech that
was "commercial" based on the nature of the speech and the rights of
the listener to receive the speech, it was confronted with claims by
corporations that they had the right to expend resources on political ads.
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,85 the bank petitioner
claimed it had a First Amendment right to take out ads urging voters not
to approve a personal income tax despite a Massachusetts statute that
banned such expenditures by corporations unless they advanced the
economic interest of the corporation. 86 The Court in Bellotti felt it
necessary to observe that a corporation had First Amendment rights and
that its contributions to political discourse were no less valuable
because of the speaker's corporate status as if it were self-evidently
true. 87 But it actually had not been so self-evident prior to the Bellotti
regularly.").
82 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769-773 (using "advertising" and "commercial speech"
interchangeably as if it were self-evident that advertising were equal to commercial speech).
83 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973).
84 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
85 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (national banks challenged constitutionality of a state statute that
criminalized contributions or expenditures by corporations to influence the outcome of a vote on
any question submitted to voters that did not materially affect the property, business or assets of
the corporation).
86 Id. at 770-72. As discussed further below, this limitation was arguably redundant since
corporate law already may preclude expenditures which are not in the corporation's economic
interest as measured by the very capacious business judgment rule as breaches of fidicuary duty.
Although the Court suggested that the First Amendment did not permit the government to tell a
corporation to "stick to its business," id. at 784-85, it did not comment on state statutes
delineating the scope of corporate power and the duties to shareholders, which do just that insofar
as they typically define the duty of the board and management, broadly speaking, as protecting
shareholder financial interests. Presumably a claim could still be made in a shareholders'
derivative action that corporate spending for an apparently non-business purpose in a particular
case was a misuse of corporate funds. However, the practical realities of the capaciousness of the
business judgment rule and the procedural hurdles for shareholders suggest that in fact
shareholders would have a difficult time maintaining such an action.
87 This holding was reaffirmed in Consol. Edison Co. ofN. Y v. Public Serv. Commn ofN. Y,
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decision. However the Court's pronouncement there, combined with its
holding in Buckley v. Valeo88 that limitations on campaign expenditures
constituted an unconstitutional limitation on speech, were to have far-
reaching consequences.
This line of cases, unlike the commercial speech doctrine, seemed
to situate squarely the corporation as a rights holder of expressive
interests. And although the Court fairly quickly retreated from its most
expansive extension of rights to for-profit corporations in Bellotti by
later upholding various restrictions on corporations' ability to
contribute to political campaigns and to spend money on ads,89 it did not
retreat all the way. So the two strands of case law have developed in an
uneasy and confusing coexistence, with Bellotti often cropping up in the
commercial speech arena as support for the notion of the corporation as
protected speaker,90 often with no mention of the later corporate speech
cases or discussion of why, if the corporation is such a speaker, its
expressive rights are limited in commerce in a way they are not limited
in political speech or why some limitations based on status as a
corporation have been deemed appropriate with respect to political
speech.9' This history suggests the Court backed into the corporate
speech formulation without fully considering the appropriateness of the
corporate person as a rights holder under the First Amendment or the
447 U.S. 530, 533-34 n.l (1980) (holding a publicly regulated utility had a First Amendment
right to insert circulars into bills that contained arguments about nuclear power, and status as a
regulated utility did not diminish the enjoyment of these rights).
88 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
89 Federal Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986)
(distribution of not-for-profit organization's pro-life newsletter violated federal statute prohibiting
direct spending by corporations in connection to elections to public office but the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to MCFL); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652 (1990) (holding state statute prohibiting corporations from using treasury funds for
independent expenditures in support or in opposition to candidates for election to public office
was not unconstitutional as applied to not-for-profit organizations where the not-for-profit
organization was largely funded by for-profit entities, and organization was formed to promote
activities other than simply advocacy).
90 For example, many of the amici in Nike v. Kasky cited Bellotti for the proposition that the
status of the speaker as a commercial entity was irrelevant for First Amendment purposes but did
not cite Austin or other cases suggesting that this was not an unlimited principle. Brief of Amici
Curiae the Association of Nat'l Adver., Inc. et. al in Support of Petitioners at 8, Nike v. Kasky,
539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835112; Brief of ExxonMobil et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 9-13, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL
835523; Brief for the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12-13,
Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835884.
91 The limitations on corporations that were upheld in MCFL and Austin were further put into
question by the Supreme Court's refusal to extend its reasoning in these two cases to a challenge
in 2007 to limits on certain types of political advertising expenditures by corporations. Federal
Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2007). For further
discussion of this issue in campaign finance as well as the bearing these questions have on
corporate governance principles, see Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign
Finance: Incorporating Corporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2001).
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possibility that there might be valid reasons to distinguish between
human beings engaging in commercial speech and entities such as
corporations. 92 Although we could say that the corporate person has a
"nature," it may be more accurate to say that the rules governing the
formation, organization, conduct, and powers of a for-profit
corporation dictate that decision making within these organizations will
tend to display certain characteristics or tendencies rather than a nature.
Change the rules and the behavior may change as well. These rules
bear examination in advance of reviewing the theoretical justifications
for protecting freedom of expression because they suggest that freedom
for these institutions may mean less freedom for others.
II. THE CORPORATE PERSON
Corporation, n.
An ingenious device for obtaining individual profit without
individual responsibility.
-Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary93
If you open a newspaper in the United States these days it is
difficult to escape the fallout from the last decade of corporate excesses.
WorldCom. Enron. Arthur Andersen. Tyco. American International
Group.94 Citigroup agreed to pay a $2 billion settlement in relation to
its role in the Enron fiasco.95 And as large as that amount seems,
Citigroup may have gotten a bargain since, according to some
observers, Citigroup's exposure could have been far greater than $2
billion.96 Other firms have yet to settle (or will probably have settled by
the time this goes to press).97 Some of the individuals associated with
92 The device of assuming a sort of Court consciousness when it is in fact made up of nine
separate persons who not only have differing views, but whose own views may change over time,
is as much a fiction as the notion that a corporation has an "opinion."
93 AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 43 (Filiquarian Publishing 2007) (1911),
available at http://www.alcyone.com/max/ht/devils/c.html.
94 The Saturday, June 11, 2005, issue of the New York Times carried at least five stories
related to corporate misconduct. See, e.g., Ken Belson, Ebbers Pleads for Leniency in
Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2005, at C13; Julie Creswell, Citigroup Agrees to Pay $2
Billion in Enron Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2005, at Al; Jurors in Trial of Two Tyco
Executives End the Week Without Completing a Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2005, at C2; A
Second Guilty Plea in A.1G.-Related Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2005, at C13.
95 Creswell, supra note 94.
96 Id ("'The potential exposure to the banks in this case could have been really large,' said
Joseph A. Grundfest, a law professor at Stanford University and a former commissioner at the
Securities and Exchange Commission. 'It was not in the best interest of Citigroup to push the
issue through to a jury verdict."').
97 See UC Secures $2.2 Billion Settlement with J. P. Morgan Chase in Enron Fraud Case,
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these failures, such as Bernard Ebbers,98 former CEO of WorldCom,
Dennis Kozlowski, 99 CEO of Tyco, and Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling,
the two principal architects of the Enron fiasco, were convicted. 0 0 Yet,
for many reasons, it appears that fundamental change has been elusive.
In response to spectacular failures like Enron, Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.101 Sarbanes-Oxley was intended as a
comprehensive reform of corporate governance principles and intended
to prevent future failures like Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom. 10 2 Yet,
eleven years before Sarbanes-Oxley was passed, the United States
Sentencing Commission made a similar bid to discourage corporate
wrongdoing by revising the Sentencing Guidelines to provide tougher
penalties for criminal wrongdoing by corporations. 10 3 These changes
were intended to make scenarios like Enron less likely. However, a
study published in 1999, in the Journal of Law & Economics, found that
those enhancements had had little effect. 10 4 So, given the experience
with these efforts, there is reason to be skeptical that Sarbanes-Oxley,
by assisting in the unmasking of a "few bad apples"' 1 5 in an otherwise
June 14, 2005, http://enronfraud.com/enr-cgi-
bin/mil?templ=news/articles/jpmorgan-settlement.html (J. P. Morgan announced its agreement to
settle and pay investors $2.2 billion for damages arising out of the Enron failure).
98 Krysten Crawford, Ex-WorldCom CEO Ebbers Guilty, CNN/MONEY.COM, Mar. 15, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/03/15/news/newsmakers/ebbers/.
99 Grace Wong, Kozlowski Gets Up To 25 Years, CCN/MONEY.COM, Sept. 19, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/09/19/news/newsmakers/kozlowski-sentence/.
100 Mary Flood, Mark Babineck & John Roper, Guilty! Guilty! Verdict Will Mean Prison for
Ex-Enron Chiefs, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 25, 2006, available at
http://images.chron.com/content/news/photos/06/05/25/extra I .pdf.
101 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745
(codified in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
102 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). For a somewhat more optimistic analysis of the
potential of Sarbanes-Oxley to spur positive change, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189 (2003).
103 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8.
104 Jeffrey S. Parker & Raymond A. Atkins, Did the Corporate Criminal Sentencing
Guidelines Matter? Some Preliminary Empirical Observations, 42 J.L. & ECON. 423, 424 (1999)
("generally finding no significant effect"). Indeed, the authors speculated that if "the 1991
guidelines were never intended to do anything other than meet a demand for political rhetoric
rather than law enforcement" their lack of impact may have been "the best of all possible worlds."
Id. at 449. From the title it is clear that the authors do not claim their observations are definitive.
But they are suggestive and generally are consistent with the observations made by others quoted
in this essay and by the arguments advanced here.
105 In the film, The Corporation, inspired by the book of the same name, see infra note 112,
the filmmakers collect news and commentary clips repeating the "few bad apples" motif as an
explanation by President George W. Bush for why, despite Enron's failure, the American
economy was basically sound. THE CORPORATION (Big Picture Media Corporation 2003). See
also The Corporation Film, http://www.thecorporation.com/ (last visited June 14, 2007). Recent
events with the subprime mortage crisis may be seen as support for this claim to the extent that
the crisis was not worse, or as undermining it because it occurred in the first place. I am inclined
to agree with Paul Krugman that the Federal Reserve's ability to head off a larger financial crisis
does not mean that there are not good reasons to be concerned about the soundness of the
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sound system, will solve the problems that precipitated organizational
collapses like Enron. 10 6
In the first place the corporation is indifferent to the most severe
aspect of criminal penalties-the loss of liberty. "Unlike individuals,
corporations have neither 'liberty' nor 'wealth' to protect as such."' 10 7
And its representatives, who do have both liberty and wealth to protect,
are partially shielded from responsibility by the laws governing
corporations. The legal structure of a corporation often shields the flesh
and blood actors in the corporation-shareholders, officers and
directors, executives-from personal liability through legal doctrines,
explicit incorporation documents, agreements, contracts of insurances
and the like. 10 8 And in those circumstances where liability could
theoretically attach to persons, corporate officers, directors and
managers act within a collectivity' 0 9 that diffuses both knowledge and
responsibility such that no one person may really possess the sort of
guilty knowledge that serves, in many minds, as a prerequisite for
criminal liability and so, almost by definition, neither does the
corporation."l 0 Undoubtedly, many of those executives who did find
themselves convicted of a crime could say, along with former
WorldCom accountant, Betty Vinson, "I never expected to be here."' 11
However, a corporation's most potent weapon against enforcement
economy. Paul Krugman, Success Breeds Failure, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/05/opinion/05krugman.html?r= 1 &scp = 11 &sq=may+05+2008
&stnyt&oref--slogin.
106 One possibility is to use the independent federal auditor who is appointed by the court in
cases of deferred prosecution of corporations. See, e.g., Stephanie Saul, A Corporate Nanny
Turns Assertive, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at CI (discussing one such arrangement in an
agreement between the SEC and Bristol-Myers Squibb).
107 Parker & Atkins, supra note 104, at 427.
108 See, e.g., JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW & POLICY 1 (5th ed. 2003)
(describing limited liability as one of the distinctive features of the corporate form). Under
exceptional circumstances officers, directors and/or shareholders can be held liable for the debts
or obligations of the firm where there are grounds for piercing the corporate veil. Id at 318-365.
109 For a description of the collective nature of the firm, see Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Essential
Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1021-34 (1998).
110 In general it is difficult to hold a firm liable for violations where intent or state of mind is
relevant. See, e.g., Stacey Neumann Vu, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability: Patchwork Verdicts
and the Problem of Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 459 (2004) (describing
difficulties assigning mens rea where responsibility is diffused); see also Arthur Andersen L.L.P.
v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705-09 (2005) (overturning conviction because jury instruction
failed to adequately convey to jury the requirement of intent).
I11 Erin McClam, WorldCom Figures Sentenced, TULSA WORLD (Oklahoma), Aug. 6, 2005, at
E6 (quoting Betty Vinson at her sentencing). Whether Ms. Vinson meant she was sorry and
surprised because she had not started out to do wrong, or she simply meant she had not expected
to get caught is not clear. But it may be fair to say that most corporate criminals have a better
chance of succeeding than the average street criminal and certainly are more likely to have access
to adequate or even exceptional representation, a factor which in turn may affect the likelihood of
conviction. For a discussion of these and other issues making so-called "white collar crime"
distinctive, see JAMES WILLIAM COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE: UNDERSTANDING WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME (5th ed. 2002).
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efforts is its ability to assess every potential penalty through the lens of
a cost/benefit, economic analysis and then to transfer the costs of
penalties to others. Because the corporation's separate identity is more
functional than it is real, no penalty assessed against a corporation is
assessed only against the corporation (or maybe even at all). Instead, it
is passed through the corporation to others: shareholders, employees,
consumers, or the public at large. Moreover, when dealing with large,
multinational corporations, those which have the potential for the
greatest social impact, it is difficult to assess penalties that are large
enough to be meaningful as punishment.
Take for example Citigroup's $2 billion settlement of its liability in
the Enron matter. This is not a small sum. But it also is not clear that it
is a large enough sum to deter future officers and directors from
engaging in similar conduct because there is no context. 1 2 Put another
way, we cannot know whether Citigroup has been "punished" without
knowing how much money it made on the transactions with Enron. If,
for example, Citigroup had made a $20 billion profit on the business
with Enron, a $2 billion reduction in that profit would still leave a
healthy $18 billion profit.1 13 And while we cannot assume that the
specter of criminal sanctions or public relations scandals have no effect
on deterring undesirable conduct (they undoubtedly have some effect),
it still seems that profit is the primary motivating factor in corporate
decision making. "For a corporation, compliance with law, like
everything else, is a matter of costs and benefits." 114 If the perceived
benefits outweigh the perceived costs, Citigroup presumably will repeat
what it did with Enron.
In fact, according to some, it may have a duty to its shareholders to
do So.115 And the evidence suggests that while the past 10 years have
112 See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND
POWER (2004) (describing profit motive as the single unifying aim of corporate behavior); see
also David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 224.
113 The Sentencing Guidelines actually suggest that the profits from the crime may be a factor
in assessing a punishment in the applicable range. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
8C2.8(b). Whether this factor is regularly assessed is a question not addressed in this essay, but
the article by Parker & Atkins, supra note 104, suggests that the Guidelines do not matter much.
114 BAKAN, supra note 112, at 79.
115 Pursuant to the standard theory, firms are run for the benefit of shareholders. See, e.g.,
BAUMAN ET. AL., supra note 108, at 465. That theory could (but does not) require officers and
directors to do everything possible to maximize the value of those stockholders' shares.
However, the business judgment rule acts as a check on judicial imposition of a strict sort of
"profit only" interpretation of management's duties. And judicial interpretation of the business
judgment rule has been fairly deferential to management decision-making. For a lengthy
discussion of why corporate law does not (and ought not) create a duty to maximize shareholder
value to the exclusion of some limited profit sacrificing behavior, see Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733 (2005). For discussions of the
shareholder primacy theory and a duty to enhance profits, as well as the argument that this
position results in the best social outcomes, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End
of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440-41 (2001). For a comparison of the
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included rather more extravagant corporate misconduct than some of the
eras that immediately preceded it, the existence of corporate law-
breaking in pursuit of profit is not only not anomalous, it is endemic." 16
The choice to breach and pay damages may be an efficient strategy in
contract regimes, but when it comes to issues touching on the public
health, the environment, and investor confidence, a decision to incur a
fine in order to engage in the conduct sought to be deterred may not be
an optimal one for society as a whole, even if it is for the company in
question.' '7 The catalog of ways in which corporate misconduct has
contributed to social ills-environmental pollution, harmful products,
lost pensions, and so forth-seems sufficiently obvious to negate the
question of whether there is a problem." 18 There is no question there is
a problem; the question is what to do about the problem.
While many observers of the past decade's corporate misconduct
focus their attention on the ethical issues, recalibrating executive
compensation, or possible changes to the corporate structure and
accounting rules for preventing future "Enrons," 19 too little attention
has been paid to a key factor making scenarios like Enron possible-
corporate communications. Enron's management systematically failed
to communicate important facts that investors, employees, and the
public might want to know while simultaneously flooding the market
with ersatz "information" designed to package, promote, and "sell" the
public on its own version of the corporation's worth. 120 It could do this
development of differing norms on this issue as between the U.S. and Europe, see Mark J. Roe,
The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
2063 (2001). Of course there is never a fiduciary duty to break the law. The problem is that it is
often unclear that the law has been broken until after the fact.
116 For example, see the four-page list of criminal and civil violations committed by General
Electric between 1990 and 2001 in Joel Bakan's study of the corporation. BAKAN, supra note
112, at 75-78. See also Russell Mokhiber, Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade,
CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/topl00.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2008) (the list includes many of the FORTUNE 500 companies); Editorial, Corporate
Crime and Punishment, 26 MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Nov.-Dec. 2005, available at
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2005/112005/editorial.html ("Does corporate crime
pay? Increasingly, not only does it pay, it's not even prosecuted-not even when the corporate
crime cops have the goods on the bad guys.").
117 Of course it is possible that it is as good as it gets. It is not at all clear that the availability
of punishments like imprisonment acts as a deterrent that is as meaningful as we might like to
think it is.
118 Antisocial conduct is arguably a problem that the criminal law does not adequately address
in any context. That argument is beyond the scope of this Article. However, large multinational
corporations with resources exceeding that of many countries clearly can do damage on a larger
scale than most individuals or even explicitly criminal syndicates could ever image in their
wildest dreams.
119 See ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 27 (collected
essays discussing how Enron happened and offering some proposals for reform).
120 See Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling: How Enron's
Public Image Morphed from the Most Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to the Most
Notorious Company Ever, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra
[Vol. 29:62608
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because of a legal environment in which duties to disclose are
sometimes ambiguous and may be laxly enforced (even in the absence
of an intent to deceive), while there is, in contrast, virtually unbridled
freedom for corporate speech that takes the form of marketing and
public relations. 121 Frank Rich, media columnist for the New York
Times, claims that it was public relations propaganda that propped up
Enron's "house of cards."'122 An intensive spin campaign may explain
how the company managed to convince investors, the financial media,
note 27, at 77-94 (describing public relations success); Frank Rich, Enron Patron Saint of Bush's
Fake News, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, §2, at I (detailing some of the public relations exercises
that created the image that Rapoport and Van Niel describe).
There may be good reasons to think that organizational culture, and perhaps Enron's in
particular, encourages undue optimism in its actors. For a general discussion of the ways in
which the context of an organization, common cognitive strategies such as optimistic bias, and
the like may either lead to inadequate information or predispose managers to interpret such
information they have in an overly optimistic fashion or engage in concealment, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Organized Illusions. A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock
Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997). Professor
Langevoort's discussion offers convincing grounds for believing that individuals such as Jeffrey
Skilling may not necessarily have intentionally engaged in wrong doing because a variety of
cognitive biases, including the optimistic bias, cloud managers' perceptions. "[T]hese cognitive
biases are the primary explanation for a host of suboptimal strategic decisions of the type
chronically observed in industry: overbidding for assets, plant overexpansion, and foolish entry
into new lines of business." Id. at 140. See also FINE, supra note 63, at Ill ("Twisting
information and self-censoring arguments-strategies we unconsciously use to keep the balance
of evidence weighing more heavily on our own side of the scales-keep us buoyantly self-
assured.").
Whether these biases are the primary explanation is perhaps debatable. But their existence
is plausible and is corroborated by some of the facts. These factors may affect the moral weight
given to the actions of these individuals. And perhaps it should affect the availability or the
application of criminal sanctions. Nevertheless, we are left with the dilemma of how to minimize
the damage from these somewhat predictable psychological strategies. Given the phenomena
Professor Langevoort discusses, it seems even less likely that broad Constitutional protection for
commercial or corporate speech will ameliorate the problem. To the contrary, it seems rather
likely to exacerbate it.
121 I have addressed the argument for including public relations as commercial speech in
greater detail in an earlier article. See Tamara R. Piety, Free Advertising- The Case for Public
Relations as Commercial Speech, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 367 (2006). The present essay
focuses on the correspondence, or lack thereof, between theories of protection for speech under
the First Amendment and the theories and realities of corporate personhood.
122 Rich, supra note 120. One example of such P.R. efforts was the infamous tour Enron
executives gave financial analysts of Enron's newly launched EES division in 1998. The analysts
were taken to the 6th floor in Enron's headquarters.
There, they beheld the very picture of a sophisticated, booming business: a big open
room, bustling with people, all busily working the telephones and hunched over
computer terminals, seemingly cutting deals and trading energy. Giant plasma screens
displayed electronic maps, which could show the sites of EES's many contracts and
prospects. Commodity prices danced across an electronic ticker. "It was very
impressive," recalls analyst John Olson, who, at the time, covered the company for
Merrill Lynch. "It was a veritable beehive of activity."
It was also a veritable sham. The war room had been rapidly fitted out explicitly to
impress the analysts.
BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE
AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 179-80 (2003).
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and the public at large that it was spectacularly successful, despite little
in the way of factual support for its claims of profits and many good
reasons for skepticism. 123
"Spin," how a story plays, and the "spectacle" are all-important
considerations in influencing behavior of all kinds: consumer,
political, 24 and personal. Corporate speakers attempt to manage these
impressions with massive expenditures for speech of all kinds. 25 And
while they may sometimes be truthful and informational, they are
always promotional. So we can expect that this speech will
systematically exclude negative truthful information. Given the
structure of the for-profit corporation, the diffusion of responsibility and
the pressure on a corporation's human representative to subsume
complex personal and political goals into a single goal for the
corporation-profit enhancement-there is little reason to expect the
corporation to disclose information that might be harmful to it, absent a
legal duty to do so. Yet even when there is such a duty there is some
reason to believe that the disclosures, when made, are not as effective as
the law presumes they are126 any more than the existence of a duty
123 Enron's continuing to post profits despite being unable to show how it generated them, and
in spite of a refusal to offer balance sheets and cash flow statements, led some observers to refer
to it as a "black box." MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 122, at 320-21. At least one commentator
makes a similar criticism of the Tyco collapse. See Jeff Matthews, This Just In: "Spin" Becomes
"Lying," Jeff Matthews is Not Making This Up,
http://jeffmatthewsisnotmakingthisup.blogspot.com/2005/06/this-just-in-spin-becomes-lying.html
(last visited June 19, 2005).
124 How else to explain widespread apathy with respect to the failure to find WMD (weapons
of mass destruction) in Iraq? One of the most blatant examples of marketing language infiltrating
the political sphere is the explanation President Bush's Chief of Staff Andrew Card gave for the
timing of the Iraq war invasion: "You don't introduce new products in August." George Packer,
Comment, Name Calling, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 8, 2005, at 33.
125 Throughout this article when I refer to "corporations" I principally mean large, publicly
traded, for-profit corporations. But much of what I say here could be applied to any form of
relatively large business organization-the partnership, the LLC, or any variation thereof. If of
sufficient size, even a close corporation may have widespread impact on the tenor and type of
speech in the market. Could be, but not necessarily. Analysis of other business forms is beyond
the scope of this article.
126 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 120, at 141 ("[A] 'can-do' culture built on... adaptive
biases will prize dismissal of risk and reject any effort to accept and acknowledge their
seriousness publicly .... Such belief systems may not easily tolerate forms of publicity or
disclosure that are at odds with the corporate self-image."); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope,
Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law From Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and
Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996) (discussing paradox of paying for
investment advice given brokers clear conflict problems and research that suggests buyers often
do not read prospectuses because of reliance on brokers); Howard A. Latin, "Good" Warnings,
Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1211-14 (1994) (discussing
information overload, which although raised in Latin's article in the context of tort, is probably a
significant ground for concern in the securities market as well). For a general discussion of some
communications problems in market information for consumers, see Jon Hanson & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 630 (1999), and Jon Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously- Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999).
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under the law guarantees that disclosures will in fact be made.
However, when the absence of important disclosures is combined with
the proliferation of salient, appealing misinformation, it seems difficult
to conclude that no harm has been done.
These observations may be fairly unexceptional. Enron's officers
lied, and that happens sometimes. The law may not be a very effective
deterrent to intentional wrongdoing. However, the importance of the
misrepresentations is that they take place at a time when large,
multinational corporations are seeking greater constitutional protection
for speech, that is-broadly speaking-marketing speech, and, as is
explored below, they seem poised to get it.l27 Before additional
protection is extended to for-profit, promotional corporate speech, it
pays to examine its role in contributing to these massive market
failures 128 and threats to public health and welfare.
Since the 1970s, governmental regulation of commercial speech,
particularly in the form of advertising, has come under increasing
scrutiny as a burden on freedom of expression. 29 While it is difficult to
127 The recent Nike v. Kasky case suggested that a majority of the members of the Supreme
Court seemed inclined to think that fairness and equal time for all viewpoints required that Nike's
"viewpoint" be given constitutional protection, lest its communication be unduly "chilled." 539
U.S. 654 (2003). Although the Supreme Court did not decide the commercial speech issues
presented because the Court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds, both the concurring and
dissenting opinions in that decision suggested that several members of the Court found Nike's
arguments persuasive. Justice Stevens' opinion concurring in the dismissal, which was joined by
Ginsburg and Souter in the relevant part, see Nike, 539 U.S. at 656 (Stevens, J. concurring),
reflects a concern for the potential "chilling effect" if Kasky's lawsuit was able to go forward; a
concern that presumes that corporations offer valuable input in this context and that overlooks the
significance of the demurrer that meant Nike was effectively asking for constitutional carte
blanche to engage in intentional deception. See Piety, supra note 9. Kennedy dissented without
opinion, but in an opinion in an earlier case he suggested that, in his view, the Central Hudson
test was insufficiently protective of "truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech." See Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia joined
Justice Kennedy in this opinion. Justice Breyer wrote a dissent in Nike from the decision to
dismiss, indicating he would have preferred to decide the Nike case. 539 U.S. at 665 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). His opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor, left little doubt that he generally supported
Nike's argument. He appeared to agree that allowing Kasky's lawsuit to proceed would have a
"chilling effect" on future speech. Justice Thomas has straightforwardly announced his support
for treating advertising speech like political speech. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at
572 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I would subject all of the advertising restrictions to strict scrutiny
and would hold that they violate the First Amendment."). By my count, even excepting Justice
O'Connor and taking account in the changes in the make-up of the Court, this suggests that a
majority of the Court is receptive, at least in part, to arguments such as Nike advanced.
128 By "market failures" I do not necessarily mean the term in the same way an economist
would. I am referring to massive business failures.
129 See Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 758-60
(1976) (discussing the historical movement of the Court's decisions to greater protection for
commercial speech). See also ROGER A. SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION 25-69
(2003) (discussing history of freedom for commercial expression in the United States); Alan B.
Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist's Recollections, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1189 (2004) (discussing the context in which Virginia Pharmacy was
argued by one of the Consumer Council's lawyers). It could be argued that commercial speech as
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identify the cause for the parallels, during that same period corporations
have pressed for and increasingly obtained greater roles in politics in the
form of contributions to candidates or causes, 130 the formation of
political action committees or other groups to lobby on their behalf,
131
and the practice of proposing legislation designed to address their
interests.1 32 A key component on which this trend has been built is the
notion of the corporation as a "person"' 33-a person with rights to
a category did not exist until the Virginia Pharmacy Court created it.
130 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (extending First Amendment rights to
corporations' expenditures for advertising that related to political lobbying). But see Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (retreating from Bellotti to the extent that
Bellotti suggested no distinction between human and corporate speakers and maintaining that
corporations were creatures of the state and enjoyed certain advantages pursuant to law that
human beings did not, advantages that may at times justify corresponding restrictions not
applicable to people); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
131 See, e.g., JOHN C. STAUBER & SHELDON RAMPTON, TOXIC SLUDGE IS GOOD FOR YOU!
(1995) (describing influence of public relations lobbying, primarily, but not exclusively, on
behalf of business interests). For a similar description of the influence of PR in Canada, see
JOYCE C. NELSON, SULTANS OF SLEAZE (1989).
132 For example, the recent reforms of the bankruptcy laws, making it more difficult for
individuals to declare bankruptcy were largely written by the credit card industry for its own
benefit to make it more difficult to discharge credit card debt. See, e.g., Michael Schroeder &
Suem Hwang, Revised Chapters: Sweeping New Bankruptcy Law to Make Life Harder for
Debtors; After 8 Years, Legislation Finally Nears Passage; No Limits on Card Giants; A Day
Trader's Bills Come Due, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2005, at A1. "On April 20, President Bush signed
what has been termed the biggest rewrite of U.S. bankruptcy law in a quarter century. The bill,
titled the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (the "Bill"), takes
direct aim at the ability of consumers to discharge their debts through Chapter 7 Liquidation and
Chapter 13 Reorganization by making the process more difficult and more expensive for
consumers." Michael J. Davis, The New Bankruptcy Code: Goodbye Consumer Chapter 7 Cases,
17 DCBA BRIEF 16 (2005). See also Elizabeth Warren, The Over-Consumption Myth and Other
Tales of Economics, Law, and Morality, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1485, 1507-11 (2004) (noting the
industry's role in obtaining bankruptcy law revisions that, according to Professor Warren, shift
the issuer's responsibility to do adequate credit reviews onto the publicly funded courts and
attributing the popularity of what she describes as the "over-consumption myth" as the product of
"public relations campaigns and vote buying"); Elizabeth Warren, Op-Ed., Show Me the Money,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at A21 (describing banks' role in lobbying for the bankruptcy law
revisions).
133 Initially corporations were thought to have only those rights that were explicitly granted to
them. See Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636-37 (1819).
However, in the late nineteenth century the Court began shifting to the view that corporations
were "persons" for purposes analyzing some rights. This shift is commonly attributed to the
Court's decision in Santa Clara Co. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). "Thus, the Court
converted an amendment primarily designed to protect the rights of blacks into an amendment
whose major effect, for the next seventy years, was to protect the rights of corporations." Mark
Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 256 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
For an excellent discussion of the history of the development of corporate theory, as well as an
argument that what Justice Field meant by corporate personhood in 1886 is significantly different
from the natural entity theory that later developed, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960 65-107 (Ch. 3, Santa Clara Revisited: The
Development of Corporate Theory). See also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 112-17 (9th ed. 2004) (discussing the development of current
doctrine); TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA (2003) (describing the rise of corporate power);
ARNOLD, supra note 15, pp 185-206 (Chapter VIII-The Personification of Corporation).
2008] AGAINST FREEDOM 2613
freedom of expression equal to those of human beings. 134
This trend to push for corporate rights paralleling those of human
beings is not one limited to the United States. It is global. At least, the
same trend is discernable in Canada and Europe. 35 For example,
corporations have sought protection under the guarantees for human
rights in the European Union arguing that restrictions on advertising are
violations of the right of freedom of expression set forth in Article 10 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. 136 Given that some European countries have laws regulating
advertising which are significantly more restrictive than U.S. law, 137 it
134 See, e.g., Brief for ExxonMobil et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835523 at *2 ("Nike's speech and speech by
corporations on other matters of public concern merit the highest level of First Amendment
protection."). One might expect such positions from commercial entities. More surprising were
the statements of support from organizations like the ACLU and the Thomas Jefferson Center for
the Protection of Freedom of Expression. Both entities filed briefs in support of the proposition
that freedom for corporate speech was an essential component of freedom of speech for all. See
Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union & the ACLU of Northern California as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL
721563 (arguing that a lawsuit by a California activist charging that Nike had issued false
statements in its press releases infringed on the First Amendment rights of Nike); Brief for the
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression & the Media Institute as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL
1192678.
135 See SHINER, supra note 129, at 70-93, 94-110 (describing similar moves to greater
protections for commercial expression in Canada and Europe respectively).
136 See, e.g., 2003 O.J. (C 289) 57 (Notice by Kreuzer Medien GmbH against the European
Parliament and the Council for the European Union challenging the regulation of tobacco
products as "infring[ing]" on "the freedom of expression safeguarded by Article II of the Charter
of fundamental rights of the European Union and Article 10(l) of the ECHR"). Attempts to limit
the governmental regulation of products causing health risks have met with mixed success. See,
e.g., Germany v. European Parliament, 2000 E.C.R. 1-8419, para. 175 ("I conclude, therefore, that
the Advertising Directive does not constitute a disproportionate restriction of freedom of
expression in so far as it imposes a comprehensive prohibition on the advertising of tobacco
products."). See also Press Release, E.C.J., Advocate General Fennelly Proposes That the Court
of Justice Annul Directive on the Advertising and Sponsorship of Tobacco Products (June 15,
2000), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cpOO/aff/cpOO45en.htm.
Although the effect of decisions such as this one is ambiguous, see Benjamin Apt, On the
Right to Freedom of Expression in the European Union, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 69, 86-87 (1998)
("The legal status of the Convention in the EU has [] been perpetually ambiguous."), such
decisions are instructive because they help to shape public perceptions. For an overview of the
approach to commercial speech in Canada and Europe, see SHINER, supra note 129, at 70-116.
137 For example, Sweden prohibits advertisements targeting children under the age of twelve.
Lennart Lindstrom & Marten Stenstrom, Sweden, in THE EUROPEAN HANDBOOK ON
ADVERTISING LAW 775, 789 (Lord Campbell of Alloway & Zahd Yaqub eds., 1999) (citing 6 ch.
l(b) § Radio-och TV-lagen (SFS 1996:844) ("advertising must not be targeted at children below
the age of 12")). British regulators recently "introduced new rules barring depictions of links
between sex and drinking in alcohol advertisements." Eric Pfanner, No Hunks in the Alcohol
Advertisements, Please, We're British, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2005, at C4. However, such bans
might be difficult to implement in practice. As the former Deputy Director of the FTC has
recently remarked in a symposium, "[W]e had trouble tailoring a regulation that would prohibit
ads only in programs watched by young children because, it turns out there aren't any programs
just watched by very young children; audiences are all intermixed together." Tracy Westen,
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seems likely that if the EU continues on this path of accepting
arguments that commercial speech by corporations is entitled to
protection as a human right, it might eventually pose a threat to the
continued viability of those regulatory efforts. 13 8
The question is: Why should corporations have human rights? 39
Protecting for-profit corporations as "persons" undermines the notion
that either human beings possess certain rights because they are ends in
themselves, or that the status of human being deserves special solicitude
and protection by and from government.1 40 Nevertheless, the argument
that corporations are "speakers" with speech rights of all kinds is one
with enormous rhetorical power. By claiming expressive rights,
corporations invoke cherished notions of autonomy, freedom, and
fairness. 141
Behind the respect traditionally given in liberal democratic thought
Government Regulation of Food Marketing to Children: The Federal Trade Commission and the
Kid- Vid Controversy, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79, 85 (2006).
138 Of course it may be that other countries will be just as likely to reject an argument that has
convinced the courts in the U.S. Although U.S. law presumably has influence simply because of
its power (both market power and political power) it is by no means universally admired or
copied in every respect. Moreover, there is no clear analog to the First Amendment in most other
economically advanced democratic systems.
139 Many of the arguments I advance here, or some version thereof, were first proposed by
others, including but not limited to, professors Daniel Greenwood, Roger Shiner, Joel Bakan, and
C. Edwin Baker. See Greenwood, supra note 109; SHINER, supra note 129; BAKAN, supra note
112; C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech
Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2004) [hereinafter Baker, Paternalism]; C.
EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994) [hereinafter BAKER,
ADVERTISING].
140 There are several philosophical roots for this position but one of the most pertinent for
purposes of constitutional analysis comes from John Locke and his observations in the Second
Treatise on Government that human beings have equal rights to "life liberty, health and property,"
an observation which was clearly influential on the Framers. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT 6 (1689). Another proponent of the position of human beings as having special
status is ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
141 However, it is worthwhile to take extravagant statements about the deep commitment to
freedom of speech with a grain of salt, given that there is very little of such freedom in the
workplace (that is, if one wants to keep his job). Furthermore, work is where a number of
citizens spend most of their waking hours. An analysis of the way in which employers are able to
punish speech with which they disagree suggests that as a society, or at least in law, deference to
property mostly trumps deference to freedom of speech. See, e.g., Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co.,
396 N.W.2d 167 (Wisc. 1986) (at-will employee had no wrongful discharge claim on grounds
that his discharge had been connected to speech on matters of public concern). See also Cynthia
L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101 (1995); Richard
Michael Fischl, Labor, Management, and the First Amendment: Whose Rights Are These,
Anyway?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 729 (1989). Moreover, there is some evidence that the
whistleblower protection provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley have not proven particularly effective.
Three years ago, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law and hailed as a safety net
for employees who stepped forward and revealed wrongdoing at their companies. But
of the hundreds of people who lost jobs and filed complaints since the act was passed,
only two are actually back at their jobs.
Jayne O'Donnell, Blowing the Whistle Can Lead to Harsh Aftermath, Despite Law, USA TODAY,
Aug. 1, 2005, at lB.
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to freedom of expression as an ideal lies an attractive picture of
human beings as autonomous choosers, and of human flourishing as
relying on freely chosen sociality. The corporate domination of both
the real market and the market-place of ideas defaces this attractive
picture. 142
There are few signs that the trend to extend greater expressive
rights to corporations is slowing. If anything, it appears to have gained
ground with the Nike v. Kasky case. 143
The issue in Nike was whether Nike could be held liable if its
statements concerning its labor practices were false. 144 What Nike tried
to obtain in the lower courts (although it retreated from this position
before the Supreme Court) was the freedom to say whatever it deemed
in its best interest without any liability should some of its statements
later be deemed false, even if the false statements were made with
knowledge that they were false. 145 In the Supreme Court Nike claimed
that because its statements were made in the form of public relations
speech and contained arguments about globalization, its statements were
opinions on matters of public concern that ought to be protected as
political speech and their truth or falsity tested under a New York Times
v. Sullivan1 46 actual malice standard. 147 It argued that the actual malice
standard was appropriate in order to ensure balance in debate on matters
of public concern. 148
Apart from the interesting challenge posed by the requirement that
plaintiff demonstrate corporate schizophrenia by proving Nike's
statements about itself were made "with actual malice,"' 149 what this
142 SHINER, supra note 129, at 3. A parallel issue, not dealt with in this article, is whether
multinational corporations ought to observe standards of conduct with respect to human rights
similar to those imposed on governmental actors. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Fishman, Binding
Corporations to Human Rights Norms Through Public Law Settlements, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1433
(2006).
143 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
144 1 have analyzed this aspect of Nike's claim in some detail in an earlier piece. See Piety,
supra note 9. For a somewhat different angle on this case see David C. Vladeck, Lessons From A
Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049 (2004). Indeed,
anyone interested in the Nike case should read all of the articles in the Case Western Reserve Law
Review symposium issue on the case. Symposium, Nike v. Kasky and the Modern Commercial
Speech Doctrine, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965 (2004).
145 See, e.g., Deborah J. La Fetra, Kick it Up a Notch: First Amendment Protection for
Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1205, 1210 (2004).
146 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
147 See Brief for the Petitioners at 43, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575),
2003 WL 898993.
148 Id. at 44-45 (contending that some erroneous statement in speech is inevitable and
protection must be given to that error).
149 It is, as noted above, difficult to attribute any "state of mind" to a legal fiction, let alone a
disordered state of mind. But a corporation might have a better basis for a claim to something
like multiple personality disorder to the extent that there are several people "in there" in the
corporate "mind." Joel Bakan claims that pursuant to the criteria in the DSM-IV the corporation
is a psychopath. BAKAN, supra note 112, at 56-59 (corporations are "singularly self-interested"
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argument elides is that because Nike's views are organized around the
corporate imperative of profit, its expression is always marketing and
thus not opinion in the usual sense of the word. 150
For-profit corporations adopt the opinions and positions their
managers think are most congenial to business operations. 151 "[A]ny
speech financed by a for-profit corporation, if it is not a
misappropriation of corporate funds, is commercial in that the only
legitimate criterion for deciding to fund the speech is whether it serves
the commercial interests of the company." 152  Moreover, Nike's
resources devoted to communication are such that only the willfully
blind could claim it had not had ample, indeed disproportionate,
opportunity to air its views so that "balance" hardly seems to require
that it be insulated from liability for false statements. 153 Also, the
structure of corporate purpose and the social context in which it takes
place runs a perhaps larger than ordinary risk that corporations will
suppress truthful speech where it appears disclosure would interfere
with its business objectives.15 4
Of course, there is no more reason to presume that corporations
will generally be truthful any more often than human beings are.
However, unlike human beings, corporations are not ends in themselves
but institutions created to further human aims.
and display attributes that map diagnostic criteria for psychopathy). However useful this is as an
insight into the ways in which the laws governing corporations may systematically generate
antisocial behaviors, I am not sure we want to go down this path. It seems to be taking
anthropomorphism a step too far.
150 "Unlike groups of citizens, who must always debate the proper and shifting balance of
conflicting values, corporations will pursue a single value to the detriment of all others."
Greenwood, supra note 109, at 1051. "There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value." Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 116, at 439. For a critique of the notion that this state of affairs is
unproblematic because a broader than ever class of persons own stock, primarily through pension
funds, see Paddy Ireland, Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth, 68 MOD. L. REV.
49 (2005). See also EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: A STUDY OF THE INCREASING
INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2002).
151 One vivid illustration of the nature of corporate speech is the report in The New York Times
of an increase in corporate political contributions to the Democratic Party. Jeff Zeleny & Aron
Pilhofer, Democrats Get Late Donations From Business, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at Al.
These contributions are presumably made in the hopes of preserving influence and audiences, not
out of any change in political viewpoints. Indeed, desire for influence, not principles, surely
explains why so many corporate donors regularly contribute to both parties.
152 Bennigson, supra note 4, at 395 (emphasis added).
153 For example, in the Nike suit, the plaintiff, Kasky, alleged that in 1997 Nike spent "almost
$1 billion" on advertising and promotion. Amended Complaint at 5, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 539
U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 994446).
154 It is always possible, perhaps even likely (although I could not say this is true as an
empirical matter), that responsible corporate managers might conclude that suppressing negative
truthful information will result in a short term gain at the expense of a longer run cost and that




Legitimacy [of an organization] means that no arrangement of
relations or of power recognized in law should be treated as an end in
itself or as autonomous. An institution must be legitimated by its
utility to some chosen end other than its own perpetuation. An
institution which wields practical power-which compels men's
wills or behavior-must be accountable for its purposes and its
performance by criteria not wholly in the control of the institution
itself. 155
A key issue in the Enron and WorldCom fiascos, and many others
of the corporate rogue's gallery, was whether these organizations, or
rather, the people speaking on their behalf, told the truth-whether they
disclosed what needed to be disclosed or made statements intended to
mislead investors (or others who might be expected to rely on their
statements). If Nike had gotten what it wanted, a constitutional shield
for false statements, would Sarbanes-Oxley matter? 156 Or would a
constitutional defense be available which would trump any legislative
intervention?
The proponents of freedom for commercial expression claim that
such protection is needed because without it public debate will be
unbalanced: one speaker will be unduly chilled. 157 This presumes it is
not unbalanced already. But given the incentive structures discussed,
the danger in extending such expansive protection to for-profit
corporations is that massive amounts of false speech will be injected
into the market without any clear checking force and that such
protection, combined with robust protection for intellectual property
such as trademark and copyright law, along with the application of
notions of defamation and libel to corporations, will result in imbalance
and chilling of debate in the other direction. 158 Indeed, one might
plausibly argue that the current state of affairs is imbalanced in favor of
corporate speech even without expansive First Amendment protection
for commercial speech simply on the basis of the disparity of resources
available. The infamous "McLibel" case in the U.K. is an example of
this problem and offers a window into what we might expect if U.S. law
155 JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 58 (1970).
156 Some observers have argued that Sarbanes-Oxley is mostly not responsive to fixing the
problems that led to the Enron fiasco and that many of its provisions are likely to do little to
advance the goal of greater corporate responsibility. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 102.
157 Fred Schauer has described the doctrine of chill as part of the substantive ordering of
values under the First Amendment as it implies the inevitability of error and a preference that
those errors run in favor of protecting more speech. See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the
First Amendment. Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REv. 685 (1978).
158 See LAWRENCE SOLEY, CENSORSHIP, INC.: THE CORPORATE THREAT TO FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES (2002). Soley's treatment is more comprehensive than this piece in that he
discusses the control of employee speech and the employment of SLAPP suits (Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation).
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were to be reformed to be as solicitous of libel for a corporation as the
law in the U.K. 159
The "McLibel" case began when McDonald's sued two
impecunious members of London Greenpeace 160 for libel because of
their distribution of leaflets that protested a number of McDonald's
business practices, primarily related to environmental impact, labor
practices, and nutrition. McDonald's initially sued members of London
Greenpeace after having put the group under surveillance by private
investigators for several months, surveillance that included infiltration
of its meetings. 161 Under the threat of liability pursuant to Britain's
very plaintiff-protective libel laws, McDonald's extracted apologies and
retractions from three members of the group. 162 However, members
Helen Steel and David Morris refused to apologize, so McDonald's
sued them. Steel and Morris were too poor to hire lawyers, and they
were clearly not economic competitors of McDonald's, 163  yet
McDonald's saw fit to launch what became, at the time, the longest
running trial in English history 164 in order to, as its representatives put
it, "stop people telling lies."'1 65
Not every speaker has the kind of resources that McDonald's has
to "stop people telling lies," or, perhaps more accurately, to promote
and enforce its version of the truth. And when the lies in question may
cause widespread social harm, for example with respect to a product
like tobacco, 166 it is difficult to see where a matching force for counter
159 See The McLibel Trial, http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/index.html (last visited Aug. 27,
2005). A feature-length documentary was recently released about the case. See MCLIBEL: THE
POSTMAN AND THE GARDNER WHO TOOK ON MCDONALD'S, available at
http://www.spannerfilms.net/?lid=161 (last visited Aug. 27, 2005).
160 The organization London Greenpeace was not affiliated in any way with Greenpeace, the
more well known organization.
161 See The McLibel Trial: Story, http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/story.html (last visited
Aug. 27, 2005).
162 McDonald's had earlier extracted apologies and retractions from some media organizations
which had reproduced the leaflet or discussed the claims. Id.
163 Id.
164 "McLibel " Pair Win Legal Aid Case, BBC NEWS UK EDITION, Feb. 15, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/4266209.stm.
165 Statement distributed by McDonald's Restaurants, Ltd. via leaflets in McDonald's
restaurants in London in April and May of 1994, explaining why it was suing Steel and Morris,
available at http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/pretrial/factsheetreply.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2006). It appears McDonald's management was not confident that the marketplace of ideas
would sufficiently sort out who was telling lies. Apparently McDonald's is not interested in
hearing from critics, although in its Corporate Responsibility Report McDonald's notes that, "In
order to be successful as a business, we must listen." MCDONALD'S WORLDWIDE 2006
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 12, available at
http://www.mcdonalds.com/corp/values/report/printable.html (emphasis added).
166 For example, in one study researchers found that there was a significant correlation
between exposure to tobacco marketing other than traditional advertising, such as product
placement, promotional displays and the like, and the initiation of tobacco use despite existence
of fairly broad restrictions on tobacco advertising, suggesting to the study's authors that even
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speech is likely to come absent governmental intervention. Because of
the single-mindedness of corporate purpose-profit-making-
corporations' management is most interested in freedom of expression
(particularly freedom from liability) for the corporations' speech. Its
members are less keen to extend the freedom of expression to others,
even when those others offer very little commercial threat and appear to
be engaged in quintessential political speech activities.1 67
Still, perhaps it might be said that McDonald's was acting in this
case no differently than a natural person might. As noted First
Amendment scholar Thomas Emerson observed, "[i]t has been common
for individuals and groups who demanded freedom of expression for
themselves to insist that it be denied to others. ' 168 But large for-profit
corporations are not just like any other speaker. They, more than almost
any other institution in modem, advanced economies, have massive
resources with which to speak and to defend their views. They can do
so in court, a venue often unavailable to ordinary people because of the
high costs of litigation. They can influence legislation through
lobbying, drafting proposed legislation, funding not-for-profit think
tanks dedicated to their issues, campaign contributions, and political
advertising. And they have a larger role in creating the conditions for
all communication and mediating the way people relate to other aspects
of their lives. 169 But their boards of directors are not elected by the
more "comprehensive controls" on such marketing efforts were called for. Marc T. Braverman &
Leif Edvard Aaro, Adolescent Smoking and Exposure to Tobacco Marketing Under a Tobacco
Advertising Ban: Findings From Norwegian National Samples, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 7 (2004)
(analyzing two sets of over 4,000 respondents), available at
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1448426 (last visited June 15, 2007).
167 The "McLibel" case is not solely attributable to the relative strictness of English libel law.
Corporate interests have launched similar efforts in the United States. One example is the case
brought against comedian Al Franken by the Fox News Network. See Fox News Network, LLC
v. Penguin Group (USA), Inc., 2003 WL 23281520 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The case was quickly
dismissed. Id. Nevertheless, it is indicative of the trend for more protection for commercial
speech, given that Fox's lawyers did not dismiss this lawsuit out of hand as unwarranted by
existing law, see FED. R. CIv. P. 1 1(b)(2), and that it was brought at all. Indeed, part of what
makes the case such a good example of the trend is that so many people, including the court and
many observers, seemed to think the claim was facially ridiculous. Apparently it was not
ridiculous enough to deter Fox's lawyers. For a survey of much more troubling cases where
corporations have been more successful in suppressing expression, see Vladeck, supra note 144,
at 1077-78 and accompanying text. For a book length treatment of the subject, see KEMBREW
MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: OVERZEALOUS COPYRIGHT BOZOS AND OTHER ENEMIES
OF CREATIVITY (2005).
168 Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
888 (1963).
169 Indeed, some churches have begun to adopt the language of marketing to promote
themselves. See Bill Sherman, Confronting the Great Disconnect, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 4, 2006,
at A6 (describing Baptist church organization's use of census data and marketing concepts to
"develop strategies to develop relationships" with people in the community as a means of
enlarging congregations). See also VINCENT J. MILLER, CONSUMING RELIGION: CHRISTIAN
FAITH AND PRACTICE IN A CONSUMER CULTURE (2005).
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public at large.
Although it could be argued that disparity in resources and abilities
to project one's message are just a necessary corollary of freedom, this
argument focuses too much on the way corporate persons might be said
to resemble natural persons and glosses over their very significant
structural and moral differences from natural persons, differences that
suggest that corporate entities neither need, nor should be granted, the
sorts of liberal speech rights that are (at least in theory) the birthright of
natural persons. 70 In this essay I review some of those differences and
argue that both in theory and in practice it is not only permissible to
differentiate between natural and legal persons but necessary to do so in
order to retain even a modicum of governmental impact on important
social goals. I do not suppose that declining to extend full speech rights
to commercial interests will be the panacea to address all the social ills
raised here. Far from it. Agency capture, lack of political will to fund
and/or enforce regulations, and many other factors presumably play a
role in our current situation. I do suggest that meaningful progress on
goals such as slowing or reversing trends with respect to environmental
degradation and the protection of public health will be difficult to
accomplish without some governmental controls on commercial speech.
A. The Structure of a Corporation
It appears to have always been a matter of some conceptual
difficulty how the law ought to deal with corporations. The idea that
corporations are "persons" for some purposes under the law is one of
long standing. 17' Initially, corporations were authorized solely by the
grant of a charter from the government. 172 The understanding was that
such charters were to be sparingly granted and only where the proposed
corporate enterprise served some greater purpose for the common good
rather than merely the enhancement of wealth for investors.173 As a
creature of the state's creation, the corporation was subject to the state
(or the Crown), which often detailed how the corporation was to be
internally governed, and prescribed limitations on its term of life, the
number of shareholders, and so forth. 174 Typically the grant was
170 It seems worthwhile to observe that if corporations, unlike persons, should not have social
responsibilities because they are not people, this should be a valid basis for refusing to extend
corresponding rights. For an argument that distinctions between legal persons should be centered
in the corporeal, see David Graver, Personal Bodies: A Corporeal Theory of Corporate
Personhood, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 235 (1999).
171 See supra note 132.
172 See HORWITZ, supra note 133, at 72-73.
173 See, e.g., HURST, supra note 155, at 13-57.
174 Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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extended in order to perform some public service. This concept of the
business corporation-as an organization with a quasi-public function
and strict regulation by government-situated the corporation in its
early days, particularly with respect to public works like bridges and
canals, as a sort of extension of the governmental function-an early
example of privatization. 175
As technology created opportunities for economic expansion, the
charter, or grant theory of the corporate form seemed less suitable, or
even practicable, for the growing economy. Some saw the charter
system as vulnerable to abuse and leading to undesirable concentrations
of economic power through patronage.
"Free incorporation," that is, the move to make incorporation more
generally available and less subject to the whims of the legislature or
the favor of particular lawmakers, was seen as a way to both stimulate
economic growth and ensure greater democratization of that growth.
States began to compete to offer incorporation statutes which promised
the most attractive legal environment for incorporation by relaxing or
dispensing with much of the prior regulatory supervision.176
"Gradually, by making the corporate form universally available, free
175 "From the 1780's well into the mid-nineteenth century the most frequent and conspicuous
use of the business corporation-especially under special charters-was for one particular type of
enterprise, that which we later call the public utility and put under particular regulation because of
its special impact in the community." HURST, supra note 155, at 17. See also Samuel Williston,
History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 110 (1888)
("But the corporation was far from being regarded as simply an organization for the more
convenient prosecution of business. It was looked on as a public agency ...."). The corporate
form was also initiated as a way for religious and charitable institutions to hold property, and
such organizations were rather liberally granted charters. See HURST, supra note 155, at 16. The
incorporation of churches and charitable groups, and the inclusion of other political not-for-
profits do not mean that there were and are no distinctions in their organization from that of the
for-profit organization. "[T]he law regulating the relations of the members to each other and to
the united body must differ according to the nature and objects of the corporation." Williston,
supra, at 123. On the other hand, the law applied to one was often applied to the other as in the
Dartmouth College case itself which involved a charitable institution. Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1605 (1988). But in many
respects the law treats for-profit and not-for-profit corporations differently. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §
501 (describing an extensive list of, among other things, corporations and organizations which
shall be tax exempt). Although the early notion of limited charters has been superseded, general
corporations are still formed to perform explicit governmental purposes. See Lebron v. Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995) ("[W]here, as here, the Government creates a
corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself
permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is
part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment."). Of course there was also the
municipal charter incorporating towns and townships. Meanwhile, some business corporations
went the other direction: they were businesses first and then built housing for workers and
established some of the infrastructure of towns in order to retain workers. For a discussion of
company towns, see LINDA CARLSON, COMPANY TOWNS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (2003);
CRANDALL A. SHIFFLETT, COAL TOWNS: LIFE, WORK, AND CULTURE IN COMPANY TOWNS OF
SOUTHERN APPALACHIA, 1880-1960 (1991).
176 See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 133, at 73.
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incorporation undermined the grant theory. Incorporation eventually
came to be regarded not as a special state-conferred privilege but as a
normal and regular mode of doing business."' 77  Instead of being a
creature of the law, the corporate form seemed a natural and reasonable
form of organization for the conduct of business, a form for which there
was no felt necessity for government to micro-manage business
enterprises outside of those industries that might be deemed "natural
monopolies." And natural monopolies fit somewhat comfortably into
the old public function notion of a corporation. But by the late 19th
century the public apparently felt that the government had little role to
play in general commerce.
As the free incorporation model came to predominate, the entity
theory and notions of corporate personhood continued to gain ground.
"By rendering the corporate form normal and regular, late-nineteenth-
century corporate theory shifted the presumption of corporate regulation
against the state. Since corporations could no longer be treated as
special creatures of the state, they were entitled to the same privileges as
all other individuals and groups.' 78 If they were persons under the law
they could be persons with whom contracts could be entered into and
who had rights under those contracts. 179
Consistent with these new legal theories, the largest corporations
had to deal with the public opposition to their enormous power.
The pure size of many corporations-their number of employees, the
magnitude of their production, their capital resources, their national
scope in distribution, and their capacity for political influence-
persuaded many Americans, classic economic theory
notwithstanding, that the nexus of social institutions within which
they lived had been radically transformed. ... This momentous shift
in the balance of social forces created a crisis of legitimacy for the
large corporations.180
The large national (and later multinational) corporation addressed
that crisis by efforts on many fronts, and communication was one of the
most significant fronts. Through advertising and public relations
177 Id.
178 Id. at 74.
179 See Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636-37 (holding that a corporation only possesses the
attributes that its charter bestows upon it and it does so to the same degree a natural person would
have such rights via contract, and thus the state could not unilaterally amend that contract). See
generally Hovenkamp, supra note 175. For more on the personification theory, see Gregory A.
Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1441 (1987).
180 ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
AND CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS 2 (1998). The injunction to develop a
soul continues. "[Companies] need to demonstrate that they have heart and soul, especially at a
time when the public is so distrustful of corporate America." RONALD J. ALSOP, THE 18
IMMUTABLE LAWS OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 70 (2004) (emphasis added).
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campaigns, corporations attempted to give themselves a human face, to
create for the corporation a personality.181
Today it is fair to say that viewing the corporation as person with a
personality has come to be seen as completely natural and that it is thus
reasonable for corporations' representatives to claim that the
corporation has expressive rights as an aspect of that personhood.1 82
However, it is important to remember that the metaphor of corporate
personhood is just that, a metaphor. And this metaphor elides several
realities of the operation of large scale corporate entities in society 83 as
well as structural aspects of the corporate form that make corporate
expression relentlessly one-sided and, ultimately, problematic.
B. The Primacy of the Profit Motive
Pursuant to conventional interpretations of black letter corporate
law, the corporation's officers and directors have primarily one duty-
to enhance shareholder value. 184 Furthermore, this duty accrues not to
181 Id. The creation of a corporate "personality" actually developed into an advertising
subcategory: corporate image advertising. TERENCE A. SHIMP, ADVERTISING, PROMOTION AND
SUPPLEMENTAL ASPECTS OF INTEGRATED MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS 285-86 (6th ed.
2003) (1986). "Corporate image advertising is aimed at creating an image of a specific corporate
personality in the minds of the general public and seeking maximum favorable images amongst
selected audiences, e.g., stockholders, employees, consumers, suppliers, and potential investors."
S. Prakash Sethi, Institutional/Image Advertising and Idea/Issue Advertising as Marketing Tools:
Some Public Policy Issues, 43 J. MARKETING 68, 70 (1979) (emphasis added). The Sethi article
contains a number of examples of the array of the types of advertisements falling into these two
categories. At present it is wholly unremarkable to talk about a corporation as if it had a
personality. Sethi distinguishes between image advertising and issue advertising because the tax
implications differ. For a discussion of the difficulty the courts have had in dealing with
corporate image advertising under the First Amendment and the commercial speech doctrine, see
C. C. Laura Lin, Corporate Image Advertising and the First Amendment, 61 S. CA. L. REv. 459
(1988).
182 There are actually several theories operating simultaneously with respect to what sort of
entity a corporation is. Different theories have gained favor at different times, from the charter
theory to the natural entity to legal entity to nexus of contracts. For a discussion of the historical
development of the various theories, see David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 201 (1990).
183 The power of the metaphor is truly astonishing. It is very difficult to write about the
corporation without anthropomorphizing it and talking about what it "wants," "feels," and
"needs," as if there was even an "it" in the same way as a person or a thing. Enormous holding
companies like Time-Warner are made up of numerous other corporations, many of which have
distinct corporate identities. Often it is the subsidiaries that are the public face of the parent and
the parent companies barely register on the public consciousness at all, despite their enormous
influence in the culture. For a discussion of the power of this metaphor in the Nike case, see
Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of
Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169 (2004)
[hereinafter Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking?].
184 As Professor Elhauge has pointed out, this "black letter" law has always been significantly
modified by the business judgment rule in a fashion that not only permits some profit-sacrificing
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the real shareholder, a shareholder who can be expected to have a
multiplicity of concerns, but to the idea of an average shareholder-
what Daniel Greenwood calls "the fictional shareholder."', 85  The
fictional shareholder cares for nothing but short-term financial gain. 86
[H]uman shareholders who are also neighbors or employees or
customers or friends may have other commitments beyond an extra
nickel in the quarterly dividend. Even on purely economic issues,
since shareholdings in this country are not only wide but shallow,
many shareholders will find that their basic interests are aligned
more with employees, stability or customers than with the highest
behavior but virtually guarantees it because of the moral and social pressures on managers. See
Elhauge, supra note 115, at 740-44. However, even Professor Elhauge agrees that profit
maximization is the management's "primary obligation" to shareholders. Id. at 745. The rule is
often stated as "maximize" shareholder value which has been justly criticized as an exaggeration.
See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, in THE ICONIC CASES IN
CORPORATE LAW I (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008). Certainly the business judgment rule ensures
that there is no duty to "maximize" that economic welfare. As Professor Elhauge has observed,
the business judgment rule not only permits some profit-sacrificing behavior but virtually
guarantees it because of the moral and social pressures on mangers. Nevertheless, the Model
Business Corporations Act defines "corporation" as "a corporation for profit ...." MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 1.40(4). And even Professor Elhauge agrees that profit maximization is the
management's "primary obligation" to shareholders. The existence of so-called corporate
constituency statutes that provide that the members of boards of directors may consider the needs
of constituencies other than shareholder, Stout, supra at 5, only serves to underscore the primacy
of the obligation to direct efforts at enhancing economic value of firm because they would be
superfluous if it was already well-understood that directors did not violate their responsibilities to
shareholders when considering the needs of other constituencies. Moreover, such constituency
statues are permissive as opposed to the mandatory fiduciary duties owed to shareholders.
Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REV. 579, 579 (1992). The business judgment rule represents
an implicit understanding that transferring the decision to the courts of what specific action would
be "profit maximizing" in any particular situation would result in significant increases in
transaction costs and that the resultant inefficiency would virtually guarantee further reductions in
profits. Nevertheless, the existence of such discretion represents no assurance it will be exercised
in a manner consistent with the public interest. See The Good Company, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22-28,
2005, at 3. It is not clear that even if one adopts a nexus of contracts theory of the corporation
this makes a meaningful difference in the goal setting with respect to public welfare issues. See
Stephen Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423, 1427 & 1446-47 (1993) (arguing that despite
the replacement of the "outdated [shareholders as owners] model of the firm" with a nexus of
contract model, shareholder wealth maximization norm is nevertheless still dominant and
appropriately so). Moreover, this conventional understanding has been trenchantly criticized by
Professor Daniel Greenwood. See Daniel J. H. Greenwood, The Dividend Problem (Utah Legal
Studies, Paper No. 05-10, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-799144.
185 1 am indebted to Professor Daniel Greenwood for this insight. See Daniel J. H.
Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom the Corporation Is Managed Revisited, 69 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1021 (1996).
186 The focus on the short term may be partly due to the rise of the importance of the
institutional investor. See Leo A. Strine, Jr., Human Freedom and Two Freidman: Musings on
the Implications of Globalization For the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behavior 30-37
(Univ. of Pa., Paper No. 187 2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/187
(attributing some of the recent scandals such as Enron as arising from the focus on short-term
gains).
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possible value for their shareholdings: A decrease in your phone bill
is likely to be worth more to you than the commensurate drop in the
price of the telephone company shares held by your pension fund.
Only foreign shareholders with little connection to the American
economy or politics beyond their shareholdings approximate this
conventional image of a shareholder always interested in higher
stock returns. 187
Officers and directors of corporations owe fiduciary duties to these
shareholders. 188  And perhaps because the interests of real human
shareholders may be varied, complex, and would be impossible to serve
in reality, administration of a large group of shareholders is thought to
demand the conceptual simplicity of the profit motive in order to define
just what interests these fiduciaries should assume they must be
serving. 189
Since the fictional shareholder is just an investor, it is immortal and
time indifferent-the market allows any investor to transform future
income into present income, short term gains into long term ones,
and so on, simply by applying the correct discount rate. It is context
187 Greenwood, supra note 109, at 1036. It may be that Greenwood underestimates the degree
to which institutional investors, primarily the managers of pension funds, do behave this way
because the aggregation of many shareholders into a fund has the same effect: of reducing the
variety of shareholder interests to a single value, profit. The growth of institutional funds that are
formed with the objective of investing only in certain types of companies may have made the
fictional shareholder model less relevant as an empirical matter than in times past. However, my
sense is that such investment funds still represent the minority of investors. Moreover, they are
also not indifferent to profit.
188 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 648 (Mich. 1919). In deference to
Professor Stout, see supra note 184, 1 would note additional support for this proposition is found
in Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (directors of a corporation are fiduciaries for
shareholder interests); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (duty to maximize stockholder value in takeover); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564
A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (directors as agents for stockholders); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, 579
A.2d 1115, 1121 (Del. Ch. 1990), as well as Chancellor Strine's article, supra note 186. Note
that for my purposes here it may not make much difference whether there is a duty to maximize
value for stockholders or a duty to maximize firm value since either interpretation creates the
same pressure to direct firm activities toward the most profitable (whether long or short term)
action rather than one which is ethically desirable (understanding that what is ethically desirable
is a goal even more elusive of adequate definition than profit maximization).
189 Within this economic interest is of course an enormous range of movement. Saying that
the fiduciary is to take into account the shareholders' economic interests does not self-evidently
further dictate whether those interests are long or short term, must take the form of dividends paid
out or value of the stock or many other permutations of how the fiduciaries may act out on their
responsibilities. For a report on some of the current debate about short-term versus long-term
business planning, see Jam Today- Worries About Short-Termism Grip America's Business-
Elite-Wrongly, Perhaps, ECONOMIST, July 14, 2007, at 67. Moreover, with the advent of
socially responsible investing (SRI) some investors are attempting to bring their investments in
line with their overall moral convictions through shareholder resolutions, divestures of stocks of
companies which do not fit investors' agenda and similar actions. See, e.g., Daska Slater, Public
Corporations Shall Take Us Seriously, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 12, 2007, at 22. For a general
summary of why such initiatives are bad for business, see CSR/SRIWatch,
http://www.csrwatch.com/Sub/Resources/about.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2007).
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indifferent-since money is perfectly fungible, a pure shareholder is
indifferent between money earned in Salt Lake City or Cambridge,
Flint or Manila. It has no commitment to particular enterprises: so
long as the investment is on the capital frontier, offering the
appropriate risk adjusted rate of return, one project is as good as any
other. Tin cans and insurance, news magazines and amusement
parks-what the company does is a matter of entire indifference. It is
universalist in the modemist, not the post-identity, sense: the
fictional shareholder recognizes no boundaries, professes no
nationality (or, more precisely, will change nationalities at the
current or future monetary exchange rate), has no religion, no
community, no union, no gender and, oddly enough, no class: the
invested funds of the unions are no different from the invested funds
of the capitalists against which they struggle. It is, in short, radically
uncommitted, cosmopolitan, deracinated, tied to no religion,
language, nation or community. Perhaps most important for
bargaining purposes, the shareholder is fully mobile-able to leap
borders (and professions, commitments and projects) at a single
bound. 190
This construction of the shareholder has a lot in common with the
economists' workhorse, homo economus. Like the economists' fictional
rational person, the fictional shareholder bears little resemblance to a
real person. Real human beings value many things in addition to their
economic interests. Yet, like the fictional rational person, the fictional
rational shareholder offers analysts and managers an attractively simple
and comparatively straightforward way to analyze performance. So the
fictional shareholder continues to be the yardstick against which
management and analysts measure the performance of a company.
That makes corporate "behavior" and "speech" very one-
dimensional. All roads, all expression, all actions lead back to the
(hoped for, if often unrealized) enhancement of shareholder value. In
this respect the corporation is a very unusual person since few people
can be said to hold one, and only one, value. It might be said in protest
that it is an inaccurate picture since, because corporations are run by
persons, and persons do have other interests, that those interests and
personalities are inevitably reflected in the corporation. And to a
limited extent this is true.
Ambiguity about what exactly is best for shareholders-long run
stability, short term gain, corporate image, etc., and the personalities of
and choices made by a corporation's executive officers can and do make
a difference to the corporation's conduct of its affairs and the speech it
issues-and not solely in the negative ways of a Dennis Kozlowski or a
Jeffrey Skilling, but also in positive ways through the expression of the
190 Greenwood, supra note 185, at 1043 (internal footnotes omitted).
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values of a Warren Buffett or a Ray Anderson. 191 In addition, the
business judgment rule and management perceptions as to what sorts of
profit-sacrificing behavior are appropriate and necessary to conform to
social norms, allow for some behavior that is not straightforwardly
profit-seeking to occur. 192 Nevertheless, the relentless forces of the
market and the primacy of economic welfare, as the legal duty and
imperative, systematically channel even the most vociferous advocates
of a "different" kind of corporate model into the same old mold.193
One of the most comical examples of this phenomenon occurred
when Johnson & Johnson sued the American Red Cross for trademark
infringement. Johnson & Johnson did use the mark first, and Clara
Barton, in establishing the Red Cross as a humanitarian organization,
did seek Johnson & Johnson's license and acknowledged its priority.
But apparently the American Red Cross had been licensing the use of
the mark to manufacturers other than Johnson & Johnson of emergency
first aid kits and other medical and surgical goods typically purchased in
drug stores. Thus, Johnson & Johnson had something of a dilemma
because, pursuant to trademark law, if it did not sue to enforce it might
be deemed to have surrendered its rights to the logo. On the other hand,
as Advertising Age reported, Johnson & Johnson probably knew that
"suing the American Red Cross for using--of all things, the red cross
logo-wasn't a slick public-relations move."'194  That might be
something of an understatement. So why did Johnson & Johnson do it?
Its executives are not saying, but one manager of a consulting firm was
quoted as saying "J & J did the right thing for both its reputation and its
financial position, 'They absolutely had to [sue],' he said, regardless of
the relatively small revenue impact and the reputation risk in taking on
the Red Cross because 'estimates now are that 65%-70% of the total
value of Fortune 500 companies are in their intangible assets."' 195 It
was a matter of protecting its assets.
Presumably he meant that even though the revenue risk today was
small, the loss of a valuable intangible asset such as a logo through
acquiescence to infringing uses would represent a greater financial loss
in the long term than any harm to its reputation from suing a
humanitarian organization. Perhaps so. But the CEO of the American
Red Cross did not see it that way. When the suit was filed he issued a
191 Ray Anderson is the "founder and chairman of Interface, Inc., the world's largest
commercial carpet manufacturer," and an outspoken proponent of a switch to manufacturing
processes that contribute to sustainability. BAKAN, supra note 112, at 71.
192 See Elhauge, supra note 115.
193 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation:
An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1995).
194 Jack Neff, J & J Targets Red Cross, Blunders Into PR Firestorm, ADVERTISING AGE, Aug.
13, 2007, available at http://adage.com/article?article-id=1 19837 (last visited Aug. 13, 2007).
195 Id. (emphasis added).
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press release with the following, "For a multibillion-dollar drug
company to claim that the Red Cross violated a criminal statue that was
created to protect the humanitarian mission of the Red Cross-simply
so that J & J can make more money-is obscene." 196 Maybe so. And
maybe since the American Red Cross was claiming to be engaging in
this licensing to support hurricane awareness but was licensing products
like humidifiers that do not obviously fit into the category of hurricane
relief supplies we should not take this burst of outrage too seriously.
Still, obscene or not, according to some observers, Johnson & Johnson's
action was dictated by its duties to the shareholders.
This tendency of the profit imperative (however conceived) to
generate antisocial, undesirable, or just downright unpopular activities
is perhaps partly attributable to the laws governing for-profit
corporations, partly a function of the difficulties in running large
organizations, a difficulty which makes profit a seemingly straight
forward and quantifiable goal in a morass of less definable goals, and
perhaps partly attributable to social attitudes as to what constitute
legitimate goals. But that its imperatives seem to eventually overwhelm
alternative business models seems undeniable.
Take for example The Body Shop. Anita Roddick founded The
Body Shop, a cosmetics company, with the avowed goal of running a
different sort of company, one that would be environmentally
responsible and which would eschew ethically troubling animal testing.
She was an outspoken advocate of corporate social responsibility.
Nevertheless, Roddick eventually had to step down from her position as
chair and relinquish control, including control of its much vaunted
social responsibility programs, because her leadership was seen as not
profitable. 197 Roddick's successor at The Body Shop asserted, "We
believe in social responsibility but we are very hard-nosed about profit.
We know that success is measured by the bottom line."'198 "Roddick's
story illustrates how an executive's moral concerns and altruistic desires
often must ultimately succumb to her corporation's overriding goals."'199
Similarly, Ben and Jerry's ice cream, for all of its founders'
commitment to social responsibility, was sold by its founders to
Unilever, a large multinational which did not have an image as a
"different" sort of company, but rather one that seemed
paradigmatically "old school." To some observers this sale undermined
196 Id.
197 BAKAN, supra note 112, at 51-53.
198 Id.; BAKAN, supra note 112, at 53 (emphasis added).
199 Id. It is worth noting that Roddick has been questioned about her consistency with respect
to these goals in a number of quarters, with many claiming that her much vaunted values had
been (how ironic) more cosmetic than substantive. See, e.g., STAUBER & RAMPTON, supra note
131, at 73-76 (exploring conflicts between The Body Shop founder's stated business objectives
and principles and the actual conduct of the company).
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Ben and Jerry's credibility as a company committed to social justice.200
These sorts of cases suggest that it is difficult to run a business in a
way that is not business as usual--economic gain. And perhaps this is
because, as Milton Friedman and so many others have argued,
management, at the end of the day, has a duty to shareholders, not to the
whole world. The only limitations on how corporations carry out that
duty to shareholders are those imposed by law. And, as explored above,
even law may represent a weak deterrent to the extent that managers
may rationally (if not legally) decide to breach and pay rather than
comply with the law. Worse, the legal interpretation of managers and
directors' duties to shareholders as duties to a fictional shareholder who
cares for nothing but economic return, actually creates structural
incentives for these managers and directors to make trade-offs that
would presumably be morally repugnant in other circumstances (for
example choosing to market a drug that may carry with it an
unacceptably high risk of injury without disclosing that risk for fear of
losing sales) on the grounds that business ethics require it.
As Greenwood puts it, "This ... is the scandal of the fictional
shareholder writ in black letter-the fictional shareholder allows people
to take actions they know are wrong while believing they are doing the
right thing." 201  Putting aside the difficulty in some contexts with
knowing something is wrong before the law has declared it wrong (a
concern that presumably does not apply to exposing others to risk of
death or serious injury), the problem is this legal construction of the
managers' duties does not just allow people to take actions that are
wrong. It actually encourages them to do so wherever it would appear
to enhance shareholder value.
Professor Daniel Greenwood offers a vivid example of this
200 Janger, supra note 27, at 74, available at
http://www.benjerry.com/our-company/research library/fin/ (citing Ben and Jerry's Financial
History). It is difficult to know whether this loss of credibility is more apparent than real. But at
least some commentators have attributed the founders' willingness to sell to Unilever after being
told of Unilever's "funding programs for hospitals in Vietnam and schools in Ghana." Laura P.
Hartman, Robert S. Rubin & K. Kathy Dhanda, The Communication of Corporate Social
Responsibility: United States and European Union Multinational Corporations, 74 J. BUS.
ETHics 373, 379 (2007). Of course, as was remarked by one marketing executive on the
acquisition of Burt's Bees, another company oriented to consumers interested in environmentally
sound products, by Clorox, a company that makes bleach, an environmental pollutant, "it's likely
not many of the consumers or category targets for Burt's Bees products are even going to know
that Clorox has acquired the company." Jack Neff, Clorox: Bleach, Charcoal and... Burt's
Bees, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 31, 2007,
http://adage.com/article?articleid=l 21673&searchphrase=Clorox%3A+Bleach%2C+Charcoal+
and. The company probably is not going to make a big effort to educate consumers about this
point. But to the extent that they do, all efforts will undoubtedly be to give Clorox the benefit of
Burt's Bees "green" image rather than the reverse since sustainability is identified as a
"megatrend" in marketing. Id. Whether it is a megatrend in manufacturing is a different
question.
201 Greenwood, supra note 185, at 1092.
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tendency. Greenwood asks his corporations students to imagine
themselves the manager of a business organized as a corporation that
runs a segregated lunch counter in the South in 1963. The manager
believes segregation is wrong. He would like to desegregate the lunch
counter. But he has concrete evidence that the corporation would go out
of business if he does so. Greenwood reports that year after year, every
class concludes that the manager's only options, pursuant to his duties
to the shareholders, are to resign his position or to continue to engage in
behavior he believes is morally wrong, i.e., segregation as a function of
his duty to the shareholders. In this way the law
strongly hinders attempts to take actions that may not only be right,
but in the best interest of all the real people concerned: Even most
of the students who do not take refuge in the role morality of
serving the fictional shareholder are unable to articulate a principled
basis for ignoring it.... [T]he most they can do in good conscience
is resign, leaving the administration of the firm to those who have
less problem following institutional norms.2°2
The primacy of the profit motive is not however by any means
always a morally pernicious influence on corporate decision making and
therefore to society at large. Apart from the social benefits of the
generation of wealth and prosperity which some might attribute to the
increased flexibility of the corporate form and the singularity of its
organizational imperative, this imperative might be beneficial (or the
least bad alternative) to a more complicated set of imperatives.
The singularity of purpose offers some analytical clarity and
simplicity as guides to decision making, at least when compared to
more nebulous social goals like "the general welfare" or "happiness."
And despite multiple ways of calculating what constitutes the bottom
line,20 3 such options are manageable models of clarity compared to
attempts to assess non-monetary contributions or impacts on social
welfare. Thus, although the idea of Corporate Social Responsibility
[CSR], the practice of a corporation taking account of the interests of
constituencies beyond shareholders, 204 has gained popularity, 20 5 that
202 Id.
203 Many criticisms about the orientation to the bottom line overestimate the degree of
consensus on what constitutes the bottom line and whether such orientation need invariably be
pernicious. On the other hand, even if there is room within the business judgment rule for
decision-making that is also consistent with moral judgments in other realms, the evidence
suggests, as discussed in this Article, that it may nevertheless offer too much affirmative support
for decision-making that will predictably run counter to those other moral belief systems. See,
e.g., RALPH ESTES, THE TYRANNY OF THE BOTTOM LINE: WHY CORPORATIONS MAKE GOOD
PEOPLE DO BAD THINGS (1996).
204 See, e.g., BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 108, at 116-17 (discussing state statutes providing
shelter within the business judgment rule for constituencies such as employees, suppliers,
creditors, etc.); Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 705 (2002); Paul N. Cox, The Public the Private and the
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movement suffers from the absence of a legal structure (or indeed even
a definition) that offers officers and directors clear guidance on what is
a permissible versus an impermissible departure from the profit model..
On the one hand, the business judgment rule and existing structures
have generally proven capacious enough to protect judgments that trade
short term profits for long term benefits. 206 So shifting between long
and short term payoffs could (theoretically) offer no obstacle to the
implementation of CSR.20 7 On the other hand, when the magnitude of
long term gains are difficult to predict with any certainty, or are
intangible, managers could still expose themselves to shareholder
liability if the alleged long term benefits are intangible enough and the
sacrificed short term profits are very large. 20 8
In addition, there is no clear definition of what "corporate social
responsibility means. '20 9 "[C]ompanies fasten the label to a quite
bewildering variety of supposedly enlightened, progressive or charitable
corporate actions. '210 Not only is the definition wildly imprecise, it is
often unclear whether actions undertaken in its name actually produce
the aimed for results. So the emerging call for a return to the
corporation as a quasi-public institution, with goals beyond profit-
making, would seem to be difficult to realize in practice. Moreover,
since the corporation is neither a democratic institution, nor one with a
publicly elected management, it is reasonable to ask whether the
acquisition of such public welfare responsibilities and goal setting is
appropriate.
Perhaps this is why The Economist suggested in an editorial that
CSR as a theory was unnecessary.
The goal of a well-run company may be to make profits for its
Corporation, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 391 (1997).
205 It might be more accurate to say that the notion is enjoying a resurgence of interest. See C.
A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002).
206 See Elhauge, supra note 115.
207 For a discussion of this position as well as some criticisms of CSR see Corporate Social
Concerns: Are They Good Citizenship, or a Rip-offfor Investors?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2005, at
R6, available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB 113355105439712626.html?mod=todays free feature
(last visited Aug. 12, 2007).
208 Economist Milton Friedman suggests there is only "one instance when corporate social
responsibility can be tolerated.., when it is insincere." BAKAN, supra note 112, at 34 (emphasis
added).
209 The Union of Concerned Executives: CSR As Practised Means Many Different Things,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 6 [hereinafter The Union of Concerned Executives]. This article
forms part of a special report, A Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility. PR Week reports that
the editorial staff of The Economist remains skeptical about the value to shareholders of CSR.
See Steve Hemsley, Who's Responsible?, PRWEEK, Aug. 12, 2005, at 22 (."At The Economist we
need hard evidence that CSR is more than just a fig leaf and that actions are being chosen because
they are a good use of shareholder's money rather than merely being of personal interest to the
CEO."').
210 The Union of Concerned Executives, supra note 209, at 6.
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shareholders, but merely in doing that-provided it faces
competition in its markets, behaves honestly and obeys the law2 1 1-
the company, without even trying, is doing good works. Its
employees willingly work for the company in exchange for wages;
the transaction makes them better off. Its customers willing pay for
the company's products; the transaction makes them better off also.
All the while, for strictly selfish reasons, well-run companies will
strive for friendly long-term relations with employees, suppliers and
customers. There is no need for selfless sacrifice when it comes to
stakeholders. It goes with the territory.
All things considered, there is much to be said for leaving social and
economic policy to governments. They at least are accountable to
voters.
212
While there is some evidence to suggest that the rosy picture of an
identity between the corporation's pursuit of its profits and the general
welfare is overstated, 213 it is beyond dispute that private corporations
are not accountable to voters except through the mechanism of
governmental control. 214 Whether it can always be said that what is in
the best interest of business is necessarily in the best interest of society
as a whole has been an issue of fierce debate and fluctuating legislative
trends from the inception of the Republic. The argument that these
interests converge has enjoyed a resurgence in the later part of the 20th
century and into the present time.215 So it is worthwhile to reiterate
what may seem to be obvious questions.
211 This is both a very big "provided" and somewhat tautological since the very thing that
many CSR proponents are suggesting is that the law require some social responsibility from
corporations. Thus, the observation that a corporation's duties do not extend beyond "obeying
the law" provides no insight into the law's content and expresses no limitation on what its content
should be.
212 The Good Company- A Skeptical Look at Corporate Social Responsibility, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 22, 2005, at 3 (emphasis added) [hereinafter The Good Company]. Of course the
government may not be as accountable to the voters in practice as it is in theory, any more than
management of a corporation is in any real sense accountable to the shareholders for its actions.
213 Characterizing workers as "willingly" working in exchange for wages when for most
people some sort of work is necessary for survival and where the wage for most work is set by the
employer, not negotiated by the worker, borders on disingenuous. Claiming that consumers are
better off for having "willingly" paid for products that were relentlessly promoted to them and
which they may not need or which may be affirmatively hazardous to their health (such as
cigarettes) borders on the delusional. For more discussion of the tendency of the marginal utility
of efficient bargaining to enhance disparities in wealth, see Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Torts in
Corporate Law: Do Corporations Have a Fiduciary Obligation to Commit Torts? (Utah Legal
Studies, Paper No. 05-06, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract__id=776206.
214 They could be said to be accountable to consumers. And they will be, to the extent that
consumers are aware of any misconduct. Whether or not they become aware of grounds for
calling the company to account and what methods are at their disposal to do so are often, but not
exclusively, a matter of governmental control through law.
215 See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 115.
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First is the observation that, as The Economist editorial recites (as
if brushing aside an obvious and unproblematic constraint) that a
company may only increase profits within "the limits of the law."
Milton Friedman made a similar observation. "There is one and only
one social responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the
rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition
without deception or fraud. '216
But such statements offer no help at all in discerning what the
limits of the law or the rules of the game ought to be. Instead they
naturalize existing limits as if they were a product of some organic
process rather than constructions of law subject to change. If the
question is what the law regulating corporations ought to be, it begs the
question to say that law reform should not impose any more duty on the
corporation than to pursue profits within "the limits of the law." When
it comes to corporate speech, this is precisely the problem: What are the
limits of the law? Or, what should they be? It cannot be the case that
the current laws represent a fixed state from which no legal reform is
legitimate. So, presumably, legal reform of the treatment of corporate
and commercial speech and thus what it means to "obey the law," is
possible.21 7
The second question-what should the law be?-goes back to the
analysis of incentives in the corporate context. Assuming the law
shielded false statements, even those intentionally made, would not a
corporation's management have a duty to make false statements
whenever truthful statements might negatively affect profits? 21 8 Under
the current understanding, it seems likely that many officers and
directors would interpret their duty in that fashion.
Similarly, while it is true that people might have many motivations
to make false statements apart from financial ones, a financial motive is
singled out as particularly significant in a number of contexts (in many
it may be dispositive) as if, under the law, it were routinely considered a
216 Milton Freidman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, available at
http ://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html (last
visited Aug. 12, 2007).
217 In this regard it is interesting that some observers think that CSR should be something
other than or more than the law requires in order to really qualify as social responsibility. "Many
businesses think that merely complying with environmental regulations is CSR, when they are
only doing what they must by law." Hemsley, supra note 209, at I (internal quotes omitted).
Since corporations are not human it hardly seems reason for criticism that they are merely
following the law. But I submit this arises from the anthropomorphism engendered by the use of
the metaphor of corporate personhood.
218 Greenwood, supra note 113, at 5. "The corporate law that corporations have chosen directs
corporate decision-makers to cause "accidents" deliberately (even if statistically) in the name of
profit." Id.
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motivation of a different order and magnitude than emotions such as
love, jealousy, envy, competitiveness, vindictiveness, officiousness or
any number of human emotional responses that while not necessarily
always standing apart from monetary motives, may not perfectly
correspond to them either. For example:
Personal financial interests in a transaction with a corporation may
create conflicts of interest for members of the board of directors who
voted on the transaction and support claims of breaches of duty to
the corporation. 219
A judge must automatically recuse herself if she has a financial
interest related to one of the parties before her. 220
A financial motive can be an aggravating factor in sentencing for
many crimes or even be an element of some crimes.221
Copying copyrighted material in order to use for a commercial
purpose may be a consideration in whether or not a particular use is a
"fair use." 222
In short, there are any number of areas where the law singles out
financial benefit as a motivation which may present a heightened danger
of corruption of truth or of the ability to render detached judgments.
For-profit corporations are created by law to make an economic profit
and its agents are committed by law to advancing this interest.
Consequently, it seems reasonable to view the profit motive with the
same cautiousness in this area just as in many others. The question of
externalities, in particular, suggests caution is appropriate before
extending broad First Amendment protection to speech generated by an
institution with such a narrow range of moral influences because the
effects of corporate decision making can be enormous.
219 See, e.g., MBCA §§ 8.31(a)(2)(iii), (v) (describing circumstances that might constitute a
conflict of interest). It must be noted that this does not represent an automatic basis for finding a
breach of loyalty. See MBCA §§ 8.31(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (placing burden of showing harm on party
challenging conduct).
220 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(b)(4), (c) (mandating refusal where judge has financial conflict
of interest).
221 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (providing enhancement for a homicide committed for
financial gain); see also Gore v. Sec. for Dept. of Corr., 492 F.3d 1237 (11 th Cir. 2007).
222 See, e.g., Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1267-71 (11th Cir.
2001) (owners of copyright for "Gone With the Wind" sued for alleged infringement by
publication of parody "Wind Done Gone"; court held plaintiff unlikely to overcome fair use
defense for parody even though parody was produced for a commercial purpose because
commercial purpose is only one consideration and not dispositive). For a discussion of how fair
use intersects with First Amendment protection, see Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay. How
Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
See also Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in
Common with Campaign Finance Reform, Hate Speech and Pornography Regulation and
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2001).
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C. Corporations as "Externalizing Machines " 223
Economic activity can generate what economists call externalities,
that is, costs to others associated with the production of goods and
services. 224 Something is "external" by virtue of its cost being absorbed
outside the company. 2 5 Environmental pollution is a familiar example
of an externality. More subtle corporate-created externalities may
include the social costs to individuals caused by the requirement that
human capital, particularly for top executives, be highly mobile226 or
requiring working hours incompatible with raising a family or caring for
an elderly parent or other dependent person.227 When a company
attempts to address issues like this by explicitly making policies
intended to absorb some of the costs of accommodating these other
interests it could be said to be internalizing what the law had allowed to
be externalized. In some cases, corporate managers conclude that a
particular practice, characterized as a cost, might actually represent an
investment because it will generate (or it is hoped it will generate)
benefits in the long run.228 For example, some companies adopt family
223 See BAKAN, supra note 112, at 60 (Chapter 3).
224 An externality could also be a benefit. For example, by locating a store in a particular town
Wal-Mart may provide jobs which could mean that other social impacts related to employment,
such as mental health, physical well-being, incidence of crime or vandalism will be affected.
Indeed, it was on the basis of the perceived existence of just such positive externalities that The
Good Company, supra note 212, suggested that a corporation's attention to the bottom line will
result in the optimal boon to society. However, this section deals with the external costs imposed
by business because in many areas the law does not recognize these costs as "belonging to" or
attributable to the corporation's activities at all but instead as a sort of natural phenomenon,
causeless and irremediable by the law.
225 Identifying what is internal and what is external may be very sensitive to assessments of
causal relationships. For example, if rootlessness contributes to reduced social support networks
and long hours add to stress and both make workers more vulnerable to depression, alcoholism
and drug abuse or other mental disorders or to stress-related physical ailments like heart-attacks,
the corporation does not succeed in completely externalizing costs because of lost worker
productivity, health care costs and the like. For a discussion of how current economic practices
may contribute to social problems, see RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER
(1998).
226 See Peter T. Kilborn, The Five Bedroom, Six Figure Rootless Life, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/0l/national/class/0I ALPHARETTA-
FINAL.html.
227 See Marleen O'Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children: Investing
in Our Future Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1258 (2004).
228 Because of the magic of double-entry booking in some sense all costs are income
generating. However, the managers of a corporation often seem to view a cost like the operation
of a daycare center, as simply a cost that reduces the profit margin without any corresponding
benefits. But of course if there are cost savings in the form of greater efficiency, less
absenteeism, great employee loyalty and the ability to attract the best workers, it may well be that
a particular cost is more than recovered in savings in other areas. However, to know this one
would have to study it and know what to study and be able to quantify factors such as loyalty, that
may be difficult to quantify. Unless there is a perceived relationship between such inputs
managers may not be able, initially, to see the possibility of savings and see only the costs.
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leave policies more generous than those required by law because the
management believes that without such programs the best job
candidates will not be attracted to the firm. However, in many other
instances of companies internalizing externalities (basic family leave
policies, minimum wage laws, environmental laws), such internalizing
has taken place only because it was required by law. In other words, as
long as the law does not require a particular practice, the logic of profit-
seeking suggests that the company should (if it can) externalize the cost.
"The corporation is an externalizing machine, in the same way that
a shark is a killing machine. '229 It "is deliberately programmed, indeed
legally compelled, to externalize costs without regard for the harm it
may cause to people, communities and the natural environment.
230
This does not make the corporate form, or any specific corporation, evil.
Rather, the corporation, as structured, is inherently amoral, and so it is
dependant for its moral content upon either the positive law or the
vagaries of the personalities of the specific persons in charge. 23' If
slave labor became legal, corporations might have a duty to engage in it
under the current legal regime.232  If it became legal to kill rival
Therefore, typically such programs are only initiated under a government mandate, that is because
the law requires it and thus makes it a cost of doing business, or where some entity initiated the
practice, the practice gained social acceptance to the extent it becomes industry standard so that
all companies in a particular industry must offer particular benefits in order to remain
competitive. Again, in this case it is internalized as a cost of doing business, but through the
operation of social norms rather than law. Assuming the latter is more acceptable to many than
the former, the troubling question becomes what to do where the norms do not appear to dictate
internalizing a very large cost, say global climate change? In such cases the question is whether
government intervention is worse than allowing the harm to continue unabated.
229 BAKAN, supra note 112, at 70 (quoting businessman Robert Monks from an interview with
the author).
230 Id. at 72-73.
231 In a recent article Douglas Litowitz asks, "Are Corporations Evil?" and concludes that
although there is much to be said for what he calls the criticisms of the structural problems in the
organization of corporations, it is actually size, not the corporate form which is most at fault for
generating the problems. Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations Evil?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811,
814-15 (2004). Litowitz notes that most corporate critics do not extend their criticisms to "mom-
and-pop corporations." Id. He has a point. Many of the observations here apply only to large
corporations. However, given that some observers consider the close corporation virtually
obsolete and that the large scale partnerships and limited partnerships that Litowitz identifies as
occasionally perpetrators of misconduct that makes the news operate under the same for-profit
imperatives as enterprises operating under the corporate form, the differences may not make
much difference for these purposes. Focus on the variations of a commercial form may be just an
argument about details. The salient point may be that the organization is a commercial one. It is
possible that all of the arguments herein can be applied to the partnership or other business
organizational forms to the extent that they diffuse responsibility and focus on profits for
shareholders, partners or investors. The key may be whether there is any real accountability to
anyone but themselves.
232 Some would say that corporations like Nike (or its subcontractors) already do engage in
something uncomfortably close to slave labor, distinct only insofar as it does not include legal
ownership of the employees' person, but otherwise involving much of its aspects-lack of real
freedom, oppressive working conditions, physical punishment, control through sexual battery,
etc. See Amended Complaint at 5, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 994446)
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executives, steal trade secrets, or to kill people for lucrative body parts,
then presumably all corporations would do those things-not just the
renegade few. 233 The law sets the limits. Often, the criminal law sets
those limits, but because a corporation has "no body to kick and no soul
to damn,"'234 the penalties for transgressing these laws largely consist of
monetary penalties. 235  Calibrating the amount of the penalty to
represent a real disincentive to future misconduct has always been a
difficult undertaking. Profits of many of those multinational
corporations which are most likely to have widespread impact on the
public welfare are so enormous that the proportional penalties assume a
size that, taken in a vacuum, seem self-evidently excessive to some
observers.
But taken in the context of the amount at stake, large penalties may
(describing alleged corporal punishment and other oppressive labor practices of Nike sub-
contractors' factories in Vietnam, Indonesia and China). For a more general discussion of the
sweatshop issue, see Donald C. Dowling, Jr., The Multinational's Manifesto on Sweatshops,
Trade/Labor Linkage, and the Codes of Conduct, 8 TULSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27 (2000). But
one does not need to travel outside of the U.S. to encounter businesses willing to engage in tactics
bordering on the employment of slave labor. The use of illegal immigrants, such as migrant
farmer workers who are controlled by the threat of disclosure to the authorities offers one
persistent example. In another example, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, a local business was charged with
slavery for allegedly importing workers from India and then holding them hostage on the
premises, denying them adequate wages, freedom of movement, etc. The employer, John Pickle
Co., was found to have violated minimum wage laws by importing workers from India for what it
described as a "training program," even though the workers were actually highly skilled welders
and the like, so as to evade the minimum wage law. See Michael Overall, Verdict Blasts Pickle,
TULSA WORLD, Aug. 27, 2004, at Al. Those workers also alleged that the company held them
prisoner in a factory dormitory, confiscated their passports and other documents and would not
allow them to leave the factory even when off duty and had lied to them about the status of the
immigration visas that would be obtained for them. Id.
233 In the satirical novel Jennifer Government, author Max Barry creates just such a world in
which everyone takes on the name of the company they work for as a surname, the government is
available for hire on a private contract basis and is relegated to a fairly minor role as referee in the
corporate violence that starts with a marketing plan by a fictional Nike company to kill ten
customers in order to generate buzz about a new model of sneakers. MAX BARRY, JENNIFER
GOVERNMENT (2003).
234 NACE, supra note 133, at 5 ("As Baron Thurlow said some three centuries ago, 'Did you
ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to
be kicked?').
235 Monetary penalties can include both civil and criminal fines as well as laws exposing the
company to civil liability. Typically, multiple enforcement mechanism coexist and overlap. In
addition, regulatory agencies can have specific enforcement powers to order things like recalls,
clean-ups, corrective statements and other affirmative steps. Some feel that the ability to fine is
more likely to inspire compliance than the recall power alone. Eric Lipton & Louise Story, Bid to
Root Out Lead Trinkets Falters in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/06/business/06toys.html?th&emc=th# (last visited Aug. 6,
2007) (reporting unacceptably high levels of lead in children's jewelry, 96% originating from
China, and quoted federal officials as saying that they need the ability to fine in order to
meaningfully deter manufacturers violating the lead standards because "recall after recall" was
not enough to make the "the marketplace safe"). See also Env't News Serv., Oil Companies
Settle Fuel Violations for 1.5 Million, CORPWATCH, Oct. 6, 2006, available at
http://corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14165 (reporting settlement for violations of Clean Air Act).
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not seem so excessive. For example, the recent $253.5 million verdict
entered against Merck in one of the Vioxx cases included a figure for
punitive damages that was "not picked at random. '236 Rather, it was a
figure pulled from "a 2001 Merck estimate of additional profit the
company might make if it could delay an F.D.A. warning on Vioxx's
heart risk. '237 Note the calculus that Merck engaged in-it estimated
what a truthful communication of the risks of Vioxx would cost the
company as a component of the decision about whether to disclose this
information to the public.2 38 Nevertheless, because defendants such as
Merck have successfully managed to convince the public and the
legislatures to focus on the size of verdicts like this one in isolation,
they have succeeded in securing the passage of caps on liability that
reduce such awards and thereby diminish their effectiveness as
penalties.239
Even these restraints, such as they are, will be breached if a
corporation's executives conclude that the penalties exacted by law will
not diminish profits as much as the failure to engage in the prohibited
activity.240 As author Joel Bakan notes, "Corporate illegalities are rife
throughout the economy. Many major corporations engage in unlawful
behavior, and some are habitual offenders with records that would be
the envy of even the most prolific human criminals. ' 24' In support of
this assertion he lists the 42 violations or judgments (most relating to
environmental issues) issued against General Electric for the period
between 1990 and 2001.242
On the other hand, not all outcomes driven by the profit motive are
necessarily bad. There are also what we might call the positive
externalities of the profit motive. If images and entertainment about
236 Alex Berenson, For Merck, the Vioxx Paper Trail Won't Go Away, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2005, at 1, 17.
237 Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
238 Initially Merck announced its determination to litigate all the cases, despite the fact that
these ran into the thousands. It won the majority of cases decided after this one. Nevertheless, on
November 9, 2007 Merck publicly announced it had reached a settlement with the plaintiffs in
some 27,000 cases for $4.85 billion. Alex Berenson, MerckAgrees to Settle Vioxx Suits for $4.85
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at Al. The settlement amount is only "about nine months of
profit" for Merck and, according to analysts, represents a victory for Merck and validates its
aggressive strategy to initially litigate forcefully, a strategy which resulted in it winning eight out
of ten of the cases that went to a jury. See Alex Berenson, Analysts See Merck Victory in Vioxx
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/10/business/10merck.html [hereinafter Berenson, Analysts See
Merck Victory].
239 For example, Texas law which puts caps on punitive damages apparently meant that the
Vioxx verdict would be automatically reduced to $26.1 million. Berenson, Analysts See Merck
Victory, supra note 238, at 1.
240 A cap on damages may not completely eliminate the deterrent effect of damage awards
where the company faces several thousand lawsuits, as Merck did. Id.
241 BAKAN, supra note 112, at 75.
242 Id. at 75-79.
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gays and lesbians are more prominent in the culture in 2007 than they
were in 1980, it may have a lot to do with manufacturers of products
and sellers of services awakening to the possibility of a market that had
been neglected. 243 Many of us view this as a morally worthwhile
phenomenon, one that contributes to a more tolerant society. But it
seems obvious that not everyone agrees. 244 And those who do not could
point to this change in the culture as another outgrowth of the (in their
eyes) immorality of corporate tunnel vision with respect to the profit
motive.
Similarly, many companies have integrated the images in their
advertising to include more people of color, more women (outside of
advertising for cosmetics, clothing, and the like) and have discovered it
pays to recognize the Hispanic market or the African-American
market.245 Arguably, 246 these trends all represent social advances for
which we can thank corporate indifference to anything but the profit
motive.247 Moral neutrality may lead to the morally worthwhile as well
as the morally bankrupt. And such neutrality may be desirable in a
pluralistic society in which the content of terms such as the "morally
243 See, e.g., David M. Skover & Kellye Y. Testy, Lesbigay Identity as Commodity, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 223 (2002). Many advertisers are now making one advertisement with alternate endings or
elements depending on its market. See Andrew Hampp, An Ad in Which Boy Gets Girl ... or
Boy, ADVERTISING AGE, Aug 6, 2007, available at http://adage.com/article?article-id= 119705
(last visited Aug. 6, 2007).
244 See Russell Shorto, What's Their Real Problem With Gay Marriage? It's the Gay Part,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 19, 2005, at 34 (recounting the fierce objection on moral grounds by
some anti-gay marriage activists, to homosexual behavior on the grounds of a belief that it
represents an immoral choice). The stunning ignorance of history, science and any sense of the
cultural context for the institution of marriage displayed by some of the subjects interviewed for
this article is fairly dispiriting if one believes that good government and a good society is even, in
part, dependent upon information and education. Nevertheless, it is clear that the individuals
interviewed are animated by fervent convictions that they label "moral." For another example of
the profit motive contributing to equality, see Ellen Waldman & Marybeth Herald, Eyes Wide
Shut: Erasing Women 's Experiences from the Clinic to the Courtroom, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
285, 300-02 (2005).
245 In a recent article, Advertising Age identified the Hispanic and Spanish language market as
an area of expected growth in an otherwise somewhat flat trajectory for advertising expenditures.
Nat Ives, Media Spending Declines as Marketers Tap the Brakes, ADVERTISING AGE, June 5,
2007, available at http://adage.com/mediaworks/articlearticleid=l 17103 (last visited June 5,
2007).
246 1 would say it is unequivocally a good thing except for a lingering suspicion that it may, at
times, be of dubious benefit to become the target of marketing efforts. It may be good insofar as
exposing others to the fact that you exist, to more realistic depictions of the world, and to raising
awareness and social and political significance of a group. It may not be so good insofar as you
may disagree with those depictions or feel the need to insulate yourself from the blandishments of
relentless commercialism.
247 I am most definitely not suggesting that corporate self-interest has solved inequality
problems or that the current advertising regime adequately or fairly represents women or people
of color; far from it. I merely wish to note that some efforts to address minority markets or
perceived markets have resulted in companies changing marketing practices to try to reflect more
diversity.
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worthwhile" and "morally bankrupt" are fiercely contested. Moreover,
such categories as the moral seem to have less relevance when dealing
with the marketing efforts for harmful products like cigarettes. 248
The ... internal mechanisms of the corporation do not differentiate
between making money by creating a good product or lobbying the
law to avoid the costs of a bad one. A corporation driven by the
profit motive is morally indifferent [unless] those effects are not
reflected in the returns to the shares.249
In addition to the primacy of the profit motive on behalf of the
fictional shareholder that drives the corporation to externalize any costs
that it can, large corporations are also bureaucracies with many of the
same undesirable features of governmental bureaucracies. This may be
particularly true in those industries where a handful of firms dominant
the market. These large aggregations of people increase the potential to
diffuse and dissipate whatever individual, human moral impulses its
officers, directors, and employees may have and to contribute to the
uncertainty about the moral and legal responsibilities of employees. 250
Diffusion of responsibility and the fiduciary duty to attend to profit
become convenient instruments for suppressing guilt feelings about
particular transactions, 21  and they make it difficult to locate
responsibility when things do go wrong.252 It seems there are very good
structural reasons for concern that these entities could be the source of
much destructive speech. Is there a theoretical basis for offering
constitutional protection to the communications of these entities?
III. THEORY AND PRACTICE IN PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION
A government should not be called upon to defend its regulation of
advertising in a court of human rights .... 253
In support of what is described as an absolutist position on the
248 See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher, Tobacco 's Ties to Minority Groups Put Their Leaders in a
Bind, WASH. POST, May 17, 1998, available at
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/hs/pubhealth/p9740/readings/tobacco-fletcher.html ("Native
Americans and African Americans have the highest smoking rates in the nation, and African
Americans are more likely than others to die from smoking-related diseases.").
249 Greenwood, supra note 109, at 1053 (emphasis added).
250 See, e.g., O'Donnell, supra note 141.
251 See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
Preventing Corporate Crime, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra
note 27, at 431, 448-50.
252 Id. at 450-52.
253 SHINER, supra note 129, at 3.
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protection of free speech, First Amendment purists are fond of
paraphrasing a saying attributed to Voltaire, "I disagree with everything
you say but will defend to the death your right to say it." However, at
no time in this country's history has anything like an absolutist position
on the application of the First Amendment ever held sway in the
government or with the Supreme Court.
To the contrary, when reviewing Supreme Court decisions on
issues of speech, one is left with the uncomfortable feeling that the
government is willing to permit the hostile speech of ineffectual
crackpots and malcontents and is very much less sanguine about
protecting speech that poses a threat to some government project or
plan.254 Still, this observation also highlights the fact that one of the
principal concerns supporting the right to freedom of expression is
concern about the mandate of a governmental orthodoxy. 255
Whether the commitment to protecting freedom of expression in
fact is real or rhetorical, it has never been the case that all speech was
equal for purposes of protection under the First Amendment. 256 For
254 For example, although Cohen's "Fuck the draft" jacket and flag burning have been
protected, much more significant political expression, such as in the work place, has not received
similar protection. And the War on Terror has provided a basis for arguing the sort of exigency
that overcomes what would ordinarily be more clearly protected speech. For example, the Bush
Administration asked the National Academy of Sciences to refrain from publishing a work on
biological terrorism by a Stanford researcher on the grounds that "[t]he paper ... details how
terrorists might attack the nation's milk supply with botulinum toxin and offers suggestions for
how to thwart such an attack." Kelly Field, Federal Officials Ask Journal Not to Publish
Bioterrorism Paper, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 17, 2005, at A11. Academic publications
are typically viewed as quintessential protected speech. Burt Neubome has similarly observed
that First Amendment protection tends to be extended mostly to the "weak and vulnerable
speakers of conscience." Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of
Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 13-14 (1989). "When a speaker becomes too effective,
we have not hesitated to override the hearer-centered underpinnings of free speech at the point
where the toleration level of the society is exceeded by the perceived threat latent in unpopular
political, religious, or aesthetic speech." Id.
255 "[T]he First Amendment 'presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered
out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection."' Brief for the
Petitioners, supra note 147, at 50. See also Jonathan Rauch, Corporate Lying Is Bad But
Allowing It Is Good, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 7, 2003; Assoc. Press, If Nike Suit Upheld, a
Critic Becomes a Censor, Solicitor Says, U.S.A. TODAY, June 28, 2003, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2003-04-23-nike-s. It was also raised in the
amicus brief filed by some 40 media organizations. See Brief Amici Curiae of Forty Leading
Newspapers, Magazines, Broadcasters, Wire-Services, and Media-Related Professional and Trade
Associations in Support of Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575),
2003 WL 835613 (arguing that a decision for Kasky would represent an undesirable chill on news
sources from corporations as well as resulting in a lack of balance in reporting on issues).
256 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004) (describing various categories left
relatively untouched by First Amendment law and arguing that boundaries are drawn more from
nonlegal factors than legal doctrines); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment" A
Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270-71 (1981) (earlier exploration of coverage/non-
coverage issue) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories]; see also Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 21 (1971) ("In framing a theory of free speech
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example, there has never been (at least in theory) a First Amendment
defense to a fraud claim, to an offer of a bribe, or to a solicitation of a
murder.2 57 Threats have also sometimes been deemed unprotected by
the First Amendment. 258 These may be acts committed by speech, but,
as noted, these speech acts are not protected by the First Amendment. 259
Until fairly recently, commercial speech fell into this unprotected
category. Commercial speech and speech by corporations (the
definition of what constitutes "commercial speech" is contentious and
unsettled),260 was only extended protection in the late 1970s. 2 6 1 Thus,
there is no venerable tradition supporting freedom of expression for the
conduct of commerce. 262
So what sort of speech is protected and why? In so complicated an
area where no hard and fast lines exist, it is not really possible to fully
answer this question; the scope of protection appears to have always
been a work in progress, a tug-of-war between political currents and
powerful interests. However, it is possible to identify some of the
theoretical grounds for protection of freedom of expression generally,
even if the practical application of those theories presents distinct
the first obstacle is the insistence of many very intelligent people that the 'first amendment is an
absolute'. ... Any such reading is of course impossible.").
257 An interesting issue is raised by whether publishing a book that might be described as a
how-to manual for hit men constitutes such solicitation for murder. In one case, the 4th Circuit
held that it did. Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of the
case, see ROD SMOLLA, DELIBERATE INTENT (1999). For a discussion of the First Amendment
treatment of crime facilitating speech generally, see Eugene Volokh, Crime Facilitating Speech,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1095 (2005).
258 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1997) (describing the threats exception but declining to
apply it in this case). For a discussion of this area, see Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings:
How the Facts Govern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337 (2006).
259 See supra notes 256-258.
260 For an excellent discussion of the definition problem, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine
Fisk, What is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1143 (2004). While I do not agree with the place where the authors draw the line between
what constitutes commercial speech (since I would include all for-profit corporate
communication, including that in the editorial format), this article clearly outlines the current
doctrinal ambiguities.
261 The Virginia Pharmacy decision in 1976 is generally credited with establishing the
commercial speech doctrine because it was in this decision that the Court first articulated a
developed theory for some limited protection for commercial speech. Va. State. Bd. ofPharm. v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976). However, another candidate is the
earlier decision of Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975), in which the Court held that a
newspaper publisher could not be prohibited by the criminal law from running an advertisement
noting the availability of abortions in New York that were illegal in Virginia. But because the
Court's holding was identified as "limited" it was not really clear what the parameters of
protection for commercial speech were, or on what theory it was grounded, until Virginia
Pharmacy. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760.
262 See Baker, Paternalism, supra note 139, at 1162 ("[O]ur strongest advocates of free speech
[John Stuart Mill, Thomas Emerson, and Hugo Black] each consistently rejected granting any
protection to commercial speech.... Neither Mill nor Black nor Emerson saw freedom of speech
as about, or as including, a business's speech promoting its sales and profits.").
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problems. Thomas Emerson, the prominent First Amendment theorist,
proposed four purposes for protecting freedom of expression, and
despite many subsequent refinements of this formula or arguments
favoring one or the other of these values, Emerson's architecture of the
theory for why freedom of expression is protected remains one of the
most comprehensive and influential.2 63
First, Emerson claimed freedom of expression is a necessary part
of self-expression and, thus, of personal fulfillment. 264 Second, as has
been repeated in numerous court decisions and academic writings,
freedom of expression is thought to be the best method of ensuring
discovery of truth.265 (It was on this ground, refusal to shield consumers
from the truth that a limited amount of protection for commercial
speech was extended in the first place.) 266 Third, Emerson argued that
protection for speech offers a basis for participation in a democracy.267
Finally, Emerson argued that freedom of expression helped maintain a
balance between impulses to change and those to stabilization in a
society.268 All four of these rationales have been offered in support of
freedom of commercial speech.269 Upon examination, however, none of
them justifies protection for freedom of commercial expression.
In addition, supporters of commercial speech have argued that the
failure to protect it (and in the context of cases like Nike, protection has
taken the form of a claim for immunity from liability for false
263 See JOHN H. GARVEY & FREDERICK SCHAUER, FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER 35-167
(2d ed. 1992) (discussing primarily Emerson's structure in chapter II, Philosophical Foundations
of Freedom of Speech, and introducing variations and other arguments in Chapter II, section F,
entitled Additional Perspectives).
264 Emerson, supra note 18, at 878.
265 ]d at 878. This argument was repeated by Nike and by most of the amici supporting Nike.
See supra note 255. But see Richard A. Posner, Bad News, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., July 31, 2005
(offering the opinion that the market for news does not necessarily produce the truth even if it
produces the opportunity to receive information from which one can synthesize the truth).
266 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-65.
267 Emerson, supra note 18, at 878. This argument is also the one offered by Alexander
Meiklejohn in his influential writing on First Amendment theory. See, e.g., Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (1961). It is worth
noting that Meiklejohn's observation, that the First Amendment does not require that every
citizen speak to all issues, "but that everything worth saying shall be said," also seems to be based
on notions that allowing everything worthwhile will be a better route to discovery of the truth
since it is hard to imagine that worthwhile does not encompass "true" as part of its value,
although it may not be either a necessary or complete description of what Meiklejohn thought
"worthwhile" meant. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 25 (1948).
268 Emerson, supra note 18, at 878-79. To make things even more complicated, Schauer, like
Shiffrin, argues that it may be a mistake to look for a single core value rather than a multiplicity
of values underlying protection for speech. Schauer, Categories, supra note 256, at 276-77.
269 Professor James Weinstein offered one of the latest rebuttals of the first two arguments.
According to Weinstein both the self actualization and truth theories are supported by the case
law. See James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment
Formalism: Lessons From Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1100-01 (2004).
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statements) will result in bad policy consequences with respect to
corporate transparency and social responsibility reporting.270 A failure
to engage in social responsibility reporting, it is argued, will have a
negative impact on commercial relations with Europe to the extent that
such transparency is required in order to do business there. 271 It has also
been argued that a failure to offer the same protection to business that is
offered to its critics would be "unfair" and represent an "imbalance" in
the debate.272 (This is perhaps a variation on the theory that more open
debate is more likely to lead to the truth). Each of these arguments will
be discussed in more detail below.
First, Emerson's basic structure should be applied to the
corporation as speaker to determine the source of a claim to rights.
Although the commercial speech doctrine focuses on analyzing content
that is defined as "commercial," as a category it overlaps with corporate
speech, which focuses on the speech rights of a corporation as an
entity.273 Thus, some speech that is "commercial" is offered by non-
270 See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 147, at 39 (noting that Nike had not released its
Corporate Responsibility Report because of fears of liability unless the California Supreme
Court's decision was overturned). Not everyone agrees that the decision hurts corporate social
responsibility reporting. There is some argument that without the ability to test the truth of such
reporting, its usefulness will be minimal. See Adam M. Kanzer & Cynthia A. Williams,
Commentary, The Future of Social Reporting Is On the Line, BUS. ETHICS Summer 2003,
available at http://dominiadvisor.com/advisor/About-Domini/News/Press-Release-
Archive/Nike Kasky Oped 6-03.doc cvt.htm ("[V]irtually everything a company says is
commercial speech, and must be accurate."). We might have some reason to question the
sincerity of Nike's alleged reluctance to issue a Corporate Responsibility Report since it in fact
issued one for 2004 despite the fact that although it had settled the Kasky case, the judicial
precedent from the California Supreme Court, with its allegedly "chilling" definition of
commercial speech, has not been withdrawn and is still the law. See Press Release, Nike, Nike
Issues FY04 Corporate Responsibility Report Highlighting Multi-Stakeholder Engagement and
New Levels of Transparency, (Apr. 13, 2005),
http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/news/pressrelease.print.jhtml?year=2005&month=04&letter-a. Of
course Nike's renewed confidence in the safety of such reporting may be due to their success in
contributing to an effort in California to pass law reform to remove the private attorneys general
provision that allowed Kasky to sue on behalf of the citizens of California. See Proposition 64,
2004 Cal. Legis. Serv., http://vote2004.ss.ca.gov/voterguide/propositions/prop64text.pdf
(approved by voters on Nov. 2, 2005). Now with only the state and federal government able to
sue, perhaps Nike's management feels that with appropriate lobbying efforts there is not much to
fear from the government and, given the response to their arguments, another lawsuit might
simply offer them the opportunity to get from the courts the additional protection they seek.
Ironically, the 2004 Corporate Responsibility Report's disclosures suggest that Kasky's
allegations may have been true.
271 See, e.g., Thomas H. Clarke, Jr., Will Nike v. Kasky Ignite Corporate Social Responsibility
Trade Wars between the US. and European Union?, SRI MEDIA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
NEWS, June 28, 2003 ("Those companies that do not publish CSR reports, or generally obfuscate
their positions on matter diverse as global warming to supply chain economics, will be much less
inclined to publicize their progress for fear of California litigation.") (on file with author).
272 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Forty Leading Newspapers, Magazines, Broadcasters,
Wire Services, and Media-Related Professional and Trade Associations in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 255.
273 See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. ofN.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n ofN.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
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corporate entities like individuals, partnerships, limited liability
companies, and so forth. As it stands now the commercial speech
doctrine focuses on the commercial nature of the speech and whether
the speaker is a commercial entity, depending on what decision is used
as support, is either only one factor that is not dispositive274 or it is an
irrelevant factor because the government ought not to discriminate by
speaker. 275 Here I am concerned with the commercial speech of for-
profit corporations, and so I will consider Emerson's theoretical
supports from the perspective of this sort of speaker.
Similarly, current doctrine has it that a for-profit speaker can issue
speech that is not commercial, that is, speech about an issue of public
concern that is political, and so not all corporate speech is
commercial. 276 I argue here that while not all speech by an entity
organized as a corporation is commercial, since many not-for-profit and
advocacy groups assume a corporate form, all speech by a for-profit
corporation is commercial since, by virtue of the rules governing for-
profit corporations a for-profit corporation has no legitimate purpose
other than commerce. 277 By definition all of its speech is commercial
whether it appears to be or not because as a non-human entity it only
has the interests that the laws governing its establishment dictate to it,
and those laws dictate that its establishment be to conduct business. So
even when Exxon-Mobil talks about global warming its purpose is
always and inherently commercial. Unlike human beings, corporations
are not ends in themselves or moral subjects. 278 They are instrumental,
legal formations of persons and capital organized to do business. When
applying Emerson's theory about First Amendment values to the for-
profit corporation it does not appear that extending these rights to for-
profit corporations would advance or support those interests Emerson
discusses.
274 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983) (presence of an economic
motive alone does not make speech "commercial"); Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 311 (Cal.
2002) (discussing factors which make speech "commercial" for purposes of the doctrine).
275 "The inherent worth of... speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not
depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual."
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
276 See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S at 783 n.18 (describing dissenter Justice's White's view that
corporate expenditures be "integrally related to corporate business operations" as undesirable
because of the prospect that corporate communications related to educational, charitable or
cultural causes might be chilled, but without discussing what motives other than a business
purpose a corporation would ever have for engaging in such speech).
277 See also Bennigson, supra note 4, at 395.
278 Even the most devoted proponents of freedom of expression for organizations do not
appear to take the position that legal fictions like corporations have inherent or intrinsic moral
worth, but rather that protection for these entities will further human flourishing. See, e.g.,




As a non-human entity, a corporation lacks the expressive interests
related to self-actualization and freedom that human beings possess by
virtue of being human. Human beings are moral subjects and ends in
themselves. 279  Corporations are not. And despite the extension to
corporations of personhood, that personhood has not extended to courts
concluding that they are entitled to all of the same protections
applicable to human beings. For example, corporations have no right
against compulsory self-incrimination 280 and no right of privacy 28'
because these rights are said to be "purely personal. ' 282 Freedom of
expression as a function of self-actualization or self-determination
would seem to be similarly personal. As Emerson put it, the right to
freedom of expression is necessary to human beings because:
[E]xpression is an integral part of the development of ideas, of
mental exploration and of the affirmation of self. The power to
realize his potentiality as a human being begins at this point and
must extend at least this far if the whole nature of man is not to be
thwarted. 28
3
Corporations do not have a "self' to be actualized or affirmed. 284
Their employees may have them. Their shareholders may have them.
But corporations themselves do not. When a corporation's agents speak
on its behalf they are not expressing themselves, they are acting as
agents to advance the corporation's ends. And if that corporation is a
for-profit one, its ends are profit, however its management defines it.285
279 As indicated above, there are a number of sources for this position of the "natural rights"
theory, whose most prominent early proponent of influence on the Framers was probably John
Locke. Locke posited that human beings belonged to God and as such should not interfere with
one another's lives, health, liberty, or property because human beings "being furnished with like
faculties... cannot be supposed any such subordination" as between each other "as if we were
made for one another's uses, as inferior ranks of creatures are for ours." JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT. reprinted in POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 6, David
Wootton ed., 1993). In his introduction to this volume Wootton describes the American
Constitution as "founded on Lockean principles." Id at 8. See also David L. Wardle, Reason to
Ratify: The Influence of John Locke's Religious Beliefs on the Creation and Adoption of the
United States Constitution, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 291 (2002). And as Eduardo Pefialver has
persuasively argued, a natural rights approach can be consistent with both "a robust sphere of
individual autonomy and with active state regulation." Eduardo M. Pefialver, Restoring the Right
Constitution?, 116 YALE L. J. 732 (2007).
280 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
281 Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
282 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978).
283 Emerson, supra note 18, at 879.
284 For a wonderful discussion of this issue from the perspective of the absence of an author,
see Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735 (1995). Professor
Bezanson's objection extends beyond the for-profit institutional speaker.
285 What constitutes the profit and the proper perspective from which to analyze that question




[c]orporate speech is coerced, not free. It is compelled, legally
mandated speech, not the result of anyone's autonomous behavior. It
does not reflect the views of shareholders, nor, if management is
acting in good faith, those of managers or other corporate agents.
Instead, corporate speech reflects the hypothetical interests of a
creature given reality by the market and the law: the fictional
shareholder. 286
The fictional shareholder is just that, a fiction-a mental
construction no more embodied than the "+" in an equation. A
corporation's "principal is merely a principle, an abstraction, not a
human being. [P]rinciples, unlike principals, do not have any autonomy
rights to be respected. '287
Nor do the people speaking on behalf of the corporation have
autonomy rights with respect to their expression since it is not their own
expression. However much their own creativity and interests may align
with the corporation's, at the end of the day, they are agents speaking on
the corporation's behalf-following orders-albeit the implicit orders
dictated by their fiduciary duties. "[P]eople who are just following
orders are neither full moral subjects nor appropriate participants in the
difficult debates of the political forum. '288  Thus, if there is a
justification for the protection for commercial speech, self-expression,
does not seem to be a part of that justification-at least not speaker self-
expression.289
But what about listener self-expression? After all, it was the rights
of the listeners that the Court in Virginia Pharmacy emphasized.
Perhaps the Court was influenced by Professor Martin Redish's
ultimately material and economic, whether increasing shareholder value in the form of stock
value, increased net profits, rate of return, stability, growth or any number of other economic
measures. To the extent intangibles like reputation, goodwill and image can be materialized into
economic value these things count as well. But it is the intangible as it translates into the tangible
economic reality, not the intangible for its own sake.
286 Greenwood, supra note 109, at 1002.
287 Id. at 1056.
288 Id. at 1057.
289 As Professor David Vladeck notes, the Supreme Court appears to have incorporated some
notion of speaker's rights into the commercial speech doctrine, despite the absence of this
element in the earlier law, in two recent cases. See David Vladeck, Lessons From a Story Untold:
Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1072-73 (2004) (citing Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) and Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535
U.S. 357 (2002)). While this is definitely a shift in the doctrine it appears to have been an under-
theorized one and there is no telling if it is deliberate or will be permanent. In neither case did the
Court acknowledge explicitly that it was introducing a justification not found in the foundational
cases. Instead, the Court appeared to assume that it was self-evidently true that the doctrine
protected this interest. This is not surprising, given the metaphor of corporate personhood. One
of the goals of this article is to expose this shift as a departure from the original justifications for
the doctrine and one with potentially far reaching consequences that it is not clear that the Court
has fully considered, given that the shift was not remarked.
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observation that "the function of self-rule290 is fostered by the receipt of
information that enables the individual to make life-affecting decisions
in a more informed fashion. '291 In other words, perhaps by giving
corporations freedom to speak, more information (or at least social
material, if not strictly speaking "information") is generated that in turn
supports the goal of self-actualization or development. One might call
this the self-expression by proxy argument. There may be something to
this.292 This argument makes the speech generated by corporations a
sort of clay from which individuals can mold their statements about
self.293 On the one hand it seems undeniable that advanced capitalism
offers a dizzying array of material from which to craft a personal
identity, particularly if one focuses on self-expression in the realm of
consumer choices.
On the other hand, one might be skeptical about how broad,
ideologically speaking, the array of choices actually is. And even if we
assume it is very broad, what if there are significant social costs, for
example environmental pollution or child labor, associated with the
provision of that array of consumption choices that supposedly supports
self-expression? Are these social costs offset by the benefit of being
able to use this speech as material for self-expression? It seems difficult
to assess such speculative benefits in order to balance them against
concrete harms like poisonous products, environmental degradation, or
other potentially negative consequences.
And what of the situation where a company imbues a brand with
misleading social meaning that means it is not exactly the clay for self-
expression it purports to be? For example, if the maker of sportswear
advertises and promotes its brand as "sweatshop free," it does so with
the theory that some consumers will base their purchasing decisions on
such representations in furtherance of the creation of an identity that
includes, among other implicit claims, "I support fair labor practices. 294
290 The term "self rule" seems to invoke both the democracy concerns and the autonomy or
self-realization concerns.
291 Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply To
Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 682 (1982).
292 For arguments in this vein, see JAMES B. TWITCHELL, ADCULT USA: THE TRIUMPH OF
ADVERTISING IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1996).
293 Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors: Corporate
Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (1998).
294 Although there is some evidence that, as with much self-reporting that involves potentially
moral claims, what people say will influence their decision-making process and their actual
behavior may diverge. Andreas Chatzidakis, Sally Hibbert & Andrew P. Smith, Why People
Don't Take Their Concerns about Fair Trade to the Supermarket: The Role of Neutralisation, 74
J. Bus. ETHICS 89 (2007). But see Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The
Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525
(2004) (arguing that to the extent people do match convictions to purchasing decisions, there is no
convincing reason to honor consumer preferences with respect to the characteristics of the
product but not with respect to the process by which it was made). See also Douglas A. Kysar,
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However, if the company's actions are not consistent with those
representations, how does the promotion of this image further the
creation of identity and self-expression among those consumers who
purchase its product with the belief that they are making a statement
about their values? Their purchases are supporting the perpetuation of
labor practices that they actually intended to disavow with their
purchases. This outcome would seem to violate, not vindicate, the
justificatory principle of self-expression by proxy. This is precisely
where the government may have a role to play by attempting to ensure
that the products consumers buy in order to express themselves are
truthfully labeled, promoted, described, and marketed so that the
consumer can effectively signal their preferences to manufacturers as
well as the world at large.
B. Truth
The value that is most often associated with protection of
commercial speech however is truth. Laissez-faire in the marketplace
of ideas is said to lead to the production of more truth.2 95 But of all the
justifications offered in support of freedom of commercial speech (or
more accurately, freedom from liability) this one might be the least
convincing. Because of gross imbalances in resources, incentives, and
opportunities to speak, broad protection for commercial speech seems
far more likely to lead to less truth rather than more.
In the conventional recitation of the truth theory it is only through
an open exchange of ideas and information that the truth is most likely
to emerge. 296  Virtually all of the variations on the theoretical
framework proposed by Emerson turn around this idea that truth, or at
least the individual's truth as expressed through their choices
The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003).
295 1 have written another article about the problems with this argument. Tamara R. Piety,
Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: Commercial Speech and the Problem that Won 't Go
Away, LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). Simply because information is truthful does not
mean it will be important, relevant, useful or sufficient in all cases. (I have Curtis Bridgeman to
thank for this insight.) Moreover, if we are to judge by the popularity of an idea it is unclear that,
as an empirical matter, the truth will out since so many popular ideas are manifestly untrue. So
the conventional invocation to this value is probably as much about the perceived value of non-
interference by government as it is about any confidence that the public will generally recognize
and accept "the truth" in most or even many cases. And this is even quite apart from the obvious
difficulties in defining truth.
296 "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting). For
a discussion of the reasons for doubt about this proposition from an empirical standpoint, see
Alvin I. Goldman and James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas, 2 LEGAL
THEORY 1 (1996).
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representing individual utility maximization, will best find expression or
satisfaction through minimal restraint on the so-called marketplace of
ideas. This is also the basis of the argument made by one of the most
prominent proponents of freedom of commercial expression, Professor
Martin Redish.297  "Information received in the commercial
context... is specifically designed to assist the individual in the
decision-making process. ' 298 On the other hand, traditionally, the law
has prohibited false commercial speech on the theory that there are
social and economic costs associated with false (or even misleading)
commercial speech and that the government appropriately has a role in
enforcing truth in this context.
However, much of the speech issued by for-profit corporations is
persuasive speech that is not necessarily informative and so may not be
easily categorized as either true or false. Indeed, one would be hard-
pressed to identify the information in much advertising. As Professor
Redish noted in 1971, even "[a] cursory examination of current
television and periodical advertising reveals that in practice,
comparatively little commercial promotion performs a purely
informational function. ' 299 Doing a similar cursory examination today
merely confirms his observation that commercial advertising (which is
what Redish was describing, not public relations or advocacy speech), is
even less informative now than it was in 1971. And for the reasons
explored above, it is difficult to conclude that for-profit corporations
will ever disseminate unfavorable information except under
compulsion. 300 So it is not clear that by offering more protection to
commercial speech, more truth is likely to be produced. False speech
by contrast can hardly be viewed as contributing to discovery of truth
even if it contributes to the palette of available symbols for self-
expression.
Nevertheless, Professor Redish's arguments persuaded the
Supreme Court, which, in the main, adopted the justification he offered
for the protection of commercial speech (along with his proposed
limitations) when it decided that the public did indeed have as much
interest in hearing correct price information as it did in hearing about
the news of the day.30 1 It was on this basis, the consumer's right to
297 See Redish, supra note 75. In fact, he also convincingly folds self-government into self-
actualization claiming that Emerson's third value is really just a manifestation of the first value.
Id. at 439.
298 Id at 445.
299 Id. at 433.
300 See supra notes 236-242 and accompanying text (discussing Merck's calculation of the
costs of disseminating information about the heart risks of Vioxx).
301 As the Court in Virginia Phannacy noted, "[T]he particular consumer's interest in the free
flow of commercial information... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the
day's most urgent political debate." Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
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receive truthful information, that the Court extended a limited
protection to commercial speech.302 Note that self-expression for the
corporation itself played no analytical part in the justification for this
extension. The right that was protected was that of the listener. Despite
expanding the category of protected speech to encompass speech not
previously protected, the Court reserved to the government the right to
regulate commercial speech for its truth on the theory that commercial
speech was hardier than other types of protected speech and thus was
less likely to be chilled by appropriate regulation to control fraud.303
If it is the public interest in the production of truth that justifies and
explains the Virginia Pharmacy decision, it would seem, as the Court
indeed found, this justification similarly offers a basis for governmental
regulation of speech which is only misleading or deceptive but not
necessarily provably false in whole or in part.304 Where, as with for-
profit corporations, structural incentives clearly slant toward persuasive
communication, whether or not it is truthful 30 5 and there are powerful
and pervasive incentives to misrepresent, the truth production function
of protection for freedom of expression does not seem to offer a strong
basis for protecting commercial speech without some very clear social
benefit to be derived. The social benefits of unrestrained commercial
speech, if limited to its claimed informational nature, appear dubious.
And it is clear from reading literature in marketing itself that many
practitioners do not view that what they are engaged in providing is
informational. Some marketing professionals openly claim that truth is
irrelevant to sales.306 In light of the above discussion of corporate
incentive structures, this is not an astonishing observation. Rather, it is
the predictable and intuitive outcome which an even slight familiarity
with marketing practices substantiates. Given that consumers have a
limited amount of time and limited access to reliable information from
425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976).
302 "In concluding that commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected, we of course do
not hold that it can never be regulated .... Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has
never been protected for its own sake .... The First Amendment, as we construe it today does not
prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as
freely." Id. at 770-72 (citations omitted). See also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566, 572 (1980) (holding that in order for commercial speech to
be protected by the First Amendment the speech "must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading").
303 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
304 Id
305 See, e.g., Sarah C. Haan, The "Persuasion Route" of the Law: Advertising and Legal
Persuasion, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (2000).
306 "The facts are irrelevant. In the short run, it doesn't matter one bit whether something is
actually better or faster or more efficient. What matters is what the consumer believes." SETH
GODIN, ALL MARKETERS ARE LIARS: THE POWER OF TELLING AUTHENTIC STORIES IN A LOW-
TRUST WORLD 6 (2005). See also Lew McCreary, Lies, Damn Lies and Puffery, CMO
MAGAZINE, July 2005.
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which to assess marketing claims, it is equally clear why, for marketers,
persuasion may not entail truth. This is quite apart from whether
marketing operates on non-rational thought processes in the first
place.307
If corporations have a duty to communicate in ways that will
enhance shareholder value by generating profits and good publicity, and
if they are permitted to communicate false information that will
generate value and can do so without legal consequences, then they will
predictably do so. 308 In fact, even with existing laws governing fraud
and corporate statements, a corporation still might decide that it is not
cost effective to follow the law.
Consider the case of Phillip Morris. On September 22, 1999, the
United States brought a RICO case against Phillip Morris and several
other tobacco companies, as well as some of their not-for-profit public
relations and research organizations, alleging a conspiracy to commit
fraud to endanger the lives of millions of Americans by concealing or
misrepresenting the evidence of the negative health consequences of
smoking. 30 9 The government alleged that "[i]n order to avoid discovery
307 There is ample evidence that marketers explicitly do not spend much time trying to appeal
to potential buyers' rationality. There is a huge literature of this topic in a number of fields. A
few current works of interest that summarize some of the literature are: ROBERT B. CIALDINI,
INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (1984) (discussing what he calls the "automatic
influence" of certain techniques used by marketers); CLOTAIRE RAPAILLE, THE CULTURE CODE
(2007) (describing his approach to discovering what motivates people as stemming from the
"reptilian brain"; Dr. Rapaille has been much sought after by marketers); FRANK LUNTZ, WORDS
THAT WORK (2007) (discussing the influence of word choice in marketing and politics that is not,
for the most part a product of reflection but rather is unthinking and reflexive). I have written at
some length about this aspect of advertising in another piece, Tamara R. Piety, "Merchants of
Discontent": An Exploration of the Psychology of Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications
for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE L. REV. 377 (2001).
308 Some of the problems with respect to counterfeits and adulterated goods coming from
China have been attributed by some observers to the absence of effective regulatory oversight in
China. See David Barboza, When Fakery Turns Fatal: Food Scare Raises Questions About
Chinese Entrepreneurs, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at Cl, C4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/05/business/worldbusiness/05fakes.html?scp= l &sq=when+fak
ery+tums+fatal&st-nyt. In addition, U.S. law currently permits sellers to make some concededly
false statements if they can be characterized as "puffing"-that is, assertions so obviously inflated
that no rational person would believe they were literally true. See, e.g., Piety, supra note 307, at
394-96 (2001) (describing puffing doctrine); David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever,
91 IOWA L. REv. 1395 (2006) (article examines puffing doctrine and recommends presumptive
liability for false statement in the absence of better knowledge about how puffing effects listeners
as well as evidence of speakers' intent to manipulate consumer responses). Why human beings
believe or are motivated by things that they not only rationally should not be but which they
affirmatively disclaim is somewhat mysterious. See, e.g., CIALDINI, supra note 307, at 115
(discussing the perplexing question of why, despite professed distaste for canned laugh tracks and
identification of them as "phony," people respond to canned laugh tracks in television
programming by rating the material in which they appear as funnier and laughing longer than in
that material which does not contain them).
309 See First Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 2-3,
United States v. Phillip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2006), (No. 99-C V-02496 (GK)),
1999 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 2496C.
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of their fraudulent conduct and the possibility that they might be called
to account for their conduct, defendants engaged in a widespread
scheme to frustrate public scrutiny by making false and deceptive
statements and by concealing documents and research that they knew
would have exposed their public campaign of deceit. '310 What was
defendants' motive? "[T]he shared goals of maximizing their
profits. 311
The tobacco companies largely furthered this conspiracy by
maintaining that the question of whether smoking had negative health
questions was a matter of debate. Of course today we know the
negative health consequences of smoking are beyond debate. And
according to many they were beyond debate for several decades, long
after the tobacco companies continued to insist that it was an open
question. 312 But the companies kept up a relentless public relations
campaign intended to create the impression that whether smoking was
bad for your health was an open question.313
Discovery revealed that much of what was characterized by
defendants as offered in aid of debate was in fact intended to obfuscate
the question or to distract the public from the known dangers of
smoking. Defendants' own documents suggested that they wanted to
conceal information, not provide it. That pattern of concealing
evidence or violating the law did not end with the collapse of the health
consequences debate. It continued in the claims that nicotine was not
addictive or that the industry was not intentionally attempting to market
to children. Both of these claims were belied by the tobacco
companies' internal communications. 314 Perhaps it is should be no
surprise that some documents never made it into discovery.
On July 21, 2004, Judge Kessler ordered Phillip Morris to pay a
discovery sanction of $2.75 million for destruction of evidence. The
sanction was assessed because the judge found that Phillip Momis's
failure to comply with a court order requiring document retention
reflected "reckless disregard and gross indifference by Phillip Morris
and its parent Altria Group toward their discovery and document
preservation obligations. ' 315  The evidence the defendants had
310 Id. 5.
311 Id. 4.
312 See, e.g., ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY 159-207 (2007).
313 Apparently the companies believed it was never too soon to start creating this impression
as, according to the final opinion from Judge Kessler, between 1971 and 1973 one company sent
more than 1,000 copies of a pamphlet entitled "Smoking/Health An Age Old Controversy" to
school children. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc, 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 189 (D.D.C. 2006).
314 Id. at 218-286 (regarding knowledge of nicotine's addictive properties and denial of same,
including in testimony before Congress), and at 561-691 (regarding marketing to youth despite
denials of same).
315 See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26 (D.D.C. 2004).
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destroyed was email that an earlier court order required them to
preserve. Pursuant to defendants' document destruction policy (or so
they claimed) that email was destroyed. Later, when the defendants
discovered these records had been destroyed, they nevertheless failed to
notify the government and the court of that fact for several months.316
Why would a good corporate citizen 317 flout a court order? Could
Phillip Morris be a rogue company?318 An explanation for this behavior
might be found in the judge's own opinion. She noted that it was
difficult to calculate the proportional sanction that the rules of civil
procedure required 319 "because we have no way of knowing what, if any
value those destroyed emails had to Plaintiffs case .... "320 In other
words, there was no way of knowing how valuable to plaintiff's case the
destroyed evidence was. However, it was possible to look at what was
at stake for defendants. The government had originally sought $280
billion in damages. Although a later appellate court ruling required that
the claim be reduced because the appellate court concluded the statue
only permitted forward-looking damages, 321 this decision did not
eliminate the possibility that defendants' liability would ultimately run
into the billions, not the millions of dollars. Given the potential
exposure, $ 2.75 million would surely be a small price to pay if the
evidence that was destroyed reduced the probabilities of a multi-billion
dollar verdict.322 Of course destruction of the evidence is wrong, illegal,
316 Id.
317 "The Altria family of companies is firmly committed to pursuing its business objectives
with integrity and in full compliance with the law." Altria Company, Societal Expectations,
http://www.altria.com/responsibility/4_2complianceandintegrity.asp (last visited August, 10,
2005). See also Altria Company, Understanding Social Expectations,
http://www.altria.com/responsibility/44_societalexpectations.asp (description of commitments
to various "stakeholders" beyond shareholders).
318 Perhaps since the tobacco companies produce a legal product that predictably kills a certain
percentage of their customers; the designation "rogue" may be difficult to avoid.
319 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (2008) ("If a party... fails to obey an order to provide of
permit discovery ... the court ... may issue further just orders.").
320 Phillip Morris USA, 327 F. Supp. 2d. at 26.
321 See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The
additional difficulty with the ability to adequately deter corporate misconduct, even with existing
laws and regulations, was highlighted when in early June of 2005 the government announced it
was inexplicably backing off of its revised damages claim in excess of $100 billion, in favor of
only $10 billion.
322 In fact the defendants got a further break when the government voluntarily scaled back its
damages request from $130 billion to $10 billion. The government lawyers defended the move
on the grounds that the court of appeals limitation of damages to forward-looking damages made
a larger request unlikely to be sustained. This explanation was met with skepticism in some
quarters and the allegation that the change was politically motivated. Eric Lichtblau, Lawyers
Fought U.S. Move to Curb Tobacco Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2005, at Al ("At the close of a
major trial that dozens of Justice Department lawyers spent five years preparing, the department
stunned a federal courtroom last week by reducing the penalties sought against the industry, from
$130 billion to $10 billion, over accusations of fraud and racketeering."), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/l6/politics/l 6tobacco.html?scp=l &sq=Lawyers+Fought+U.S.+
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and sanctionable. And it was duly punished in this case. But it is easy
to see, even as a hypothetical matter, that the economic trade-offs in
specific cases may represent a well nigh irresistible temptation to
violate discovery orders and pay damages rather than run the risk of
greater liability down the road. Incentives do not seem very well aligned
with truth production even in the context of a court action where there is
a legal duty to produce it. How sanguine can we be that truth will be
produced in less stringent contexts like the issuance of promotional
materials?
Apart from the ubiquitous profit motive as an obstacle to truth
finding, 323 there is an additional problem: The legal deterrents that
might act as an incentive to truth telling-criminal and civil penalties-
are not as effective as they might be. Even when a corporation is found
to have lied, it may be difficult to attribute that lie (and the requisite
intentionality) to any person, thereby making a corporate criminal
conviction virtually impossible. For example, the government
succeeded in garnering a conviction against Arthur Andersen for its role
in the Enron debacle, but that conviction was later overturned by the
Supreme Court after the Court found the jury instructions were too
vague on the mens rea issue and therefore might have permitted the jury
to convict without evidence of the requisite criminal intent. 324
Of course, establishing the mens rea or intent of a corporation is
itself a somewhat metaphysical proposition since we can only find
intent in its human representatives-the employees, officers, and
directors. But the dispersal of authority, knowledge, and responsibility
within organizations may mean that everyone connected with an
organization can plausibly claim they did not know that what they were
doing was wrong, so a criminal conviction, whether of the corporation
or of an individual employee, may be difficult to obtain, as it was in the
Arthur Andersen case itself.
Moreover, if the interest that justifies protection of commercial
expression is the production of truth it appears that for-profit
corporations (perhaps like human speakers) are mostly interested in the
protection of their own speech, not in freedom of expression for others.
Corporate interests often aggressively litigate against the speech of
others that they find offensive. Examples of this practice are the
"McLibel" case in the U.K. discussed above, beef producers lawsuit
against Oprah Winfrey for what it claimed was "disparagement" of
Move+to+Curb+Tobacco+Penalty&st=nyt.
323 This is not just a problem in the area of corporate governance or communication with
consumers. Corporate funding of scientific research may pose a problem for scientific truth as
well. "Entanglement with business interests undoubtedly poses a threat to the scientific ethos, and
in consequence to the advancement of science." Susan Haack, Scientific Secrecy and "Spin
The Sad Sleazy Saga of the Trials of Remune, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 63 (2006).
324 Arthur Andersen, L.L.P. v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
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beef,325 Monsanto's. efforts to suppress negative press about its bovine
growth hormone,326 and Fox Network's lawsuit in the U.S. against
comedian Al Franken for the use of the words "fair and balanced." 327
Suits such as these undoubtedly have, and are meant to have, a chilling
effect on the target and anyone else who has a mind to criticize the
companies in question.328
Moreover, advertisers often have enormous influence on media
content and can withdraw their advertising dollars from media and from
messages with which they disagree or which they find presents the
wrong environment for their ads. 329 Such influence and pressure affects
the availability of dissenting or contrary information because advertisers
can affect the willingness of publishers to carry such information. For
example, for years many general circulation publications were
threatened by the tobacco industry with the withdrawal of advertising if
they published news stories on the health dangers of smoking.330 And
unfortunately such threats "are usually unnecessary-the media know
what behavior is expected and have complied."' 331 The result is far less
truth any way you look at it.
325 CNN News, Oprah Accused of Whipping Up Anti-Beef "Lynch Mob",
http://www.cnn.com/US/9801/21/oprah.beef/), Jan. 21, 1998 (last visited Aug. 13, 2007). For a
discussion of veggie-libel laws, see Megan W. Semple, Veggie Libel Meets Free Speech. A
Constitutional Analysis of Agricultural Disparagement Laws, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 403, 404-05
(1996) (describing agricultural disparagement law arising out of the concerns raised about the
pesticide Alar).
326 For a discussion of one instance which got a lot of coverage, see the discussion of
Monsanto's attempt to suppress a negative news report on their bovine growth hormone product
infra note 413.
327 See Fox News Network, LLC v. Penguin Group (USA), Inc., No. 03 Civ. 6162(RLC), 2003
WL 23281520 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2003) (denying temporary retraining order on humorist Al
Franken's use of the term "fair and balanced").
328 In secret tapes made of the settlement negotiations in the McLibel case some unidentified
representative of McDonald's appears to concede that the lawsuit was intended to discourage
others with similar opinions as Steel and Morris from voicing their opinions publicly. The
McLibel litigation follows the pattern of what has been called a SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against
public participation) action. For a general description of SLAPP suits and the first amendment
issues, see Alice Glover and Marcus Jimison, S.L.A.P.P. Suits: A First Amendment Issue and
Beyond, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 122 (1995).
329 It hardly seems necessary to support this assertion since it seems so obvious, as illustrated
by the famous Janet Jackson "Nipplegate" incident which resulted in loss of sponsorship
opportunities to Ms. Jackson as well as tangles over program content. More recently AT & T was
accused of censoring a live feed for a Pearl Jam concert to delete critical references to President
Bush. Although the company claimed those deletions were an error it apparently admitted that it
was censoring the feed for profanity. See Center for Media and Democracy, Jamming Pearl Jam,
http://www.prwatch.org/node/6342) (last visited Aug. 15, 2007). Nevertheless, some discussion
of this phenomenon can be found in MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, supra note 15; C. EDWIN
BAKER, ADVERTISING, supra note 139; C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND
DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS (2006).
330 See, e.g., BAKER, ADVERTISING, supra note 139, at 52-53 (citing cases where magazines
had cancelled articles criticizing or edited out discussions of the adverse effects of tobacco).
331 Id. at 53.
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When combined with the massive amounts of spending by large,
multinational corporations, the prospect looks grim for truth to win in
the marketplace of ideas if market principles prevail. Nike spent almost
$1 billion in fiscal year 1997 on marketing,332 yet Nike argued to the
Supreme Court that without constitutional protection from liability for
false speech it would be silenced, and it would not be able to participate
in the debate about globalization. 333 A billion dollars funds a lot of
speech. It seems demonstrably untrue that Niki- was silenced. And
given the economic imperatives discussed above, it is unlikely that Nike
will be silenced by any penalties or judgments against it for alleged
misrepresentations. 334 But with that sort of budget it may well be able
to silence or drown out opponents. What this adds up to is the
conclusion that it is ndiive to think that in this environment more
protection for commercial speech, that is, removing the existing
constraints on it, is likely to lead to more truth, a better debate, or any
more information. Indeed, it is plausible to conclude the opposite will
occur-rather less information and more misinformation.
C. Participation in Democracy
A third justification offered by Emerson and others for the
protection for freedom of expression is that freedom of expression is a
prerequisite to democracy. A democracy is not really a democracy
without the participation of its citizens. Citizens require protection for
their expression in order to fully participate. Corporations, though, are
not citizens. They have no interest in democratic participation as such.
For-profit corporations have an interest in supporting whatever legal or
political regime guarantees the most congenial environment in which to
generate profits. Thus, they do not hesitate to re-incorporate in Liberia
or the Bahamas or to move certain parts of their operations to other
countries whenever it is profitable to do so. The fact of initial
incorporation in the United States is not an insurmountable obstacle to
this practice, and they have no allegiance to any particular nation. 335 As
332 See Amended Complaint at 5, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 994446).
333 See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 147, at 38-50.
334 The settlement agreement was largely confidential except for a portion which awarded $1.5
million to the Fair Labor Association and $500,000 a year to be donated to a microloan program.
For a discussion of the settlement and its implications, see Ronald K. L. Collins & David M.
Skover, The Landmark Free-Speech Case That Wasn't: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 965, 1019-21 (2004).
335 1 leave aside the question of whether the nation-state or patriotism or any of its
accoutrements are good or desirable things. They may not be. And at least one observer has
suggested that the concept of a nation-state is in decline and being replaced with market-states.
See PHILIP C. BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES (2003). It is easy to understand why the
market-state might protect its own expression. But it is equally easy then to see why the public
26572008]
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
non-citizens, corporations have (or, rather, ought theoretically to have)
no role in the participation in democracy.336 This is not to say of course
that their representatives cannot offer opinions. But it is to say that
corporations are not clearly entitled to a voice in matters of public
concern as a matter of democratic participation. Nevertheless, their
opinions and their influence are widespread.
Corporations cannot vote. Yet it is apparent to the meanest
intelligence that corporations have a major, if not a dominant, role in
our democracy. Corporations play key roles in urging legislation upon
Congress with a large measure of success, as the recent revisions to the
bankruptcy code, urged by the credit card companies for their own
benefit, illustrate. 337 Typically industry has drafted the legislation in
question as well as funded the research and engaged in public relations
campaigns to get the issue as they see it before key members of the
public and the legislatures. 338 In the past, corporations could offer
legislators attractive trips to luxurious locales under the pretext of
"education. '339  Still, they can invest billions in not-for-profit
organizations to act as fronts, such as alleged in the tobacco litigation
with the now defunct Council for Tobacco Research. 340 They can also
invest billions in putting together "astroturf" organizations to lobby
might want some restraint on that expression just as the First Amendment itself is constructed as a
restraint on government.
336 See, e.g., Baker, Paternalism, supra note 139, at 1178-83 (Part 111-A Corporation is Not
A Citizen).
337 See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma
or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy
Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 253-54 (2006) (detailing how industry lobbying efforts on the bill
by one account exceed $100 million dollars without an organization with comparable assets
lobbying on behalf of debtors). Congress has currently passed a bill with extensive limits on
certain types of lobbying but, based on newspaper accounts it appears to be primarily directed at
the practice of wining and dining legislators, not at prohibiting the practice of drawing up
proposed legislation. David D. Kirkpatrick, Tougher Rules Change Game for Lobbyists, N.Y.
TiMES, Aug. 7, 2007.
338 See supra note 336. See also Rafael Efrat, Attribution Theory Bias and the Perception of
Abuse in Consumer Bankruptcy, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 205, 220 (2003) ("The
subtle mass media message of consumer bankruptcy abuse has been recently steered, to some
extent, by an aggressive public relations campaign by the credit card industry."). The author
claims that this practice and the fairly uncritical adoption by media made the perception of
bankruptcy abuse salient and thus look advantage of cognitive biases to create impression
unsupported by the data. Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social
Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1, 22 (2002) (descnbing credit industry's role in
generating research). Robert Cwiklik, Ivory Tower Inc.: When Research and Lobbying Mesh,
WALL ST. J., June 9, 1998, at B 1.
339 The recent rule changes make that practice suspect and apparently largely out of bounds.
See Kirkpatrick, supra note 337. On the issue of corporate lobbying generally, see STAUBER &
RAMPTON, supra note 131; SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, TRUST US WE'RE EXPERTS
(2001); and NELSON, SULTANS OF SLEAZE, supra note 131.
340 Examples are the various research institutes set up by the tobacco industry to act as fronts




Influence is not limited to the legislature. Corporate interests also
may influence agencies, whether indirectly through the efforts of
lobbying legislators, the executive, who may in turn shape agency
decision making, or directly through comments to the rule-making
process or adjudicative processes available under administrative law.
And because priorities shift over time and depending on who is the
occupant of the White House, sometimes enforcement efforts may not
be as vigorous as the drafters of the legislation or rule contemplated. It
may not much help for a particular regulatory effort if the head of that
effort, be it an agency or a prosecutor, views his or her job as being in
partnership with business 342 or decides he or she is not in favor of a
particular regulatory or disciplinary effort and wants to withdraw it.343
One particularly stark example of this was in the early 1980s when the
head of the Federal Trade Commission publicly described his
understanding of his job as one of urging Congress to narrow the scope
of the agency's jurisdiction.344 And it certainly is not obvious that
narrowing the scope of an agency's jurisdiction might not be in the
public interest, as this understanding was in some conflict with the
legislative direction that had been given by statute. How much of this
understanding sprang from political pressure from the targets of
regulation is probably impossible to say. But it is commonplace to
suppose that politicians are rather more solicitous of industry interests
than those members of the public with less to offer in the way of
341 "Astroturf" organization refers to organizations created by paid public relations firms or
other corporate sponsors organizations which resemble grassroots organizations put together by
citizens but which are really made up of persons paid by the industry in question to pose as
"concerned citizens." See STAUBER & RAMPTON, supra note 131, at 79 (describing astroturf
lobbying efforts).
342 "The notion that business and government are and should be partners is ubiquitous,
unremarkable, and repeated like a manta by leaders in both domains." BAKAN, supra note 112, at
108.
343 There is often something of a revolving door between the firms in the industry to be
regulated and the employees of the governmental agencies doing the regulating. Editorial,
Lobbying from Within, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/17/opinion/17fri 1 .html?scp= 1 &sq=lobbying+from+within&st=
nyt. There are perfectly understandable reasons supporting this movement that are not in any way
sinister. Who is likely to have more knowledge of the practices of the agency than a former
employee? Similarly, why would not the agency see an advantage to hiring people with industry
knowledge? And how is that knowledge to be acquired outside of the agency? Nevertheless, the
degree of movement is often troubling and raises concerns about agency capture.
344 See, e.g., Peter Grier, FTC Chief Changes Role of "Nation's Nanny," CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 6, 1983, at 5 (describing chief of FTC as pushing Congress for narrower tailoring
of his agency's authority), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/1206/120635.html. As
recently as 2003 an FTC Commissioner described the agency's mission as allied to that of
advertisers. Commissioner Thomas B. Leary, FTC, Speech at a Conference at the Food and Drug
Law Institute: Allies in a Common Cause (Jan. 16, 2003), (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/fdli.pdf).
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campaign contributions. What is true for legislators often seems true of
all politicians, and high level appointees in the administrative side are
often, in a very real sense, politicians. Thus, when the Department of
Justice reduced the requested damages in the above mentioned tobacco
lawsuit from the $130 billion it had originally sought to "only" $ 10
billion, some observers felt this might be connected to the tobacco
lobby's influence. 345 Lawyers for the Justice Department denied that
they had reduced the damages demand as a result of political
pressure. 346 However, many observers were skeptical.
These incidents and others are suggestive of widespread corporate
influence on government. Despite having no vote, large corporations
have far more voice, more participation in shaping the law and
government policy than most flesh-and-blood citizens do.347 "We live
in corporate advertising's democracy. '348 This is especially true where
the communications are designed to affect policy. It is difficult to
understand how requiring that corporate communications be truthful,
where the truth can be ascertained, will injure democracy.
In addition, because corporate speech is not itself the result of a
democratic process, it also does not have a claim on that basis to be
respected as a contribution to the democratic process. Corporate
positions on political or social issues are not produced via a democratic
process. There is no shareholder democracy with respect to the
issuance of corporate speech since shareholders' participation in a
corporation is extremely circumscribed and largely relegated to issues
of the delegation of control. 349 So when managers craft corporate
speech, they do so with one overriding goal-profit-which may or may
not reflect actual shareholder views, had they been asked. Speech that
does not enhance shareholder value cannot be justified as an appropriate
corporate expenditure.
When a corporation lobbies. . its goal is set by law and market: it
lobbies on behalf of the principle of the fictional shareholder, to
maximize the returns to an imaginary being with no interests other
345 See Lichtblau, supra note 322.
346 Id.
347 This observation constitutes at least a rebuttal to the recent claim by George Mason
economist Bryan Caplan that it is irrational voters, unschooled in the verities of economics, who
are responsible for bad laws and bad policies because they keep voting for politicians pursuing
bad economic policies. BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER (2007). There is
some question whether the voters are actually getting what they are voting for in the first place.
See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MA1TER WITH KANSAS? (2004). But based on the amount of
money spent by corporations on lobbying, including drafting legislation, it might seem fair to say
that the actual content of the laws owes far more to the more economically sophisticated
corporate lawyers, executives, and lobbyists than it does to voters.
348 Bruce Ledewitz, Corporate Advertising's Democracy, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 389, 459
(2003).
349 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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than its shares in the corporation. No internal debate, coalition
building or political process sets the corporate goal; the views of the
various human participants in the firm are largely irrelevant. Unlike
the group of citizens, then, the corporation speaks in a unified voice
on behalf of a single principle rather than an ever-recreated
compromise. 350
Fictional shareholders ... will sacrifice almost anything in the
interest of higher profit ... ; in contrast, the citizens behind the
fiction can be expected to have far more diverse and conflicted
opinions on... important political struggles. 351
Not only is the corporation itself a legal fiction, not a human being
with interests in expression, its constituents are themselves a fictional
product. The fictional shareholder is a device management uses as the
measure of shareholder interest. And pursuant to that fiction the
shareholders' interests are relentlessly economic and short-term at
that.352 This makes them inappropriate subjects of protection since it
makes their interests interchangeable with capital, even though capital is
already influential. It does not need protection.353
The Supreme Court has itself occasionally acknowledged that a
for-profit corporation's participation in the democratic process is
appropriately circumscribed. Although the Supreme Court in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti354 held that a corporation had a right
to participate in political debates in some fashion, it retreated some from
this position in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce355 with a
reminder that corporations are, after all, creatures of the state and
recipients of special benefits from the state not enjoyed by natural
persons.
State law grants corporations special advantages-such as limited
liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and
distribution of assets-that enhance their ability to attract capital and to
deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on their
shareholders' investments. These state-created advantages not only
allow corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation's economy, but
350 Greenwood, supra note 109, at 1054.
351 Id. at 1004.
352 Because a very large portion of stock is held in trust for the investor in the form of
retirement and other funds that pool resources and the managers of those funds have a fiduciary
relationship, the beneficial owners feel even more pressure to focus solely on short term
profitability because there is little in the way of legal or moral justification for managers to do
anything else. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the
Implications of Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behavior 31 (Univ. of Pa.
Working Paper Series, 2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/187.
353 Greenwood, supra note 109, at 1003.
354 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
355 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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also permit them to use resources amassed in the economic marketplace
to obtain an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.
356
As the Court in Austin also noted,
[T]he political advantage of corporations is unfair because "[t]he
resources in the treasury of a business corporation ... are not an
indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas.
They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of
investors and customers. The availability of these resources may
make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the
power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its
ideas." 357
Moreover, many observers have suggested that the techniques of
advertising and promotion are corrosive of democracy to the extent that
these techniques have bled into political communication. 358 Frank
Luntz, master political strategist, describes his techniques as relevant to
both business and politics and consults for both.359 The interpenetration
of the strategies, ethics, and techniques of marketing which do not seek
primarily to inform but to persuade into political speech may explain
why President Bush's spokesperson, Andrew Card, compared the
announcement regarding the War in Iraq to a "product launch." 360 It
may also explain the incidents of paying pundits to promote government
programs or to carry government messages, a public relations technique
that in the hands of the government appears to be prohibited
propaganda.361 It may explain why politics looks and sounds so much
like marketing or why the current administration appears to think, like
the quoted marketing executive, "truth is irrelevant" as to whether or
not weapons of mass destruction are found or there has really been a
terrorist plot that was foiled by the authorities, or whether anyone
remembers who told what to whom about CIA agent Valerie Plame.
356 Id. at 658-59 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
357 Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986)). The
Court recently showed signs of stepping back again in the other direction in support of fewer
restrictions in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). But because the
entity in question was a not-for-profit, clearly political organization it is not clear how much we
should assume this will tell us about the Court's willingness to not make any distinctions at all
between the for-profit and the not for-profit organizations in the political context.
358 See, e.g., PBS Frontline: The Persuaders (PBS Home Video 2004) (featuring an interview
with Bob Garfield, columnist for Ad Age, an advertising trade publication, describing his views
of the negative effects of what he deems blatantly false political ads, whose content is influenced
by advertising trends); Ledewitz, supra note 348 (describing commercial advertising and
extensive protection for same under the commercial speech doctrine as a threat to democracy
because advertising is not itself democratic and need not consider democratic imperatives).
359 "Language, politics, and commerce have always been intertwined, both for better and for
worse." LUNTZ, supra note 307, at xii. See also id. at 127-78 (corporate and political case
studies).
360 See supra note 124.
361 See Lee, supra note 42, at 984 n.5 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 29:62662
AGAINST FREEDOM
These are simply problems of spin control, not reasons to fear troubling
backlash from the electorate. 362
It is undoubtedly the case that politicians have always been in the
persuasion business. And politicians, like, lawyers, do not enjoy the
highest reputations for honesty in the popular imagination. That does
not mean that there is not something vaguely troubling about the
unselfconscious adoption of marketing techniques, attitudes, and
terminology to issues that seem of rather weightier significance than
fresher breath. When we consider for-profit corporations' very
powerful interests and their influence in government, their anti-
democratic structure, and their singular organizational imperatives, it
hardly seems that democracy would be well served by offering them
even more leeway in the form of a constitutional shield for their
expressive activities. Protection for either democracy or the democratic
process seems to offer little support for the proposition that for-profit
corporations should enjoy the same rights to speech as human beings.
To the contrary, an examination of the reality of the accumulation of
resources, access to media, and corporate influence on government
suggests that it is properly restrained in support of the goal of the
preservation of democracy.
D. Balance and Blowing Off Steam
Finally, Emerson suggested that protection for freedom of
expression offered some play in the joints of democracy-some
possibility for blowing off steam by those who might otherwise have
incentives to foment unrest and that such protection thereby contributed
to social stability.363 But those persons he envisioned needing a place to
vent were undoubtedly the poor and dispossessed, those whom the
people in power must always fear lest they get excessively disgruntled.
For-profit corporations, while they may, as novelist Max Barry
imagined in Jennifer Government, pose a real threat to government, do
not pose that threat because they do not have outlets for their
expression.
As non-human entities, corporations do not have, in the first place,
an emotional need to blow off steam. And given their privileged
position in the American economy and in the political realm, it is
difficult to characterize corporations as a despised and powerless
362 FRANK RICH, THE GREATEST STORY EVER SOLD: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF TRUTH
FROM 9/11 TO KATRINA (2006) (exhaustive review of the Bush administration's P.R. techniques).
363 Others have advanced similar theories as well. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace
ofIdeas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 80-85 (1984) (arguing that the marketplace of
ideas is a legitimizing myth that defuses disenchantment with status quo and governing elites).
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minority having a grudge they need to vent lest they upset the
government. 364 Despite corporations' privileged position, the request
for more protection is framed as one to protect balance. But the
environment in which discussion about many issues of public concern
take place is already severely imbalanced and compromised by the firm
grip of consumerism and corporate structuring of our wants and
needs-in the first world and elsewhere. Only the truly poor are largely
free of the bombardment of commercial speech experienced by almost
everyone else since, because they do not have much money, poor people
do not present a good market.365 Nevertheless even those not marketed
to may suffer some of the social consequences of consumerism, albeit
without any sponsor to voice their concerns more directly to
government. Interest in balance hardly seems to support the argument
for more protection for corporate speech.
Even putting aside economic imbalance, there is evidence that on
the merits, interest in balance would seem to go in the other direction
because it is pro-corporate speech that appears neutral. It is the anti-
corporate argument that has difficulty getting aired because of for-profit
corporations' dominance of the media.366 For example, in Sultans of
Sleaze, author Joyce Nelson describes the efforts in 1988 of the British
Columbia Council of Forest Industries to re-position their industries as
"'green."
The council mounted a massive and expensive campaign to convince
the public of its 'sound forest and stewardship and reforestation
programs.' The campaign included educational displays in shopping
malls, huge posters at bus stops, ads inside buses, and colour [sic]
supplements delivered to most households in the province.... But
the biggest irritant in the whole PR effort was the Council's 'Forests
Forever' ads: a $2 million pitch on billboards and TV and in print
media in which the council spokespeople say what a wonderful job
364 Although, because they have so much power, the danger may be the temptation to
effectively run the government for its own benefit. This is the dystopian possibility satirized in
the novel Jennifer Government. See supra note 1.
365 Poor people may find themselves disproportionately the target of advertising of products
like tobacco, alcohol and lottery tickets. And one recent contributor to Advertising Age urges
marketers to realize that even people earning only $2,000 a year can represent an untapped
market that will be responsive to the right approach. Michelle Kristula-Green, How to Market to
Asia's Masses, ADVERTISING AGE, Aug. 6, 2007, available at
http://adage.com/print?article id=1 19637 (last accessed Aug. 6, 2007). Given however that the
author was touting marketers' success in converting many Vietnamese from riding bicycles to
riding motorcycles and scooters (a somewhat troubling shift in light of the problem of global
climate change, although someone driving a car in North America is not in the best position to
point fingers) and the successful promotion of powdered milk (a product of dubious utility if
there is no reliable source of clean water), it is not clear that these efforts represent an overall net
gain to either the consumers or the society at large.
366 See, e.g., ERIC ALTERMAN, WHAT LIBERAL MEDIA? (2003).
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they are doing in managing B.C. forests. 367
The ads ran for over a year on CBC-TV despite protests by
environmental groups; but when a counter-ad, "Mystical Forests,"
detailing the actual practices of the logging industry was proposed by
environmentalists and presented for CBC approval, it was turned
down as "too controversial. '368
Canadian journalist and social activist Kalle Lasn has encountered
similar problems getting the broadcast media to air his organization,
AdBusters' advertisements for "Buy Nothing Day" or for its advertising
parodies, leading the AdBusters Media Foundation to initiate legal
action that has (so far) apparently been unsuccessful. 369
Reflecting similar tendencies to reject controversy, Amtrak, a
governmental corporation, attempted to refuse to carry artist Michael
Ledron's advertisement which entailed a photo-commentary on Coors
Brewing Company's support for the Nicaraguan Contras and other
right-wing causes. The advertisement parodied Coors' advertising
campaign which proclaimed Coors to be "the Right Beer now," with the
line, "Is it the Right's Beer Now?" Despite Ledron's payment for the
advertisement, Amtrak refused it on the grounds that Amtrak did not
allow "political" advertising.370  Of course, the characterization of
Ledron's advertisement as "political" implies that the Coors
advertisement is not political.371 And in a sense it is not. Coors just
wants to sell beer. But Ledron wanted to impeach the political choices
the company had made by supporting the Contras. So he sued claiming
the First Amendment prohibited Amtrak from refusing his
advertisement. Amtrak attempted to assert its status as a corporation to
argue that Lebron could not claim a violation of his First Amendment
rights in connection with its refusal of what it characterized as political
speech because there was no government action. 372
The Supreme Court rejected Amtrak's argument, holding that
where the government retains complete control over the corporation, the
corporate form may be disregarded and the corporation viewed as an
arm of the government. Nevertheless, this resolution of the case turns
on Amtrak's status as a governmental corporation. A private media
367 NELSON, supra note 131, at 133.
368 Id.
369 See KALLE LASN, CULTURE JAM: THE UNCOOL1NG OF AMERICA 196-97 (1999).
370 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 376-77 (1995). The adoption of the
Coors company slogan to more effectively convey the message is an example of the "culture
jamming" described by Lasn. See supra note 369.
371 1 agree that the Coors advertisement is not "political" in the same way that Ledron's speech
was. But the characterization of Ledron's speech as having a "position" while the Coors
advertisement does not suggests that the Coors advertisement is neutral. This conforms to the
traditional distinction between commercial and political speech.
372 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 377-78.
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company would (in general) be free to reject any advertisement it found
controversial or political without fear of a First Amendment claim. And
since one of the things of greatest concern for advertisers, the lifeblood
of all media, is that all content in the media present the appropriate
selling environment for their goods and services, it is easy to see why
"[a] message in support of the status quo is typically considered to be
'neutral,' 'objective,' and 'non-controversial,' while a message that
departs from the status quo position or criticizes it is considered to have
a 'point of view' and 'bias.' 373
Such an orientation does not suggest that balance is likely to
emerge from the current environment. 374 The corporate form offers an
unparalleled opportunity for the accumulation of wealth and power,
while, at the same time, diffusing responsibility. Although the
frustration expressed on behalf of many business interests about over-
regulation and other perceived impediments to business may suggest
that this frustration could become a threat to the government and that
protection for commercial speech that insulated corporations from
liability might lessen this threat in part, it hardly seems like the sort of
safety valve that Emerson seemed to have had in mind in discussing this
rationale.
In short, after reviewing all of Emerson's proposed grounds for
protecting freedom of expression: autonomy and self-expression or self-
actualization; discovery of the truth, preservation of democracy, or the
democratic process; and ensuring a measure of social stability by
offering some protection for dissent, none of these grounds offers
support for protection of commercial speech. Instead they offer some
powerful reasons for retaining some restrictions.
IV. DEALING WITH THE PERSISTENT OBJECTIONS
Perhaps it is because of the power of the metaphor of corporate
personhood on commercial speech discourse, 375 but a persistent
373 NELSON, supra note 131, at 133.
374 Another example of this phenomenon of defining for-profit commercial speech as
normatively neutral in contrast to non-commercial interests is the characterization in the now
defunct publication, Brill's Content, of Consumer's Union having a compromised "neutrality"
because it "accepted grant money from foundations with specific agendas-such as limiting the
use of pesticides" and then ran "stories supporting those foundations' goals." Jennifer
Greenstein, Testing Consumer Reports, BRILL'S CONTENT, Sept. 1999, at 72.
375 As Professor Mark Hager put it, "Social and legal struggles will continue to be iconic, that
is, metaphorical, struggles . . . .Antiprogressive conceptions must be fought with competing
conceptions.... Conceptual struggle will persist, even though it be recognized that these are
contests of metaphor and symbol, not of logic, and are won through eloquence and imagery, not
through showdowns in pure reason." Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of
Organizational "Real Entity" Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 575, 577 (1989). See also Steven L.
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objection raised to the argument advanced in this article, the idea that
for-profit corporations are legitimately subjected to different standards
than human beings or not-for-profit organizations, is that it involves
speaker discrimination-a sort of discrimination that some observers
have suggested is particularly inappropriate for government to engage
in. Even where critics concede that speaker discrimination is not per se
inappropriate, it may be argued that such discrimination is harmful
because of the difficulty in drawing lines between for-profit and not-for-
profit organizations or between corporations and other forms of
business organization. Since, the argument goes, that distinction is
impossible to make we ought to strap ourselves to the mast and keep the
government out of the business of making speaker discrimination a
basis for speech regulation.
As to the first objection, there is nothing inherently inappropriate
under existing doctrine about differing standards depending upon the
identity of the speaker. For example, differing standards have been
upheld with respect to attorneys 376 rather than other commercial
speakers or the public at large. Moreover, I frequently encounter the
objection that my argument would appear to deprive not-for-profit
groups, organized as corporations, of speech rights. "What about the
NAACP, the NRA?," they say. Furthermore, even if we grant a for-
profit/not-for-profit distinction, what prevents corporations such as
Wal-Mart or Phillip Morris from setting up not-for-profit corporations
to do their speaking for them? The answer to the first question,
distinguishing between the for-profit and the not-for-profit corporation,
is addressed at more length below. The answer to the second question,
corporate funded not-for-profits, is more difficult. It is not impossible
to draw distinctions, and the Supreme Court has done so. But effective
policing might require fundamental reorganization of the principles of
law governing corporations.
Opponents of regulating corporate speech also claim that
discriminating on the basis of marketing versus non-marketing content
Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137
U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1164 (1989) ("They [the courts] will not be able to purge metaphors from
their analyses, but will be driven to other metaphors."); Berger, supra note 183; Linda L. Berger,
Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions
on Campaign Finance Reform, 58 MERCER L. REv. 949 (2007).
376 Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc. 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (stating, "We believe that the Florida
Bar's 30-day restriction on targeted direct-mail solicitation of accident victims and their relatives
withstands scrutiny under the three-pronged Central Hudson test that we have devised for this
context. The Bar has substantial interest both in protecting injured Floridians from invasive
conduct by lawyers and in preventing the erosion of confidence in the profession that such
repeated invasions have engendered."); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 459
(1978) ("A lawyer's procurement of remunerative employment is a subject only marginally
affected with First Amendment concerns. It falls within the State's proper sphere of economic
and professional regulation.").
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is inappropriate content regulation. 377 This objection overlooks that
content discrimination by category-pornography, fighting words and
fraud-are already established areas of content regulation. Indeed, to
the extent that the commercial speech doctrine sets up commercial
speech as subject to a different analysis than political speech, it does
represent regulation on the basis of content.
Finally, proponents of balance point to available critiques in the
media of corporations like Nike as evidence that disingenuous or
misleading public relations efforts will ultimately fail because the truth
will come out, and, thus, concerns about overbreadth and governmental
overreaching should cause us to prefer overprotection of all speech,
including commercial speech, rather than overregulation, which risks
chilling some valuable speech. These are objections which raise good
questions but ultimately are not persuasive. 378
A. Speaker Discrimination and Line-Drawing
In the first place, the corporate entity is a legal creation, so one
response to the speaker discrimination objection is that discrimination is
not unjustified if it is well-founded in fact. This is not like the invidious
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or sexual orientation that
would offend human dignity and principles of equality. Corporations
are not human beings. They only have the qualities and the rights given
to them by law, no more, no less. And just as the law already
distinguishes between for-profit and not-for-profit, close and public
corporations, with differing rules applicable depending upon the status
of the corporation, it is not immediately obvious why, if a not-for-profit
is subject to different tax laws, it could not be subject to different
treatment for purposes of the First Amendment. 379  Indeed, such
differing treatment is already the law with respect to the political speech
of organizations and legal distinctions between the treatment of for-
profit and not-for-profit entities.
In First National Bank v. Bellotti, the Supreme Court suggested
that the speaker's identity as a corporation had no bearing on the value
377 As Robert Post has pointed out, "content-based regulation of speech is routinely enforced
without special constitutional scrutiny." Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2364 (2000).
378 It is worth noting that in both the Austin case and the MCFL case the Court was confronted
with not-for-profits. So the issue of distinguishing between types of corporate organizations and
organizations and individuals is one with which the Court already has grappled. See infra notes
381-389 and accompanying text.
379 In fact it is currently the case that not-for-profits organized as corporations may be
prohibited from some lobbying activities that are otherwise protected. This is exactly backwards.
2668 [Vol. 29:6
AGAINST FREEDOM
of its speech. 380 Later, however, the Court retreated from this very
strong stance that line drawing on the basis of speaker identity was
always inappropriate. In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,381 the
Court was faced with the question of whether a federal election funding
statute that required corporations to make contributions only from
special segregated accounts was applicable to a not-for-profit
organization. While the plurality decision found the statutory
limitations on for-profit corporations generally defensible on the
grounds the law's purpose to prevent "the unfair deployment of wealth
for political purposes," 382 was not implicated in by the not-for-profit
organization because "the concerns underlying the regulation of
corporate political activity [were] simply absent with regard to
MCFL." 383
The distinction between speakers was drawn even more finely in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.384  There the Court
reviewed the constitutionality of a state statute regulating corporate
expenditures from general treasury funds in support of or opposition to
a candidate. The organization challenging the law was not-for-profit,
but, unlike MCFL, it was one organized principally for the purposes of
advocacy. The Court found that despite the Chamber's not-for-profit
status, Michigan could apply the challenged law to the Chamber
because, on the facts, its organization and purpose was broader than that
in MCFL and it encompassed several purposes which were "not
inherently political. ' 385 The Court observed that, in contrast to MCFL
which had a policy of not accepting contributions from business
corporations, more than three-quarters of the Chamber's revenues came
from for-profit entities and that were it not to apply Michigan's law to
the Chamber, "[b]usiness corporations .. .could circumvent the Act's
restriction by funneling money through the Chamber's general
treasury." 386
What emerged from these two cases was a three-part test for
distinguishing between entities for purposes of limitations directed at
for-profit entities:
Whether the organization was "formed for the express purpose of
promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business
activities." 387 (Presumably this stands in contrast to the for-profit
corporation organized, pursuant to state law to engage in a lawful
380 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
381 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
382 Id. at 259.
383 Id. at 263.
384 Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
385 Id. at 662.
386 Id at 664.




The absence of shareholders or other persons with "a claim on its
earnings or assets" such that there will be "no economic disincentive
for disassociating with it if they [shareholders or members] disagree
with its political activity. 388
The independence of the organization from business interests. (This
prong invites scrutiny of the organization's source of funds to
prevent as noted above, circumvention of the law by simply
channeling contributions to captured nonprofits.) 389
If this sort of line drawing is permitted in the context of limitations
on corporate political speech, 390 it is surely not nonsensical or
indefensible in the area of commercial speech generally. Because of
differing legal structures, there are very real differences in the incentive
structures of for-profit and not-for-profit that make differing treatment
as to status sensible in the commercial speech context. Indeed, with
respect to not-for-profit corporations you might say that unless the
organization is funded by commercial interests, there could be a
presumption (perhaps rebuttable) that its speech is not "commercial."
The reverse seems appropriate of for-profit corporations.
As discussed above, the way in which corporations operate offers a
basis for distinguishing between them and human beings.
Compared to noncorporate businesses, the corporate structure creates
two problems for this supplemental means [social and moral
sanctions] of regulating conduct: (1) Shareholders are insulated from
the exposure and knowledge that creates social and moral sanctions,
and (2) shareholders have collective action problems that make it
difficult for them to act on any social or moral impulses they do feel.
Managerial conduct that perfectly represented shareholders would
thus tend to produce socially suboptimal conduct. 39 1
If one were to judge by the tidal wave of socially suboptimal
conduct that has lately become apparent, one might be justified in
concluding that, in general, management has been representing the
fictional shareholder too well.
The coverage of corporations under the First Amendment is a
matter of finding a theoretical fit between the purpose of the amendment
and the nature of corporations. But corporations have no organic
nature. 392 They have the form they are given and thus whether their
388 Id. at 663 (citing MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264).
389 Id. at 663-64 (citing MCFL, 479 at 264).
390 For a much more comprehensive discussion of the existing restrictions on corporations'
contribution to political discourse, see Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign
Finance: Incorporating Corporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 7-27 (2001).
391 Elhauge, supra note 115, at 740 (emphasis added).
392 It may be that groups, including corporations, exhibit phenomena that suggest some
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nature fits the purpose depends on their legal construction. Seen in that
light, rather than as organic creatures with some mysterious natural
essence, distinguishing between for-profit and not-for-profit
corporations does not seem as problematic. Corporate law governs the
purposes for which corporations are formed-for-profit or not-for-
profit-which in turn dictates the applicable legal structure that
describes a permissible range of actions in furtherance of those
purposes. That seems a natural place to draw the line for speech
protection. Treating all corporations as equal persons because all
human beings are equal persons seems to reify the corporate person.
"[R]eification is a device for making something that is in fact complex
seem simple, and that can be dangerous. In reality, only individuals
enjoy benefits, or bear the burdens and responsibilities, of actions
affecting other individuals. '393 While it is obviously oversimplified to
add to that quotation that "only individuals have opinions or speech
rights," given that not-for-profit organizations are often organized
precisely for generating speech, the conclusion that all organizations
should have speech rights also does not follow.
The Framers noted the potential for large, for-profit, organizations
to accumulate the type of power that can threaten the stability of
democracy. 394 In the late nineteenth century the growth of massive trust
arrangements that exercised enormous market power with detrimental
social effects resulted in governmental action trust-busting devices such
as the Sherman Antitrust Act.395 Thus, "[i]t is . . . sensible for a
Constitution which defends individual free expression and associational
freedom to recognize free expression rights for many organizational
entities but not for corporate capital. ' 396 For example,
[in] a union vote, persons are equal. In a corporate vote, shares of
capital are equal, but persons are unequal according to how much
capital they respectively own. The corporate voice then, represents
not a plurality and a unity of people or citizens, but a plurality and
unity of capital.397
But this argument does not avoid the practical objection that
organic elements or systematic characteristics. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971). However, saying groups have some dynamics that we might
analogize to an organic character is a far cry from saying they have the same dignitary rights
accorded human beings.
393 KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 132, at 118.
394 See, for example, Jefferson's reference to "the aristocracy of monied corporations" as a
"challenge to our government" quoted in NACE, supra note 133, at 46.
395 For a description of the rise and fall of the trusts and what he calls the "robbers and the
barons," see Steven Harmon Wilson, Ph.D., Malefactors of Great Wealth: A Short History of
"Aggressive" Accounting, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra
note 27, at 41-61.




definitional borders are nevertheless permeable. And when it is difficult
to sort out news from promotion or art from product placement, not
every case may be so easy to resolve. Some groups may represent real
mixed-purpose entities even more difficult to pigeonhole than the
Chamber of Commerce. 398 Corporations fund real grass roots and not-
for-profit organizations as well as astroturf organizations and front
operations. How are we to tell the difference? And who should be
trusted to make the distinctions? If the local mom and pop grocery store
wants to protest government zoning regulations and add the prominence
and power of its trade name in lieu of the perhaps less well known
names of the individual owners, should that be permissible? Does the
argument to deny for-profit corporations the protection of the First
Amendment start us down a slippery slope in which some valuable
speech will be regulated away?
This is a problem Professor Shiffrin describes as the bias problem.
And it is real. Moreover, it is often difficult to recognize bias when it
exists. 399 The bias problem is not, however, an insurmountable problem
because in fact the bias problem is one which we regularly encounter in
the law. The objection about speaker discrimination is one that goes to
the heart of our more cherished illusions about the potential of law for
establishing certainty. The objection seems so persuasive when offered
in the context of this question of protection for speech. Yet when one
looks more closely, it is clear that almost all of the law is made up of
such difficult line-drawing exercises. 400 And the argument that we must
protect the for-profit corporation's speech because we cannot tell where
to draw the line as between for-profit and not-for-profit and mixed-
purpose groups is an objection that does not withstand close scrutiny-
as reflected in the cases discussed above as well as many others. The
law already makes many distinctions between for-profit and not-for-
profit, between types of business (such regulated monopolies), and
between businesses on the basis of size, location, and revenues. For
example, certain aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley are only applicable to
companies above a certain size. In September of 2005, the Securities
and Exchange Commission extended a second extension of time for
small business to comply with certain of the provisions of Sarbanes
Oxley. 40 1 "Small" is defined as companies with "a market capitalization
398 This is a problem which I discuss in greater detail in Tamara R. Piety, "Flogging,"
"Fronting," and Fakery: Corporate Public Relations Advocacy Research Groups and Commercial
Speech, (Feb. 16, 2007) (draft manuscript, on file with author).
399 Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 1272-73.
400 For example, how is one to tell legitimate discipline of an employee from retaliatory
discipline for the employee's whistle blowing activities? Does the right to bear arms mean the
right to bear nuclear arms? What standard of care is reasonable?
401 Carrie Johnson, Small Firms Get More Time on Sarbanes-Oxley Rules,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Sept. 22, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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of less than $75 million."40 2
As with all line drawing exercises, the question could be raised,
"Why $75 million and not $65 million or $100 million?" Drawing a
bright line always runs the risk of over- and under-inclusiveness such
that some of the cases included in the scope of the rule's application do
not actually raise the risk of the evils that the rule is meant to address
and that some of the cases meant to be controlled by the rule fall outside
of its operation. That is not however a reason not to draw a line. It does
not seem at all absurd to suggest that there may be material and
significant differences between for-profit and not-for-profit, between the
corner grocery store and Time Warner, differences that matter for
purposes of the First Amendment.
So the issue, properly understood, is whether there is more harm to
be anticipated by drawing the line as I propose, to exclude for-profit
corporations, or at least large, for-profit corporations, from obtaining
any more speech rights than those announced in the Virginia Pharmacy
case-that is, protection for truthful, non-misleading statements-than
might flow from lifting the ability of the government to regulate speech
in aid of commerce. A parallel inquiry might be whether the benefits
anticipated from the regulation of speech exceed the costs or whether,
conversely, the benefits of freedom of commercial expression outweigh
any costs. Given the harms reviewed here, despite the lack of full
protection for commercial speech, it would seem that the dangers of
more protection are obvious while the potential benefits of more
protection may be more dubious.
Certainly, it would seem to be the case that those opposing
regulation in the public interest have the obligation to show that there is
a less restrictive alternative that does not entail resignation to a
categorical prohibition on regulation. This is especially true when we
have historically recognized the value of reasonable regulation in the
interest of not just of protecting the market, but of protecting the speech
rights of the real as against the fictitious.
To be sure, just as when the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan
drew a line of actual malice for sustaining libel claims against public
officials on matters of public concern, it was possible that some
meritorious claims would be lost, some libels would go unpunished and
perhaps some new, unanticipated evil would arise as a result which
might require a reassessment of the standard in light of that evil,
[although so far it has not], this proposal, to reject the notion of freedom
for commercial expression, may run into future difficulties. But to





difficulty as to how to draw the line in some future cases not yet
brought seems wrong when the dangers and problems arising from the
current system are so manifest and more protection seems likely to
exacerbate rather than alleviate those harms. It cannot be
overemphasized that what is at issue here is whether to hand over a
constitutional shield to commercial interests for speech contrary to the
public interest. 40 3 Do we really want GlaxoSmithKline to have a First
Amendment defense to its efforts to market Paxil for off-label uses?
B. Content Discrimination
Some observers argue that offering promotional speech less First
Amendment protection than political or expressive speech is
inappropriate content discrimination. Given that by its terms the
commercial speech doctrine sets up a content distinction, this objection
is really an argument that the Court in Virginia Pharmacy should have
recognized the speech at issue as completely protected, rather than
setting up an intermediate status for commercial speech.
But couching this objection in terms of content discrimination
elides the fact that prior to Virginia Pharmacy (and indeed to a large
extent afterwards) this was acceptable content discrimination.
Promotional (or commercial) speech was simply not thought to be
covered by the First Amendment at all. That the doctrine recognized
different types of speech necessarily meant that some content
discrimination would be built into the logical structure of First
Amendment analysis. It was only the marginal expansion of protection
in satisfaction of a public purpose that opened the door to claims that
the courts or legislatures could not continue to reconsider the issue as
one not dictated by the most expansive understanding of first
amendment norms, but by the narrowest.
So if commercial communication is not covered, it seems difficult
to say that extending limited protection is engaging in content
discrimination. By its terms, the Amendment acts as a restraint on
government. Even within the framework of the restraint on
government, exceptions were made for certain types of speech: libel,
obscenity, sedition, treason, etc. Virginia Pharmacy had the effect of
extending limited First Amendment protection to a previously
uncovered content category-commercial speech.
Therefore we must undertake the question of the permissibility of
content discrimination from the standpoint that the existing law permits
403 See Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Markets & Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law,
74 UMKC L. REv. 41 (2005).
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content discrimination in this area. Commercial speech is defined by its
content.404 Thus, the question is not whether we shall initiate content
discrimination, but whether content discrimination of this type is
rational and should be extended, modified, or abolished. The Virginia
Pharmacy Court began from the premise that commercial speech is less
critical to the values the First Amendment was intended to protect than
other types of speech that were protected. But it concluded that this did
not mean that commercial speech was of no value. Even though, as was
noted in other contexts, the Constitution does not require subscription to
any particular economic theory, the Court found there was some social
benefit to be derived from not unduly restricting speech in the
commercial context. The Court found some value, coupled with a keen
public interest, in certain types of commercial speech-truthful
commercial speech.
This holding distinguishes commercial speech from core
expressive speech which is protected not because of its content or who
the speaker is but because protection for it furthers human freedom.
And commercial speech by corporations offered to further their interests
in the marketplace is very different from that of an organization of
persons, such as the ACLU, formed for the purpose of political
participation. Just as is so often recited in other contexts, false speech
has never been protected for its own sake, the question is whether there
is some countervailing reason to protect the false speech? In the
political context, as the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan noted,
protection for even false statements in politics allows for vigorous
debate, the airing of all views, etc. It furthers individuals' self-
expression and protects the expression of dissident viewpoints.
But what value does false commercial speech protect? False
commercial speech may give the speaker a commercial advantage, but
that is not a socially desirable one. This is one reason fraud has never
been protected. To attempt to shield what would otherwise be a
fraudulent statement by dressing it up as protected expressive speech is
really an attempt to conflate categories of speech in order to deflect
legitimate regulation.
Freedom for commercial expression should not be expanded
beyond the current doctrine, and the current doctrine ought to be
interpreted more capaciously to include all for-profit motivated,
promotional speech that takes place under the umbrella of marketing.
Let it be left to the facts of the particular case whether some speech is
404 There is some dispute about this. But to the extent that commercial speech is only protected
under the doctrine if it is true, it seems that whatever else commercial speech is, the test as it
stands is content-based to the extent it must be truthful. Compare Weinstein, supra note 269,
with Bruce E. H. Johnson & Jeffrey L. Fisher, Why Format, Not Content, is the Key to Identifying
Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1243 (2004).
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primarily marketing. Presumably, in the process of hearing such cases,
facts heretofore not considered can be analyzed with an eye to whether
or not they fit primarily in the marketing category or primarily in the
political speech category, and the outlines of the doctrine can be further
sketched out. This is the way a common law system works.
As Justice Holmes observed in Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles
of policy which are other than those on which the particular right is
founded, and which becomes strong enough to hold their own when
a certain point is reached. The limits set to property by other public
interests present themselves as a branch of what is called the police
power of the state. The boundary at which the conflicting interests
balance cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, but
points in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions
that this or that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side.40 5
According to Professor Gerald Torres:
What Holmes was describing is the way in which policy is created
both logically and prudentially. He was articulating a system for
recognizing when a particular position is of doubtful authority. By
referring to a system of rights (and within it a system for their
evolution), he was rejecting a sterile search for first principles,
because he was conscious of the fact that so-called first principles are
never unmediated. The way in which they are mediated (the way in
which we recognize their legitimate evolution) is by constantly
comparing the principle in question with the "neighboring"
principles that are not in question in this case, but which describe the
boundaries of the issue under consideration. Too great a deviation
from the norms described by the family of principles suggests the
potential illegitimacy of the deviation. Importantly, it does not
foreclose that "deviation" for all time, necessarily, but cabins it when
the deviation would render a system of principled restraint unstable.
This approach to the problems of the extent of governmental
regulatory power reveals the constellation of rights, powers,
liabilities, and immunities as a dynamic system, not as the mere
ordinal ranking of predetermined claims. That such a dynamic
approach to analysis and adjudication leaves much undecided is not a
demerit and, in fact, is an important value. 40 6
Professor Steve Shiffrin makes a similar claim when he argues for
an eclectic balancing with respect to First Amendment questions
implicating economic regulation. 40 7 Rather than adhering to a particular
value, "the Court has been generous about the range of values relevant
405 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
406 Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Public Power, Public Value, and Private Right, 26
ENVTL. L. 1, 24 (1996).
407 Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 1251-82.
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in first amendment theory, and unreceptive to those who seek to confine
it to a particular favorite. '40 8 Moreover, the "Court has been [properly
in Shiffrin's view] eclectic about the tests it employs in differing
contexts. ' '40 9 "[T]he structure of first amendment doctrine varies from
context to context," Shiffrin observes. And that is a good thing because,
[t]he nature of social reality is too complex to expect that any single
vision, value, or technique could meet the needs of society. '410
C. Balance, Overbreadth, and the Media as Watchdogs
Some argue that my proposed definition of commercial speech
subject to regulation is overbroad and will prohibit or burden speech
that should be protected. Given this concern, the argument goes, it is
better to allow the speech and rely on the media to uncover deceptive
practices and to call to account firms that attempt to deceive the market.
According to these observers the Nike case itself is an example of
the wisdom of this approach because (according to some observers) few
consumers credited Nike's claims of better labor practices and it
continued to get negative coverage in the press despite its public
relations campaign. 411 There are several reasons why this argument is
unpersuasive. First, there are structural reasons to believe that reliance
on the media to correct and publicize misstatements is misplaced-the
principal structural concern being that of the dependence of much of the
traditional media on advertising revenue makes it vulnerable to pressure
regarding editorial content from those advertisers. 412 Second, there is
abundant evidence to support the proposition that those structural
incentives operate to keep much negative information out of the
mainstream media, suggesting that cases such as Nike's, where a large
corporation is subjected to some testing of their claims as well as
trenchant criticism, are more the exception than the rule.413
408 Id. at 1252.
409 Id.
410 Id.
411 This is no longer true. Now Nike regularly appears on some "best corporations" lists.
Whether this is a result of substantive changes or better P.R. is not clear. Some critics say it is
only the latter.
412 See, e.g., BAKER, ADVERTISING, supra note 139, at 44-70; MCCHESNEY, supra note 15.
413 See, e.g., MCCHESNEY, supra note 15, at 58-59. One notable case of suppression is the
saga of Jane Akre and Steve Wilson, investigative journalists who alleged they were retaliated
against by Fox News for questioning the widespread marketing of Monsanto's rBGH (Bovine
Growth Hormone) product to dairy farmers and the negative consequences for the public health.
Akre and Wilson won the Goldman environmental prize for this reporting. The Goldman
Environmental Prize, http://www.goldmanprize.org/node/65 (last visited Aug. 13, 2007). And at
least one book was written on the suppression of reporting (although only some of the
suppressions were alleged to have resulted from advertising pressure or fear of it). KILLED:
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According to Judge Richard Posner, news itself is a commodity
like everything else. "Being profit-driven, the media respond to the
actual demands of their audience rather than to the idealized 'thirst for
knowledge' demand posited by public intellectuals and deans of
journalism schools. ' 414 However, he theorizes that fortunately, for
those who are interested in the truth, there is nevertheless "a market
demand for correcting the errors and ferreting out the misdeeds of one's
enemies . "415
One's assessment of the efficacy of the market as a checking
function on misinformation may depend upon the time frame one uses.
For example, it is clearly the case that the manifold detrimental health
consequences of smoking became undeniably manifest over time. But
that time frame constitutes several decades, perhaps more than half a
century between the time that the tobacco companies were aware of
those negative health consequences and when they were prepared to
acknowledge or disclose them. And marketing efforts to sell cigarettes
and to soft-pedal the dangers continue to this day. It is difficult to say
how many lives might have been saved if the truth had been more
readily available earlier and these companies not been permitted to
engage in the manipulation of public information for so long.
Similarly, the market correction did not come soon enough for
many of Enron's stockholders, employees, creditors, and investors.4
16
In fact, it is probably fair to say that it was not solely those with a direct
investment in Enron who felt the pain of its collapse but, rather, that it
caused widespread market shocks that rippled through the economy as a
whole. Whether these were ultimately salutary remains to be seen. And
however much it may be argued that in the case of Enron the signs were
there for all to see for some time, it seems worth asking whether the
signs would have been clearer were Enron not permitted to engage in
some of the techniques of obfuscation and promotional activities in
question which it used. Nor is the market for truth likely to be sufficient
in the future with respect to any future "Enrons." When things are
going well for a company it seems Enron demonstrates that naysayers
may have a difficult time being heard.417
In addition, the news media have become so dependent upon the
corporations themselves for the information about companies that too
often their reporters rely exclusively on information from the companies
GREAT JOURNALISM TOO HOT TO PRINT (David Wallis ed., 2004).
414 Posner, supra note 265, at 9.
415 Id. at 9-10.
416 They did arise eventually. The Enron story apparently was broken by an inquisitive
Fortune reporter, Bethany McLean. See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 122 (Gladwell, NEW
YORKER with blog response).




themselves rather than on independent newsgathering. 418  Such
information is supplied largely in the form of press releases, web
postings, press conferences, and other public relations tools. And much
of the content of those releases is unregulated. Moreover, there is no
entity with a clear economic motive to protect the environment, to
prevent the adulteration of drugs or food, to promote equality, or to
preserve many other public goods, both tangible and intangible such
that we can anticipate that there will be a vigorous competition in the
marketplace of ideas over certain issues in which no single entity has an
economic interest.
D. Size Matters
Another objection to regulating the truthfulness of commercial
speech where the company is large and multinational is some version of
an argument that the corporation's size makes it unreasonable to require
it to be strictly accurate in all its public representations. The objection
is often stated in relationship to some allegation of intentionality versus
negligence. It was raised by Nike in Nike v. Kasky 4 19 and has been
raised by Wal-Mart in the class action gender discrimination suit filed
against it.420 It may indeed be true that size inhibits the ability of a
corporation to manage its information. 421 But it is not clear why that is
a reason to absolve the company of liability. As the Supreme Court in
Virginia Pharmacy noted, the corporation is surely the entity with the
most knowledge about the truth or falsity of its own claims or practices.
The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be more easily
verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or
political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to
disseminate information about a specific product or service that he
himself provides and presumably knows more about than anyone
else. Also, commercial speech may be more durable than other
kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits,
there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and
418 See, e.g., STAUBER & RAMPTON, supra note 131, at 179-96.
419 "[Clompanies are invariably hesitant to react when called on, as Nike has been here, to
make on-the-spot responses to accusations-in this case, accusations about the more than half-
million individuals employed not by it but by its subcontractors halfway around the world. Those
responses will predictably be chilled first by delay while the speaker seeks to verify all the facts
.... .Brief for the Petitioners at 40, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
420 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 222 F.R.D. 137, 142 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (Wal-Mart sought to
decertify a gender discrimination class on the grounds of its size). For more discussion of the
case and the evidence of significant centralization of operating policies at Wal-Mart, see Melissa
Hart, Learning From Wal-Mart (Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. Working Paper No. 06-36, 2006),
available at http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/pubpdfs/hart/HartWalMart.pdf.
421 See, e g., Langevoort, supra note 120, at 119-24.
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forgone entirely. 422
The claims a corporation makes are claims presumptively made
with the motive of influence public behavior or attitudes favorable to
itself. It does not seem unfair to hold a corporation to the truth and
accuracy of statements about itself, particularly when those statements
are made in the interest of self promotion.
Moreover, it is precisely because the size of the largest
corporations offers them the opportunity to have a disproportionate
effect on the public and the economy at large that it is important that
there be some check on their ability to manipulate public opinion. No
individual can match the resources marshaled by the largest
corporations to pursue their projects. And the power wielded by such
entities has been a matter of some concern for American corporate law




Finally, as noted above, the argument has been made by Nike and
others that the failure to protect speech like Nike's response to the
criticisms of its labor practices will have a chilling effect on a
corporation's willingness to offer information. In its case brief to the
Supreme Court, Nike pointed to the fact that it had not released its
Social Responsibility Report because of its fears about potential liability
as evidence that the chilling effect was not speculative but real.424
There is reason to be skeptical though about Nike's claims that it
did not release its reports because of fear of future litigation rather than
as an attempt to bolster its case in that litigation because it has
subsequently released these reports, even though California law remains
unaltered (except for the removal of the private attorneys' general
portion of the relevant laws). Nike continues to post social
responsibility information on its web site and to send its representatives
to participate in panel discussions like one with this author that took
place at the University of Miami.425 Presumably it would not do this if
its representatives actually feared the company was at risk.
But there is a more fundamental reason why the arguments about
422 Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
423 Strine, Jr., supra note 186, at 11-21. See also Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to
Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 179 (2005); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An
Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002).
424 See, e.g., La Fetra, supra note 144, at 1226-28.




the chilling effect are ultimately unpersuasive. And they relate to the
structural incentives. In the first place, as the Virginia Pharmacy Court
itself noted, there is reason to suppose that the incentive to promote
one's product or service offers a fairly compelling counterbalance to
"appropriate regulation." 426 Such appropriate regulation might fairly be
a requirement that commercial communications be truthful.
And although as subsequent commentators noted it may be that
commercial entities are too easily "chilled" by the specter of economic
loss in that they may suppress valuable speech when it appears that it
might be unprofitable,427 thus (so some say) dragging culture to the
lowest common denominator of commercial acceptability 428 rather than
offering a broader palate of artistic and political choices, it seems
unlikely that broader immunity for false speech or less regulation is
likely to significantly change that calculus. And as previously noted,
the means and incentives to vigorously litigate the boundaries of speech
as property in intellectual property law exerts a fairly powerfully
chilling effect of its own in the other direction. 429 Moreover, it is
precisely that heightened sensitivity to the disclosure of unpopular or
unfavorable information that might lead us to believe, at least in the
realm of commerce, that we are better off not extending protection too
broadly.
Still, for reasons explored above relating to the size of the
enterprise and inherent uncertainty in the application of the law, it might
be argued that this uncertainty will lead the enterprise to err on the side
of caution as Nike claimed it was doing. However, the evidence
suggests that existing penalties have not been sufficient to deter many of
the largest, most important companies from violating the law on
numerous occasions. 430  This is not surprising since it is "[t]he
possibility of imprisonment coupled with the stigma and disabilities
426 Va Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
427 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 633 (1982).
428 And in some cases representing a loss of valuable, truthful information as when two
networks refused to carry an advertisement for condoms because their representatives apparently
felt the advertisement was too racy and over-emphasized the contraceptive aspects of condom
use. Andrew Adam Newman, Pigs With Cellphones, but No Condoms, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18, 2007
at C6. According to a Fox representative, one of the networks rejecting the advertisement,
"Contraceptive advertising must stress health-related uses rather than the prevention of
pregnancy." Id. One is tempted to say, "Sez who?" Why should Fox be the arbiter of how
condom use should be advertised? It may simply be deciding for itself and anticipating what it
thinks its viewers want. But when there is more unanimity on a topic as there often is with what
constitutes material that is controversial or unsuitable for broadcast, the dominance of commercial
media will mean the information is far less likely to be conveyed effectively. And it illustrates
again that although governmental orthodoxy is something to be feared, restraints on government
do not remove all the sources ofpotential chill on valuable speech.
429 William A. Wines & Terence J. Lau, Can You Hear Me Now?-Corporate Censorship and
Its Troubling Implications for the First Amendment, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 119(2005).
430 See supra notes 241-242 (regarding Bakan's list of citations against GE).
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which accompany a criminal conviction [that] will most often lead an
individual to view the criminal penalties as more harmful than a civil
sanction. '43' But as we have observed, a legal fiction cannot really be
deterred by shame or imprisonment since it has no self to be imprisoned
or shamed. So much of the chill is warded off by the absence of the
strongest part of the calculus related to chilling effect. For if the
penalties are largely economic they become merely one more economic
factor to weigh in the balance against the potential economic benefit of
speaking.
There is more to the chilling effect doctrine than the outcome of
the calculus on whether to speak or not to speak. The doctrine
represents a presumption that something valuable is lost as the speech is
chilled. We might trust market incentives to provide a strong enough
impetus for truthful speech where the potential benefit is likely to be
great and, because it is truthful, the potential liability is less than that
which is knowingly false. Moreover, by their nature business decisions
are often more easily quantifiable in terms of profits and losses in a way
that political or personal decisions often are not. So the problem is with
the middle, that potentially valuable speech the truth or falsity of which
is ambiguous-it is the fear of chilling that speech which is most at
issue. Is something valuable being lost?
If the protection for expression is the value of the expression as a
human being the answer would seem to be "no" since, although the
expression is created by human beings, it is not of a human being and all
that entails. If the government wants Exxon-Mobil or Shell's views on
global warming it may ask for it and extend immunity in exchange for a
statement. But if Exxon-Mobil or Shell wants to offer facts about
global warming to promote its economic welfare, it does not seem
unfair to ask that these facts be true. It will not have any motivation
other than its welfare to offer them. And it does not seem unfair that the
risks assumed should that speech be false or misleading, be
commensurate with the economic gain that they stand to receive and the
greater potential for harm flowing from the decisions of major actors in
commerce than that of individuals or those entities which do not stand
to gain.
[I]t must be recognized that any rule will produce some excess
deterrence and thus, some chilling effect. Therefore, to say that a
regulation is unconstitutional because it has a chilling effect on
protected activity is to say virtually nothing at all. What we must
look for is some way of determining under what circumstances the
inevitable chilling effect becomes great enough to require judicial
invalidation of legislative enactments, or to justify the creation of
substantive rules that recognize and account for the invidious




At the same time,
[o]bviously one could eliminate all first amendment error by
deeming every utterance protected, regardless of its potential harm.
By so doing, we would minimize or eliminate the more harmful
error, but at an unacceptable social cost, and with an unacceptable
increase in the error over overprotection.433
CONCLUSION
Having once named the corporate form as a "person," it may be
difficult to turn back. Metaphors like the legal "personhood" of
corporations and "the marketplace of ideas" have enduring power 434 and
can apparently, even in the minds of the most intelligent observers,
represent a more appealing starting point of analysis than one grounded
in an analysis of observed reality. But in the case of corporate speech
and commercial speech, that metaphor has taken over the doctrine and
moved the courts and observers away from the grounds on which
limited protection was offered to commercial expression in the first
place-protection of consumers' autonomy rights to make their own
decisions with all the truthful information-and toward a freestanding
entitlement for corporations to be free of governmental regulation of
their communications. To the extent that this would shield untruthful
communications, it represents a perversion of the doctrine.
Large corporations have as much or more influence on our lives
than the governments under which we live. They influence what we
aspire to be, how to order our lives, how to allocate time between work
and leisure, how to allocate income between consumption and savings,
what we think is attractive in a mate or in ourselves, what we think our
weddings should look like, and how we feel about ourselves given our
looks and possessions. They frame some of our most urgent desires and
tell us what we ought to think is important. They play a large role in the
election of political candidates. They may even have a role in
manipulating war and peace. They accumulate massive amounts of
wealth and wield substantial influence with governments in a way that
few individuals or any political coalition have ever done before or could
ever hope to do. Their access to the media-the means of
communicating-affect our ability to fully understand and frame the
issues or to make choices.
432 Id. at 701.
433 Id. at 732 (emphasis added).
434 See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIvE BY (1980); Winter, supra
note 375.
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Yet, although there are many positive consequences arising from
corporate energy and the dedication of these vast resources to satisfying
human needs, the frames they supply often affect our health, the
environment, and our emotional lives in profoundly negative ways.
Despite this already profound influence, large, multinational
corporations seek to use the metaphor of corporate personhood to shield
themselves from the costs of these activities so as to take advantage of
the rhetorical power of the notion of protection of freedom of
expression as contributing to human flourishing and central to a
democracy. As Professor Shiner puts it, "[t]he predatory attempt by
corporations to appropriate" notions of protection for freedom of
expression as contributing to human flourishing and central to
democracy in order to perpetuate their dominance in our lives "needs to
be exposed as the conceptual and normative fraud that it is.'435
In Bellotti the Court noted.that:
According to the appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful
and their views may drown out other points of view. If appellee's
arguments were supported by record or legislative findings that
corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic
processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment
interests, these arguments would merit our consideration. But there
has been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has been
overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in
Massachusetts, or that there has been any threat to the confidence of
the citizenry in govemment.436
If this was an invitation I would say that if the evidence did not
exist before, it does now. It is time to reframe the debate and to see
commercial speech as it is, not as we wish it to be and to reassert the
worth of human beings over the institutions meant to serve them.
435 SHINER, supra note 129, at 3.
436 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1978) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
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